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Viewing cable 07PHNOMPENH536, DEA SAYS CAMBODIAN SUPERLAB WAS INITIAL PROCESSING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PHNOMPENH536 2007-04-11 06:54 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Phnom Penh
VZCZCXRO0785
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0536/01 1010654
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 110654Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8309
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000536 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, INL/AAE--CHARLES BOULDIN, 
OES--ANTOINETTE CONDO 
BANGKOK FOR NAS--TERRY DARU, DEA--SCOTT SEELEY-HACKER, PAT 
CHAGNON, AND JOHN SWAIN, AND REO--JIM WALLER 
HANOI FOR DEA--JEFFREY WANNER AND POL--PETER ECKSTROM 
VIENTIANE FOR NAS--CLIFF HEINZER 
PACOM FOR JIATF-WEST--DAVID KILBOURN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR SENV PGOV ASEC CB
SUBJECT: DEA SAYS CAMBODIAN SUPERLAB WAS INITIAL PROCESSING 
FACILITY FOR METH PRODUCTION 
 
REF: PHNOM PENH 515 
 
1.  (SBU) A Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) team has determined 
that Cambodia's newly discovered methamphetamine superlab was 
capable of completing only the first stage in the thionyl 
chloride method of methamphetamine production, meaning that 
an intermediate product, chloroephedrine, must have been 
shipped to a second location for further processing.  The 
team discovered chemicals sufficient to produce 72 kg of 
chloroephedrine, which could be processed in another facility 
into roughly 4.8 million methamphetamine tablets, with a 
street value of USD 14.4 million in Phnom Penh.  The superlab 
site contains many hazardous chemicals, none of which are 
stored properly, and represents an imminent environmental and 
health threat to the local area. 
 
Drug Lab Used in First Stage of Meth Production 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
2.  (SBU) A DEA team of three Washington-based forensic 
chemists, one Beijing-based diversion investigator, and two 
Bangkok-based special agents arrived in Cambodia on April 7 
and conducted further investigation of the superlab, 
following up on a visit by two DEA agents last week.  The 
team confirmed earlier findings that the lab was using the 
thionyl chloride method of methamphetamine production. 
However, they determined that the lab was only able to 
perform the first stage of the two-stage methamphetamine 
manufacture process:  combining ephedrine, chloroform, and 
thionyl chloride to make chloroephedrine an intermediate 
product also known as chloropseudoephedrine.  The second 
stage, conversion of chloroephedrine to methamphetamine, is 
far more difficult, requiring more skill, a different set of 
specialized chemicals (e.g., expensive metals to serve as 
catalysts) and industrial equipment, including a pressurizing 
device.  The DEA team concluded that the drug producers must 
have either had an additional location where they finished 
processing the chemicals, or sold the intermediate product to 
another drug producer for further processing.  They noted 
that in the U.S., there is an increasing trend of 
specialization where various individuals or teams take 
different parts of the process, from purchasing chemicals and 
different stages of manufacture and processing. 
 
3.  (SBU) At the drug lab site, the team seized approximately 
1,560 liters of thionyl chloride, 140 liters of diethyl 
ether, and 700 liters of acetone.  They also found containers 
indicating a total quantity of 750 liters of chloroform, 
though some of this had already been used.  They also seized 
a trace amount of pseduoephedrine, 52 kg. of processed 
chloroephedrine and an additional approximately 30 kg. of 
chloroephedrine that had not yet been finished processing. 
Using only the amount of chemicals found on site, the DEA 
team estimated that the drug lab could produce approximately 
72 kg of the intermediate product, chloroephedrine.  If the 
72 kg of chloroephedrine were to be converted into 
methamphetamine, it would yield approximately 55 kg of pure 
methamphetamine, which could produce roughly 4.8 million 
methamphetamine tablets (worth roughly USD 14.4 million in 
Phnom Penh or USD 33.6 million in Thailand) or 5 million 
crystal methamphetamine (ice) dosage units worth roughly USD 
8.5-10.3 million in Thailand, according to DEA and UNODC 
estimates. 
 
Superlab Site Poses Extreme Environmental, Health Risk 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
4.  (SBU) DEA chemists noted that the chemicals on site are 
poorly stored and represent a critical environmental and 
health threat to the area.  Thionyl chloride reacts with 
water, including trace amounts such as humidity in air, to 
produce two extremely dangerous and corrosive chemicals, 
sulfur dioxide and hydrochloric acid.  Diethyl ether, they 
noted, is explosive.  None of the chemicals at the site are 
being stored properly, they noted, with chemicals sitting 
outside in intense heat and subject to damage from weather or 
animals.  In particular, the chemists were concerned by the 
thionyl chloride, which is in a building where part of the 
roof is missing and, despite the presence of a tarp, is 
likely to be exposed to water once rainy season starts in a 
few weeks.  This could create a poisonous cloud of 
hydrochloric sulfide gas which could blow over to a village, 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000536  002 OF 002 
 
 
critically injuring many and perhaps killing some.  They 
noted that the thionyl chloride has apparently already begun 
to leak as it is corroding the boxes in which it is stored. 
The team also reported that, in addition to taking samples 
from the chemicals on site, they also collected a water 
sample from a nearby well.  It had an oily layer on top, they 
reported, and did not appear to be potable, indicating likely 
contamination of groundwater as well. 
 
5.  (SBU) DEA agents and UN Office of Drug Control (UNODC) 
staff have emphasized to the Cambodian government that the 
superlab site poses a significant environmental and health 
threat.  The World Health Organization and UNODC are working 
with the National Authority for Combating Drugs (NACD) to 
determine what steps must be taken to clean up the site and 
to coordinate potential donor assistance. 
 
6.  (SBU) Additional details about this drug lab cement 
Cambodia's new status as a drug producer.  It is noteworthy 
that the lab was only able to complete the first stage in 
methamphetamine production.  Perhaps the infrastructure, 
equipment, and human capacity limitations which have hampered 
Cambodia's industrial development were also a factor in 
preventing the building of a lab able to handle the more 
technical second stage of methamphetamine production. 
However, the additional counternarcotics challenge that 
Cambodia now faces is not their only concern.  The Cambodian 
government is just beginning to realize the extent of the 
environmental problem now on their hands.  Remediation will 
be a difficult process as Cambodia has no experience with 
drug lab clean up and even industrial waste is rare here. 
Clean up work will have to be outsourced to a foreign firm at 
considerable cost, and it is unclear who would be willing to 
fund such an undertaking. 
MUSSOMELI