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Viewing cable 07SEOUL1112, GOVERNOR RICHARDSON AND FORMER SECRETARY PRINCIPI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SEOUL1112 2007-04-17 04:34 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1112/01 1070434
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170434Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3927
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2336
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2445
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7961
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
UNCLAS SEOUL 001112 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MUNC KS KN
SUBJECT: GOVERNOR RICHARDSON AND FORMER SECRETARY PRINCIPI 
VISIT SEOUL 
 
REF: SEOUL 1078 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: During an April 11-12 visit to Seoul, New 
Mexico Governor Bill Richardson and former Secretary of 
Veteran's Affairs Principi noted that the DPRK had been 
cooperative in facilitating the transfer of the remains of 
servicemen thought to have died during the Korean War.  The 
Richardson-Principi delegation also conveyed its view that 
the DPRK was willing to move forward on the February 13 
Initial Actions agreement following resolution of the Banco 
Delta Asia (BDA) issue.  In Seoul on April 11, the delegation 
met with ROK Foreign Minister Song Min-soon and Unification 
Minister Lee Jae-joung.  On April 12, the delegation met with 
President Roh Moo-hyun (reftel).  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
RETURN OF REMAINS 
----------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) On April 11, after crossing the Military 
Demarcation Line into South Korea from North Korea, New 
Mexico Governor Bill Richardson and former Secretary of 
Veteran's Affairs Anthony Principi met separately with 
Foreign Minister Song Min-soon and Unification Minister Lee 
Jae-joung.  Richardson noted that the delegation's primary 
reason for visiting the DPRK was to facilitate the return of 
remains of missing American servicemen thought to have 
perished during the Korean War.  To this extent, Richardson 
explained, the DPRK had made a goodwill gesture in returning 
six sets of remains.  It was made clear, however, that the 
delegation's trip to the DPRK and the return of the six 
remains did not indicate a resumption of the remains recovery 
project, which needed to be discussed in the context of 
progress of Six-Party Talks, he said.  Richardson said that 
the most significant difference from his previous five visits 
to North Korea was that there was more commercial activity in 
Pyongyang this time.  Former Secretary Principi added that 
the bipartisan delegation's mission was important to the 
families of the fallen soldiers and also to help heal the 
wounds of war between the United States and North Korea. 
 
3.  (SBU) Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung described the 
return of the remains as a success.  It would not only help 
improve U.S.-DPRK relations, but the ROKG hoped to build on 
it in April 10-12 ROK-DPRK Red Cross talks to discuss the 
ROK's own POW and MIA concerns.  Lee said that during the Red 
Cross talks the ROKG would deliver two messages: (1) the USG 
was doing its part on BDA, so the DPRK should respond 
positively; and (2) it was important for all sides to 
implement the February 13 agreement.  Lee added that he hoped 
that the bipartisan nature of the delegation would play a 
role in helping to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue and bring 
peace to the Peninsula. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
DPRK INTENDS TO COMPLY WITH 2/13 AGREEMENT 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4.  (SBU) Richardson shared his impression that the North 
Koreans were serious about denuclearizing, but they were 
being petty and difficult about the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) 
issue.  In particular, the North Koreans had welcomed the 
announcement by the U.S. Treasury that DPRK accounts in BDA 
had been unblocked, but they expected more still to be done, 
for instance, having the money hand-delivered to them.  They 
did, however, reaffirm their commitment to the February 13 
agreement and told Richardson that they were ready to invite 
IAEA inspectors into the DPRK "the next day" after the BDA 
funds were returned. 
 
5.  (SBU) Principi reiterated that DPRK officials during the 
delegation's visit expressed a commitment to the Six-Party 
Talks and reaffirmed that they would fulfill denuclearization 
obligations once BDA was resolved.  Principi said that A/S 
Hill had done an extraordinary job in helping to resolve the 
BDA issue, but now the ball was in the DPRK's court. 
Principi said he departed the DPRK with a slight sense of 
optimism, adding that now sufficient resolve, focus, and 
discipline were needed to succeed. 
 
6.  (SBU) Song agreed with Richardson's impression that the 
North Koreans were serious about their intent to comply with 
the February 13 agreement.  On BDA, he stressed that the 
 
biggest concern for the North Koreans was their legitimacy as 
a member of the international banking community, rather than 
the issue of the USD 25 million itself.  Song speculated that 
there seemed to be a communication problem within North Korea 
about how to proceed.  In the past, DPRK decisions have been 
made very "abruptly," so he thought that a decision to move 
forward could come anytime.  Still, Song agreed that the ball 
was now in the North Korean's court; now that BDA funds were 
unfrozen, they had to take action.  Song said that it was 
premature to think about what course of action the North 
Koreans would take next. 
 
--------------------- 
NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS 
--------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Richardson told Unification Minister Lee that after 
six visits to the DPRK, he found North Korean leadership to 
be isolated and unpredictable.  What would help the DPRK 
better understand the importance of human rights and family 
reunions was more contact with the ROK.  We needed diplomacy 
in the Six-Party Talks and engagement with the DPRK to move 
beyond the Armistice Agreement.  It was his impression that 
the DPRK saw its relationship with the ROKG as better than 
with other Six-Party members, so the ROKG role in encouraging 
the DPRK to denuclearize and reform was key.  He suggested 
that, perhaps, the ROKG should do more to address rural 
poverty in the DPRK and to increase people-to-people 
exchanges.  The ROKG should think about what dramatic step it 
could take to help the DPRK, he said. 
 
8.  (SBU) Lee said that he agreed "100 percent" with the 
Governor's opinion.  The Six-Party Talks and North-South 
dialogue were like two wheels that turned together.  At times 
the Six-Party Talks could help North-South dialogue and at 
times North-South dialogue could help propel the Six-Party 
Talks.  The ROKG had a three-prong approach to improving 
relations with the DPRK.  First, the ROKG was supporting 
North-South dialogue in various cultural, social, and 
humanitarian fields.  Second, the ROKG supported economic 
cooperation, as in the Kaesong Industrial Complex that would 
teach North Koreans about capitalism and the market system. 
Finally, the ROKG supported joint programs, such as visits of 
the DPRK youth soccer teams, the DPRK taekwondo team, and 
delegations to commemorate the June 2000 inter-Korean summit 
and August 15 Liberation Day.  Lee himself was also committed 
to improving DPRK agriculture.  Ten years ago, before he 
became Unification Minister, Lee said he had been involved in 
farmer-to-farmer agricultural programs, such as seed 
potatoes, to help DPRK rural sectors.  Now, as minister, Lee 
supported giving the DPRK fertilizer aid to help the DPRK 
raise its agricultural yields. 
 
9.  (SBU) On the issue of a second North-South summit, Song 
said that the ROKG principle was firm: holding a summit "for 
the sake" of holding a summit was inadvisable given ongoing 
Six-Party Talks and the situation on the Korean Peninsula. 
Rather, the ROKG would pursue a summit only if real progress 
in inter-Korean relations and denuclearization of the North 
could be realistically expected to result from the summit. 
Richardson noted that the North Koreans seemed to regard the 
South highly.  In his opinion, the North Koreans had not 
ruled out the possibility of a North-South summit in the near 
future. 
 
------------------------------------ 
U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE IN EXCELLENT SHAPE 
------------------------------------ 
 
10.  (SBU) Song noted that the U.S.-ROK Alliance was in 
excellent shape, highlighting the conclusion of the KORUS 
FTA, the February 23 agreement to transfer wartime 
operational command (OPCON) in 2012, and progress in 
relocating U.S. military bases.  The bilateral alliance, and 
shaping the alliance to meet our future common needs, were 
top priorities for the ROKG, he said.  Song said that 
securing FTA ratification by the National Assembly would be a 
tough task, but that he, as well as Prime Minister Han 
Duck-soo and Trade Minister Kim Hyun-chong, were already hard 
at work lobbying for its ratification.  Noting that U.S. 
Congressional ratification would also be difficult, 
Ambassador Vershbow said that opening the Korean market for 
U.S. beef imports would help.  Song said that once the World 
 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) made a determination on 
the safety of U.S. beef, there would be no reason to ban U.S. 
beef or delay the procedures necessary to resume U.S. beef 
imports. 
 
11.  (U) The Richardson-Principi delegation did not have an 
opportunity to clear this message. 
STANTON