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Viewing cable 07PANAMA557, PANAMA SUPPORTIVE BUT WARY ON KOSOVO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PANAMA557 2007-04-12 22:53 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Panama
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #0557 1022253
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 122253Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0148
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0269
C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000557 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR IO AND WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2017 
TAGS: PREL UN UNMIC PGOV YL PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA SUPPORTIVE BUT WARY ON KOSOVO 
 
REF: STATE 47794 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM EATON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D 
 
1.  (C) "Rest assured, we're on the same page" on Kosovo 
future status, First VP and FM Samuel Lewis told Ambassador 
Eaton and POLOFF when he delivered reftel demarche on April 
12.  Lewis expressed Panamanian support of the UNMIK 
Administrator's recommendations -- including independence -- 
but acknowledged Panama was waiting to see the text of the 
proposal before pledging full public support.  Panamanian 
Senior  Advisors for UNSC Affairs Nils Castro and Adolfo 
Ahumada accompanied Lewis. 
 
2.  (C) Lewis said that based on his conversations with 
Ambassador Ricardo Arias in New York, Panama's primary 
concern revolves around the threat of Russia exercising its 
veto power.  Lewis opined that if the Russians perceive they 
have been given adequate opportunity to express their 
concerns on Kosovo, they will abstain from voting on the 
UNSCR, telling the Serbs they have "exhausted all other 
possible alternatives on Kosovo."  He added that Russia was 
pushing for a fact-finding mission to the region, but 
Ambassador countered that after Ahtisaari's 20 rounds of 
talks in 16 months with the Belgrade-Pristina governments, 
even Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon does not endorse further 
rounds of negotiations and discussion. 
 
3.  (C) Ambassador also noted that Panama's public silence 
could be misinterpreted and only embolden the Russians to dig 
in their heels.  Lewis agreed there is "no way back" to 
reunifying Kosovo and Serbia, calling Kosovo independence a 
"reality," stating he would send a message to Arias in New 
York to deliver an explicit (but private) message of Panama's 
support for internationally-supervised Kosovo independence to 
remove any possible misconceptions of Panama's position. 
Lewis added that Panama would not undermine the ability to 
work behind the scenes with Russia, but wanted to see the 
text before publicly endorsing any resolution. 
 
4.  (C) When asked if Panama had any specific issues, 
concerns, or text they would like to see addressed in the 
resolution, Castro replied that Panama wanted to avoid 
another outcome similar to Burma by spending the sufficient 
amount of time to build consensus around the resolution, 
noting that "Panama is not concerned about the concept, but 
the speed at which a resolution is drafted."  Castro also 
noted that Panama wished to see a "discrete transition to 
independence" in which the "symbols of independence" were 
introduced delicately and sensitively to avoid antagonizing 
the various ethnic groups within Kosovo.  Castro opined this 
process could take months, but Ambassador again countered 
that while the USG also supports the gradual transition to an 
internationally-supervised independent Kosovo, the status quo 
cannot be perpetuated indefinitely without spawning unrest 
that could destabilize the Balkans once again. 
 
5.  (C) On 11 April, POLOFF delivered similar reftel talking 
points to MFA working level official Ernesto Cerrud, who 
paralleled the response that Panama does not wish to "force 
the issue" on Kosovo independence, and would prefer to await 
the results of the Russian-led fact-finding mission to the 
region before deciding to vote on a resolution.  Cerrud's 
comments mirrored those of Lewis, underscoring the Panamanian 
paranoia that Russia will veto any resolution that is not 
supported by Belgrade. 
 
6.  (C) Comment: Lewis and his advisors commented several 
times they didn't want a repeat of the Burma resolution 
vetoed by China.  Local press painted this veto as a personal 
embarrassment and setback for Lewis.  As a Presidential 
hopeful to succeed Martin Torrijos, Lewis is even more 
cautious now than usual about press and public perceptions of 
him.  Lewis may also be concerned that creating a rift 
between Panama and Russia vis a vis a vetoed Kosovo 
resolution could damage the effectiveness of his planned tour 
of Europe in May which includes a stop in Moscow. 
Nevertheless, Lewis received our message clearly, and knows 
he cannot hide in the shadows or the sideline on this issue. 
However, the local Panamanian UNSC team may be willing to 
stall the resolution signing process as long as possible.  We 
will continue to pressure Panama to take a stand.  Continued 
pressure on Ambassador Arias will also underscore the 
seriousness of our resolve on this issue. 
 
EATON