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Viewing cable 07SEOUL1047, CHUNG DONG-YOUNG'S ADVISORS SET FOREIGN POLICY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SEOUL1047 2007-04-10 07:22 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1047/01 1000722
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 100722Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3810
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2304
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2409
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7949
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
UNCLAS SEOUL 001047 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD KN KS PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: CHUNG DONG-YOUNG'S ADVISORS SET FOREIGN POLICY 
DIRECTION 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Advisors to presidential hopeful and 
former Uri Party chairman Chung Dong-young's (DY) told us 
April 4 that Chung likely would leave the Uri Party to form 
his own coalition party before the presidential candidate 
registration deadline of April 23.  Chung's advisors asserted 
that DY ultimately would support the FTA, but he thought 
ratification should be postponed until 2008.  Chung also 
hoped that the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) would 
eventually be designated as an "outward processing zone" in 
the FTA.  The advisors said the DPRK's strategy in the Six 
Party Talks was to obtain heavy fuel oil for disablement of 
the Yongbyon facility, and then negotiate a separate deal for 
more (either light water reactors or other aid) in exchange 
for dismantling their nuclear programs and relinquishing 
plutonium.  The advisors believed the Banco Delta Asia issue 
was only a "technical problem" and would be resolved because 
North Korea desperately wanted to regain its international 
financial transaction capability.  They asserted that South 
Korean humanitarian aid to North Korea established the 
groundwork for future progress on North-South relations.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
---------------------------- 
CHUNG DONG-YOUNG AND THE FTA 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) On April 4, the DCM hosted a dinner for foreign 
policy advisors to former Unification Minister and current 
presidential contender Chung Dong-young.  Chung's advisors 
all agreed that Chung would leave the Uri party to create his 
own coalition, although Professor Kwon Manhak of Kyunghee 
University said specific details would be made public closer 
to the April 23 election filing deadline.  Chung would 
support the recently concluded FTA, Kwon said, but he 
declined to comment on the degree of that support prior to 
the election.  According to Kwon, Chung believed the 
agreement had been reached too fast and ratification should 
be held after the presidential election.  Chung's advisors 
expressed their hope that the Kaesong Industrial Complex 
(KIC) in the DPRK would ultimately be specifically designated 
as an "outward processing zone" and therefore fall under the 
purview of the FTA. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
YONGBYON FOR HFO AND SEPARATE DEAL FOR PLUTONIUM 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
3. (SBU) According to Kim Yeon-chul, a North Korea expert and 
Korea University Professor, Chung believes that an ROK-DPRK 
summit, preferably at Kaesong, would help the 
denuclearization process.  Denuclearization would take time, 
and given that nuclear weapons and fuel were North Korea's 
only bargaining tools, the DPRK would not give them up 
easily.  The DPRK's strategy was to trade "Yongbyon for heavy 
fuel oil (HFO) and make a separate deal for the plutonium." 
Chung also believes that ROK aid to the DPRK was humanitarian 
in nature and helped lay the groundwork for future amicable 
relations.  On a practical level, aid to the North resulted 
in better security on the Peninsula and an increase in the 
number of South Koreans in North Korea.  As an example, Kim 
noted that the development surrounding KIC effectively 
blocked one of the North's main invasion routes to the South. 
 The complex employed over 11,000 North Koreans, creating 
higher standards of living in the city of Kaesong and sowing 
the seeds for change, Kim asserted. 
 
--- 
BDA 
--- 
 
4.  (SBU) The Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue would be resolved 
amicably and soon, according to Senior Research Fellow at 
Sejong Institute Dr. Hong Hun-ik, because the remaining 
issues were technical in nature and, more important, because 
North Korea wanted and needed to reestablish its ability to 
execute international financial transactions.  Consequently, 
the DPRK's interest in a positive resolution was far greater 
than the dollar value of the frozen funds. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
1718: NATIONAL INTERESTS SUPERSEDE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Professor Kwon commented that sanctions were not 
effective against the DPRK.  The DCM pointed out that 
sanctions were effective if all parties adhered to them, and 
that the UNSC Resolution 1718 also symbolized the 
international community's strong political commitment toward 
a denuclearized North Korea.  Professor Kwon went on to say 
that North Korean ships passing through ROK waters knew that 
they "could be boarded" at any time, so the ROK assumed they 
were in compliance, but he added that "national interests 
often supersede international law." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
6. (SBU) With popular support currently hovering under five 
percent, Chung's chances of becoming president are remote at 
this point.  Nonetheless, given his history as Unification 
Minister and his strong support for engagement with North 
Korea, his campaign would likely benefit from any significant 
improvements in North-South relations in the run-up to the 
presidential election. 
VERSHBOW