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Viewing cable 07SEOUL1141, PRIVATE BROADCASTING TO NORTH KOREA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SEOUL1141 2007-04-19 07:29 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1141/01 1090729
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190729Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3978
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2358
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7973
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2467
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
UNCLAS SEOUL 001141 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV PINR KS KN
SUBJECT: PRIVATE BROADCASTING TO NORTH KOREA 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Fueled by foreign funding, three 
Seoul-based radio stations are broadcasting news, information 
about defection, entertainment and other programming into the 
DPRK via shortwave platforms located overseas.  The three -- 
Free NK Radio (FreeNK), Open Radio for North Korea 
(OpenRadio) and Radio Free Chosun (RFC) -- have emerged in 
response to a perception that ROKG broadcasts to the North 
have become "diluted" by the Sunshine Policy and that Voice 
of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) are "too 
American."  Although the extent of the DPRK shortwave radio 
audience is unknown, proponents believe that the availability 
of inexpensive radios from China and a weakening of central 
government control may make broadcasting an increasingly 
viable way of reaching out to the North Korean people.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
ROKG BROADCASTING TO NORTH KOREA 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) ROKG official broadcasting is conducted through the 
Korean Broadcasting Service (KBS).  Producer Park Myung-gyu 
told us that the KBS began its DPRK broadcasting in 1948 as 
the "Free Sound of Korea," an anti-Communist effort targeting 
ethnic Koreans in North Korea, China and the USSR.  KBS 
changed the name to the Social Education Service (SES) in 
1972 pursuant to a North-South agreement that the two 
countries would not slander one another.  KBS directs its 
programs not specifically to the DPRK, but rather to ethnic 
Koreans living in Northeast Asia. 
 
3. (SBU) Park said that, in accordance with the Sunshine 
Policy, SES has modified its programs over the past decade to 
reflect the ROKG's focus on promoting reconciliation and 
cooperation with the DPRK.  Its current objective is to 
inform ethnic Koreans about regional current events, 
religion, and ROK pop culture. Some programming, however, is 
tailored to a North Korean audience.  A program called 
"Unification Train," for example, invites resettled North 
Koreans to discuss their experiences, while another program, 
"Faces We Long to See, Voices We Long to Hear," focuses on 
the stories of separated families.  SES broadcasts 24-hours 
per day. 
 
PRIVATE BROADCASTING FILLS VOID LEFT BY SUNSHINE POLICY 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
4.  (SBU) FreeNK, OpenRadio, and RFC have emerged -- with 
substantial assistance from the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) -- in response to a perception that SES 
programming has become too diluted under recent ROK 
administrations.  The ROKG is too concerned about upsetting 
the DPRK, explained one station representative.  Another 
pointed out that SES is of only limited effectiveness because 
it neither focuses on the DPRK, nor uses North Korean 
defectors as announcers.  While the broadcasters were 
generally supportive of VOA and RFA, which broadcast between 
three and four hours of Korean-language programming per day, 
some thought that the two stations were too closely 
associated with the United States to attract a widespread 
North Korean audience. 
 
FREE NK RADIO 
------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) FreeNK is a shortwave station (11750 kHz) which 
broadcasts daily from 19:00 until 20:00 and, starting from 
May 1, from 05:30 until 06:30 at 7390 kHz.  This relatively 
short broadcast period is based on available funding. 
Programming, which Director Kim Seong-min characterized as 
"mental food" for North Koreans, typically involves 
interviews with resettled North Koreans or North Korea 
specialists about the DPRK, current events, separated 
families, advice about defection, warnings about human 
trafficking, and success stories from successfully resettled 
North Koreans.  According to Kim, the station strives to 
produce objective and accurate reports that would allow North 
Korean listeners to make their own decisions.  FreeNK also 
broadcasts entertainment programming, such as a drama based 
on anecdotes from one of Kim Jong-il's bodyguards. 
 
6.  (SBU) Six of FreeNK's ten staff members are resettled 
North Koreans, including one who used to be an announcer in 
the DPRK.  According to Kim, North Korean listeners feel more 
comfortable with North Korean broadcasters and are more 
likely to trust the message if it is delivered in a familiar 
accent.  The programs are recorded in Seoul on digital MP3 
files and sent to VT Group, a British company which operates 
a commercial shortwave radio network.  Kim said that VT Group 
broadcasts the programs into the DPRK from Taiwan. 
 
7.  (SBU) As an indicator of success, Kim noted that the DPRK 
in official media has denounced FreeNK as "trash" and advised 
that FreeNK's building "should be blown up."  Kim, though 
proud of the recognition, takes these threats seriously.  He 
said that leftist South Korean groups, such as Tongilyeondae 
and Hancheongyon, have organized protests, sometimes violent, 
in front of FreeNK's office.  According to Kim, FreeNK has 
also received threatening phone calls and packages, including 
a bloody ax.  Two plainclothes police officers are at all 
times stationed in front of FreeNK offices, which are 
unmarked. 
 
8.  (SBU) Domestic political opposition has made funding 
difficult.  Kim said that he at first relied primarily on 
defector donations, which were insufficient.  FreeNK was able 
to begin regular broadcasts after it received a USD 150,000 
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) grant in 2005.  It 
received another USD 200,000 from NED in 2006, and an 
additional USD 20,000 from Freedom House.  Kim was upbeat 
about funding prospects for 2007.  He said that FreeNK might 
receive USD 300,000 from the Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights and Labor through a grant arranged by the Defense 
Freedom Forum.  In addition, he was optimistic that FreeNK 
could sell advertising on its website. 
 
OPEN RADIO FOR NORTH KOREA 
-------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Echoing FreeNK's President Kim, OpenRadio President 
Young Howard said that his station also provides "food for 
the North Korean mind."  Howard said that although OpenRadio 
implicitly works for regime change in the DPRK, its public 
purpose is to promote conversation between the people of 
North and South Korea, which is necessary for "true 
reconciliation" between the two Koreas.  OpenRadio, which 
operates out of a storefront marked "Construction," has been 
on the air since July 2006, has a staff of six, and currently 
broadcasts from 23:00 to 24:00 at 7390 kHz. 
 
10.  (SBU) Unlike FreeNK, OpenRadio generally does not 
produce its own material, but instead airs content provided 
by 10 non-governmental organizations, including Freedom House 
and the International Republican Institute, and 15 
universities.  OpenRadio programming generally consists of 
drama, music, education, health care, news, language 
instruction, or civic education.  In a typical civic 
education program, defectors and South Koreans would talk 
about different types of political systems and compare the 
South and North Korean systems.  Howard said that because 
North Koreans are most concerned about their finances, 
OpenRadio also broadcasts a program on how to make money. 
OpenRadio sends the digitally formatted programming to VT 
Group for transmission into North Korea from sites in 
Malaysia, Taiwan, Kyrgyzstan, and elsewhere. 
 
11.  (SBU) OpenRadio's support base tends to be more 
progressive than FreeNK's mostly conservative backers because 
any individual or group can participate by contributing 
content.  As a result, said Howard, OpenRadio has attracted 
student and other groups who "think it's a humanitarian 
project."  Howard said that Radio 21, a pro-Roh Moo-hyun 
organization, is one of its contributors.  Financially, 
OpenRadio receives USD 200,000 from NED, USD 25,000 from 
Freedom House and about USD 75,000 from donations. 
 
12.  (SBU) Marketing a radio program which is illegal for its 
target audience is a challenge, said Howard.  Without further 
elaboration, he said that OpenRadio capitalizes on the 
relatively free flow of CDs, DVDs, and VCDs across the North 
Korea-China border. (NOTE: NKNet Secretary General Kim 
Yun-tae recently told us that "some radio organizations" 
advertise the frequency and time of their programming at the 
end of CDs, DVDs, and other media bound for North Korea via 
the border areas of China. END NOTE.). 
 
RADIO FREE CHOSUN 
----------------- 
 
13.  (SBU) Radio Free Chosun (RFC) is the most secretive of 
the private broadcasting groups.  It records thirty minutes 
of programming each day from an undisclosed location in 
Seoul.  Even when meeting with us, RFC would only meet in the 
office of a separate organization, NKNet, and was circumspect 
about revealing the identity of the representatives we met, 
Assistant Director "Ms. Park," and Editor "Mr. Chung," a 
North Korean defector. 
 
14.  (SBU) RFC has six full-time and three part-time staff, 
Park said, and operates on a USD 200,000 NED grant, 
additional Freedom House funding, and help from NKNet.  Like 
the other alternative stations, RFC also contracts with an 
unidentified third party to broadcast its programming into 
North Korea from a platform outside the ROK.  RFC broadcasts 
original programming between 05:00 and 05:30 at 9785 kHz, and 
replays the broadcast between 22:30 and 23:00 at 9485 kHz. 
 
15.  (SBU) RFC creates its own programming.  Its major 
current project is a serial drama based on the life of Kim 
Jong-il.  Fifteen actors volunteer to play 70 parts in the 
50-episode series, starting from "debunking the myth of Kim 
Jong-il's birth."  According to Park, the drama will allow 
the North Korean people to make their own decisions regarding 
their leadership. 
 
IS ANYONE LISTENING? 
-------------------- 
 
16.  (SBU) It is difficult to estimate the number of North 
Koreans in the DPRK who listen to foreign radio broadcasts. 
In a 2005 survey conducted by the NGO NK Database, over 18 
percent of 291 resettled North Koreans said that they had 
heard foreign radio broadcasts while in the DPRK.  Among this 
group, all of whom left the DPRK after 2003, the most popular 
program was KBS's Social Education Program (10.52 percent), 
followed by Radio Free Asia (3.61 percent), Voice of America 
(.65 percent) and Radio Free NK (.65 percent). 
 
17.  (SBU) According to a May 2005 InterMedia survey of 200 
defectors, 10 percent of defectors listened to VOA and 3.5 
percent listened to RFA at least once a week while in the 
DPRK.  FreeNK's Kim said that a 2006 Christian Council of 
Korea survey found that 17 percent of resettled North Koreans 
had listened to FreeNK.  Reflecting on his own experience, 
Howard from OpenRadio believes that there are many broadcast 
listeners ("BCLs") who scan radio channels late at night, 
just as South Korean student activists used to listen to 
North Korean broadcasts in the 1980s. 
 
18.  (SBU) RFC's Chung, who listened to foreign broadcasting 
from the 1980s until his 2003 defection, claimed 70 percent 
of North Koreans, and perhaps 100 percent of those near the 
DPRK-China border, possess radios.  Representatives of 
FreeNK, OpenRadio and RFC all agreed that most North Korean 
listeners receive the broadcasts on shortwave radios smuggled 
across the border from China.  According to OpenRadio's 
Howard, small, digital radios are readily available in border 
areas of China and even in North Korean markets for about USD 
5.  NKNet Secretary General Kim Yun-tae said that radios are 
available in the DPRK for about USD 10.  Most have 
AM/FM/shortwave reception, as well as tape recorders which 
provide "legitimate" cover that could protect the owner if 
discovered by authorities, Kim said. 
 
19.  (SBU) There appear to be other sources of shortwave 
radios as well.  FreeNK's Kim said that diplomats or others 
with travel privileges sometimes carry radios into the 
country.  Kim also said that the ROK National Intelligence 
Service sent numerous radios into the DPRK by balloon prior 
to 2002.  Some NGOs are also engaged in sending radios into 
the DPRK.  An evangelical Christian Group, TWR, told us that 
it had distributed "thousands" of radios in North Korea. 
 
20.  (SBU) While listeners still expose themselves to 
considerable risk by tuning into foreign broadcasting, there 
is a perception among broadcasters that the risk is 
diminishing.  Societal control is collapsing, said RFC's 
Chung, and the regime is no longer able to enforce the laws 
as strictly as it once did.  FreeNK Assistant Director Kim 
Ki-seong likewise said that government control appears to 
have lessened and people are more confident about breaking 
the rules.  Howard from OpenRadio also said that the 
penalties for listening to illegal broadcasts in the DPRK 
appear to be less severe than in the past.  Whereas in the 
past a person caught listening to a prohibited station would 
be sent to prison, the police now just confiscate the radio 
and sell it in the market. 
 
EFFICACY OF BROADCASTS 
---------------------- 
 
21.  (SBU) Kookmin University Professor Andrei Lankov is a 
strong proponent of radio broadcasting.  According to Lankov, 
the number of listeners is probably small, but broadcasting 
could play an important role in regime transformation.  When 
change comes, the radio listeners -- who are likely to be 
relatively well-educated risk takers -- will be either the 
catalysts of change or positioned to move into positions of 
authority after change occurs. 
 
22.  (SBU) He explained that the target audience should be 
mid- to high-level functionaries in Pyongyang, and 
programming should include entertainment media along with 
objective news.  "BBC hooked many listeners in the Soviet 
Union because of its expert commentary on classical music. 
Something similar is needed in North Korea."  Lankov 
suggested that a diversity of programming, including 
religious, education, news, and one or two more "aggressive" 
stations, would be an effective approach.  Programming that 
is too stridently anti-DPRK would likely repulse the majority 
of listeners. 
 
23.  (SBU) Dongguk University Professor Koh Yu-hwan agreed 
that direct criticism of the DPRK regime could undermine the 
credibility of such programming.  Koh suggested that 
programming should have direct relevance to the everyday 
lives of North Koreans.  "The North Korean population," said 
Koh, "is curious about what is happening outside their 
country.  Accordingly, regional current affairs programming 
would be useful as well."  Kim Geun-shik from the Institute 
for Far Eastern Studies thought that the defector programming 
was a useful addition to previous broadcasts.  Voice of 
America and Radio Free Asia were "too American," he said, and 
thus had a limited appeal. 
 
24.  (SBU) Inje University Professor Brian Myers said that 
"Cold War style" broadcasts are unlikely to be effective. 
Myers, who is an expert on DPRK propaganda, explained that 
the DPRK's legitimacy is not based on the belief that Kim 
Jong-il is giving North Koreans a better standard of living. 
It is a nationalist message that Kim Jong-il is protecting 
pure Koreans from foreign subjugation and domination.  Using 
outside propaganda to fight nationalism is very difficult, as 
demonstrated by its nearly complete ineffectiveness with 
Imperial Japan. 
 
25.  (SBU) The messenger would also be important.  Myers 
pointed out that most defectors are uneducated laborers or 
farmers from North Hamkyeong Province, the poorest region of 
North Korea.  The educated classes in Pyongyang -- the most 
valuable target of broadcasting -- would not be persuaded by 
the typical defector.  "Imagine if the U.S. were under a 
totalitarian regime.  Would the educated classes in 
Washington be convinced by late-night shortwave broadcasts 
from West Virginian expats?"  There would have to be a great 
emphasis on finding well-educated, sophisticated North 
Koreans to do the broadcasts. 
 
26.  (SBU) Lankov suggested that programming created by 
Korean-Americans could be useful.  According to standard DPRK 
propaganda, overseas Koreans suffer under the yoke of foreign 
imperialists and are merely waiting for the opportunity to 
return to a unified Korea.  Direct radio broadcasts from 
content Korean-Americans would help disabuse North Koreans of 
that notion.  Myers disagreed.  "Korean-Americans are 
presented as prodigal son figures.  They are Koreans who have 
betrayed their country.  It probably would not be an 
advantage in propaganda terms." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
27.  (SBU) Radio programming could play an important role in 
providing North Koreans with an initial exposure to world 
events and the diversity of opinions that exist beyond DPRK 
borders.  As inexpensive electronics filter into the DPRK 
through the Chinese border, programs such as those described 
above are likely to enjoy a growing audience, especially if 
broadcasters continue to use North Korean announcers and 
otherwise tailor their programs to their target audience. 
28.  (SBU) It is also noteworthy that former ROK democracy 
activists are spearheading OpenRadio, and probably RFC as 
well.  Both appear to have close links with each other and 
NKNet, an NGO with roots in the democracy movement and a 
mandate to pursue North Korean human rights.  Their fixation 
on secrecy likely reflects not just a concern for the 
resettled North Koreans with whom they work, but also the 
standard operating procedures that they developed in the 
1980s.  While most of their colleagues from the democracy 
movement have since become advocates of reconciliation and 
engagement, these former activists have found the comfort of 
moral consistency in activities which more directly promote 
human rights and democracy in the DPRK.  Their main obstacle 
is the expense of overseas transmission, which severely 
limits the duration of the broadcasts.  END COMMENT. 
STANTON