Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07ROME710, ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ROME710.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ROME710 2007-04-06 10:09 2011-08-12 11:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Rome
VZCZCXRO7040
OO RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHNP
DE RUEHRO #0710/01 0961009
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 061009Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7637
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0550
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0310
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0369
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0651
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0359
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0464
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0939
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 4301
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0219
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2310
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0430
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8544
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2462
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0733
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0393
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000710 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 
TAGS: PREL NATO UNSC EUN IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE, 
MEPP, LEBANON, IRAN SANCTIONS, GUANTANAMO AND ABU OMAR
 
 
REF: A. STATE 36991 
     B. STATE 37005 
     C. STATE 41871 
     D. STATE 42573 
     E. ROME 625 
     F. ROME 702 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD SPOGLI, REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 

SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C/NF) Amb. Spogli got FM D'Alema's agreement to make a 
clear statement in support of the Athisaari plan for Kosovo 
and was told that the FM did not think he could or should 
control an Italian NGO threatening to close its hospitals in 
Afghanistan unless one of its employees was released by the 
Afghan Government.  During an April 5 tour d'horizon, the 
Ambassador and FM also discussed Iran sanctions (D'Alema said 
Italy was applying the rules thoroughly), the Middle East 
peace process (D'Alema worried the Israelis and Palestinians 
would miss an opportunity for progress), Lebanon (where 
everything but UNIFIL is at an impasse, according to the FM), 
and the Abu Omar case.  The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the 
request that Italy consider taking some Guantanamo detainees 
to help speed the closure of the facility.  D'Alema said 
trying to close Guantanamo was a noble step and that if Italy 
could help, it would try to do so (see also septel on 
Guantanamo).  End Summary. 
 
Afghanistan and Emergency Now 
----------------------------- 

2. (C/NF) On April 5, Ambassador Spogli and Foreign Minister 
D'Alema discussed key issues on the foreign policy agenda. 
The Ambassador raised concerns about the statements of Gino 
Strada, head of the Italian NGO Emergency Now, who was 
threatening to close his hospitals in Afghanistan unless the 
Afghan Government released one of his staff being held for 
possible terrorist affiliations.  The Amb. said such an 
unwelcome step would be punishing the Afghan people and asked 
if D'Alema could help get Strada to stop making threats. 
D'Alema replied that he had spoken with Strada, who told him 
that if his employees are going to be arrested in 
Afghanistan, he would move his operations to a country that 
doesn't arrest his staff.  D'Alema told the Amb. that all 
sides needed to show flexibility and that if the Afghan 
Government had evidence against the individual being held, it 
should be shared. D'Alema noted that Italy was grateful to 
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul for helping secure Red Cross access 
to the detained individual.  Then, somewhat exasperated, he 
said, "Strada is who he is.  He runs an NGO. He is not part 
of the Italian Government.  He says they cannot work in 
Helmand without having contact with the Taliban.  He thinks 
the Taliban have the legitimate support of the people there. 
We have urged him to be prudent.  But we do not control him 
and he feels threatened."  D'Alema then said that during the 
Mastrogiacomo kidnapping the Taliban cell phones that were 
traced all had Pakistani numbers, and that if terror bosses 
could live carefree in a Pakistan that could not be 
reproached because of its alliance with the U.S., we would 
not win this war. 
 
Kosovo - Firm Support for Status 
-------------------------------- 
 
3. (C/NF) The Ambassador noted that the Italian position on  
the Athisaari plan for Kosovo had generated some confusion 
and that a clear statement of support would be very helpful. 
D'Alema emphatically insisted that Italy supported the 
Athisaari plan's core status provisions ("they should not be 
touched").  Italy continued to believe that some non-status 
issues, like protection of religious sites and minority 
rights, however, could still be improved.  He said there were 
two unacceptable outcomes: continuing the status quo and a 
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The latter 
would tear Europe apart and pull the legal legs out from 
under the European mission to Kosovo.  He argued that a UNSCR 
was needed that would help soften the Russian position, and a 
proposal needed to be crafted for Serbia - something 
conditional with flexible rewards - that could be offered to 
Belgrade when Serbia inevitably rejects Kosovar independence. 
 Without these elements, the region could be destabilized, he 
said.  He added that Italy had been clear in its talks with 
Russia and everywhere else that it would absolutely support 
Athisaari's core status proposal without prolonging talks and 
without new negotiations.  The Ambassador asked if D'Alema 
could make a public statement to that effect.  D'Alema agreed 
to do so. 
 
Iran Sanctions - Italy in Compliance 
------------------------------------  

4. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked how Iran sanctions were 
proceeding for Italy, and noted our disappointment that when 
action was taken against Bank Sepah in Italy all funds had 
already been moved.  D'Alema said the Iranians knew it was 
coming and were a step ahead, as they had been elsewhere.  He 
added that when he had spoken with Larijani early in the week 
to urge the release of the UK sailors, Larijani had protested 
vigorously about the action against Bank Sepah.  D'Alema 
asserted "we are applying the sanctions rules.  We are in 
compliance.  But Italy is also the victim of the sanctions 
and is excluded from negotiations with Iran and from the 
group with primary responsibility for decisions on Iran, 
despite being a UNSC member." 
 
Israel-Palestine: About to Miss an Opportunity? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 

5. (C/NF) The Ambassador thanked D'Alema for his recent 
helpful comments insisting that Palestinian leaders accept 
the three Quartet conditions before Italian officials would 
meet with them.  The FM said he feared a moment of 
opportunity was being lost.  Abu Mazen was stronger than 
before but needed to find a way to get results out of his 
dialogue with Olmert.  Both sides, he said, need to be pushed 
and encouraged.  Without progress the risk of violence would 
increase.  He suggested what was needed now was a confidence 
building phase with limited ambition focusing on releasing 
prisoners, improving Palestinian quality of life, granting 
more freedom of access/movement and getting credible security 
assurances for Israel.  The Palestinians, he said, would 
never accept an independent state within provisional borders, 
because they believe this means they will never get final 
status issues resolved.  He envisions an eventual regional 
final status conference, but not until the open final status 
questions have been resolved by the two sides.  He said with 
both sides weak and lacking strategies to reach solutions, 
the international community needed to step in and offer hope 
for positive movement.  Europe should press the Palestinians 
and the U.S. should press the Israelis in a coordinated 
division of labor, he suggested, adding that the Palestinians 
needed to hear the message that when the time comes, the U.S. 
would be willing to push Israel to resolve the final status 
issues.  He informed the Amb. that Abu Mazen would be in Rome 
in the coming weeks. 

Lebanon - D'Alema Concerned 
--------------------------- 
 
6. (C/NF) Turning to Lebanon, D'Alema said he was very 
concerned because the only thing working there was UNIFIL. 
Everything else was totally blocked.  Parliament was not 
meeting.  Reconstruction was at a standstill.  The economy 
was in danger.  There was no progress on the arms embargo or 
Sheba Farms.  He said the Lebanon Contact Group meeting in 
London had been a good step and hoped that the group would 
meet at the political level to help bolster UN action.  He 
also said some way had to be found to get Syrian buy-in or 
the embargo would never work. 

Guantanamo Detainees - Closure a Noble Idea 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the request for 
Italy to consider taking some of the 25 releasable Guantanamo 
detainees who could not be returned to their countries of 
origin.  D'Alema said it was a delicate issue, but the idea 
of trying to close Guantanamo was noble, and if Italy could 
find a way to help, it would.  The devil would be in 
practicalities of whether Italy could take any of the 
detainees. (See septel for PM and Min. of Interior views on 
taking Guantanamo detainees.) 

Abu Omar - Pre-emptive Letters 
------------------------------ 

8. (S/NF) D'Alema closed the hour-long meeting by noting that 
he had asked the Secretary if the Department could send 
something in writing to him explaining that the U.S. would 
not act on extradition requests in the Abu Omar case if 
tendered.  This, he explained, could be used pre-emptively by 
the GOI to fend off action by Italian magistrates to seek the 
extradition of the implicated Americans.  D'Alema said he 
understood that L had discussed this with the Italian 
Ambassador in Washington.Amb. Spogli explained that we were 
waiting for the constitutional court to decide on the merits 
of the case before deciding on our next steps, because Min. 
of Justice Mastella had suspended action until that court 
rendered a decision.  The FM noted that there was still the 
risk of action by the magistrates at any time.  The 
Ambassador agreed that we should work to avoid having 
extradition requests forwarded. 
SPOGLI