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Viewing cable 07NAIROBI1782, KENYA DROUGHT UPDATE - 2006/7 SHORT RAINS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07NAIROBI1782 2007-04-20 10:14 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #1782/01 1101014
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201014Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9204
INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0200
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1809
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 5126
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4147
UNCLAS NAIROBI 001782 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AID/DCHA FOR MHESS, WGARVELINK 
DCHA/OFDA FOR KLUU/GGOTTLIEB/AFERRARA/ACONVERY 
KCHANNELL/LPOWERS/CABLA 
(A)AA/AFR FOR WWARREN 
DCHA/FFP FOR BHAMMINK/JDWORKEN/DNELSON/CMUTAMBA 
AFR/EA FOR JESCALONA, JBORNS 
ROME FOR FODAG 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
STATE FOR AF/E, AF/EPS 
NSC FOR JMELINE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID KE
SUBJECT:  KENYA DROUGHT UPDATE - 2006/7 SHORT RAINS 
ASSESSMENT AND WAY FORWARD 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 738 B. 05 NAIROBI 7345 AND PREVIOUS 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
1.  Kenya's interagency food security assessment for the 
2006/7 short-rains (October- December) has been 
completed. The overall assessment process and 
methodology was coordinated and backstopped by the Kenya 
Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) comprising 
representatives of line ministries within the GOK, NGO 
and UN agencies. 
 
2.  The assessment revealed significant improvement in 
food security in most parts of the country including the 
pastoral areas.  However, an upsurge in diseases, most 
notably the Rift Valley Fever (RVF), Lumpy Skin Disease 
and the contagious bovine pleuro pneumonia, reversed 
anticipated gains from favorable short rains, and the 
impacts of these diseases are being felt in some 
pastoralist districts.  Additionally, the cumulative 
impact of several previous years of drought on 
livelihoods should not be underemphasized. While 
emergency relief food helped to save lives and to 
prevent further deterioration of the asset base, the 
underlying causes of food insecurity continue to haunt 
hundreds of thousands of Kenyans. 
 
3.3. .The Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) has 
recommended that 919,843 persons, situated predominantly 
in the pastoral areas, continue to be targeted under 
general feeding and cash/food for asset programs through 
September 2007. In addition, KFSSG recommends that 
391,772 children continue to participate in school 
feeding programs. In total, just over 1.3 million 
persons will be targeted under various programs that are 
aimed at meeting immediate needs while enhancing 
recovery.  This number represents a significant drawdown 
from the initial caseloads of 3.1 million targeted 
beneficiaries at the height of the 2006 drought, 
subsequently reduced to 2.4 million. Gross food 
requirements for the next six months (April-September) 
are estimated at 84,723 MT, valued at approximately 
US$48 million. Of this, 60,000 MT is already resourced 
either in country or in the pipeline, leaving a net 
requirement of approximately 25,000 MT valued at US$14 
million. A specific request for emergency food aid will 
be forthcoming pending further discussions with the GOK, 
WFP and other donors. 
 
4.   The KFSSG has also emphasized that urgent 
mitigation and recovery programs are central to 
sustaining the recovery process, noting that the absence 
of such programs has often led to the use of relief 
assistance as a stop-gap measure even as chronic food 
insecurity becomes entrenched.  End summary. 
 
 
THE FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND KEY FINDINGS 
 
 
5.  An interagency and multi-sectoral food security 
assessment organized by the Kenya Food Security Group 
(KFSSG) completed the fieldwork and data analysis and 
issued its final report on April 12, 2007. 
 
6.  This is the first assessment that has used the 
Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase 
Classification System (IPC) as the analytical framework 
for situation and response analysis.  The IPC is 
developed by the Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU) of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and is 
designed to add rigor to food security analysis and be 
transparent and evidence-based.  Because it employs a 
 
uniform set of indicators, and internationally 
recognized thresholds for many of them, the IPC provides 
a common currency for food security and humanitarian 
analysis that allows direct comparisons within and 
between countries.  The IPC has four components.  The 
first component is Phase Classification, which is a 
scale running from Generally Food Secure and Chronically 
Food Insecure, through Acute Livelihoods Crisis, to 
Humanitarian Emergency and finally Famine/Humanitarian 
Catastrophe.  Each phase is assigned based on a 
convergence of evidence that is framed by the second 
component - the Key Reference Outcomes - together with 
other indirect evidence that is available. The Strategic 
Framework (third component) allows analysis to recommend 
the broad types of response that would meet immediate 
and underlying needs of people in the different phases. 
Finally, the Early Warning component provides 
information on the direction of change and relative 
risk. 
 
7.   Based on this analytical framework, the assessment 
revealed the following key findings: 
 
8.   I) Of the thirty-two vulnerable districts assessed 
(some under the current EMOP) that fall within the 
marginal mixed farming livelihoods zone and pockets in 
the agro-pastoral zone, six in the eastern, four in the 
coastal belt, and five mixed-farming areas are 
considered Generally Food Secure.  These districts 
received good levels of rainfall and an above average 
harvest, resulting in increased food availability at 
household level, food diversity on the market, and low 
and stable cereal prices. Hence, no food interventions 
are recommended in view of these food security 
improvements. 
 
9.   II) Eight districts (some districts partially) 
within the pastoral livelihoods and marginal mixed 
farming livelihoods zone, are classified under the 
Chronically Food Insecure Phase ? Alert Level.  This 
classification is based on the fact that the main food 
security indicators, including food consumption and food 
diversity, are chronically at the minimum threshold 
levels.  However, as market food availability and access 
conditions have improved, general food distributions and 
selective feeding are not considered viable or necessary 
options.  Expanded school feeding and cash interventions 
are recommended due to food availability in the market. 
Food for assets will be considered in the absence of 
readily available cash intervention programs in the 
pastoral areas. 
 
10.   III) Three districts in the pastoral 
livelihood zone (Marsabit, Samburu and Kwale hinterland) 
that have received favorable rainfall, and were mostly 
spared from the RVF outbreak, are classified under the 
Chronically Food Insecure Phase ? Moderate Risk. 
Significant household food deficits still exist in 
certain geographic areas under this phase classification 
as the recovery process has not yet been full completed. 
Food for assets is recommended due to food access and 
availability constraints.  General Food Distribution is 
recommended for the interim until appropriate programs 
are established.  Selective feeding is recommended in 
areas of high malnutrition. 
 
11.   IV) Four pastoral districts (Mandera, Turkana, 
Wajir and parts of Isiolo)characterized by widespread 
long-term unsustainable use of natural resources (land 
and water), persistent and cyclical recurrence of 
production shortfalls, health epidemics, and chronic 
malnutrition are classified under Chronically Food 
Insecure Phase ? High Risk.  Although these areas were 
not affected directly by the RVF -- and hence no 
livestock death was reported or human lives lost -- 
 
markets were disrupted, which affected incomes of local 
households.  General Food Distribution is recommended 
until food availability and access constraints are 
mitigated and Cash Interventions and/or Food for Assets 
Interventions are operational.  Selective feeding is 
recommended in view of high malnutrition. 
 
12.   V) Five districts comprising most of the 
eastern pastoral livelihoods zone (Garissa, Ijara, 
Isiolo, Tana River and Wajir)are classified under Acute 
Food and Livelihood Crisis Phase.  This cluster 
represents chronically food insecure areas affected by 
multiple shocks that have pushed the food security line 
below the minimum acceptable for the livelihood zone. 
The drought and floods, followed by RVF, have resulted 
in infrastructure damage, massive livestock death, 
market disruption and loss of income for pastoralists. 
General Food Distribution is recommended while 
supporting and phasing in Cash for Work and Food for 
Assets interventions. Recommended also is Expanded and 
Strengthened Selective Feeding in combination with other 
interventions in view of high malnutrition rates. 
 
 
SHORT-TERM, RECOVERY AND LONG-TERM INTERVENTIONS 
CRITICAL FOR SUSTAINED LIVELIHOODS 
 
 
13.   Based on the above findings derived from the 
IPC analytical framework, the KFSSG has recommended that 
just over 1.3 million persons continue to receive relief 
assistance.  Of these, 919,843 are targeted for general 
distribution and cash/food for asset programs, 120,000 
under the selective feeding program, and 271,772 
children under the expanded school feeding program.  In 
spite of this caseload and continued need for emergency 
assistance, KFSSG argues that the observed widespread 
improvement in food security should provide the best 
opportunity for systematically addressing the underlying 
causes of food insecurity that invariably amplify the 
impacts of any one poor season. 
 
14.    In view of this, the KFSSG has proposed several 
types 
of interventions that could take advantage of current 
favorable food security conditions and build the 
resilience of pastoral livelihoods.  These interventions 
include: piloting cash-based transfers in selected 
districts; establishing a certification system for the 
Rift Valley Fever and other diseases requiring 
quarantines; rehabilitating infrastructure in the 
market-dependent pastoral livelihood zones; addressing 
chronically high malnutrition and poor access to health 
services; assisting destitute pastoralists; improving 
land, water and crop management; strengthening national 
drought management capacity and enhancing emergency 
preparedness; and enacting the national policy for 
sustainable development of Arid and Semi-Arid Lands of 
Kenya.  According to the assessment report, in order to 
carry out specific activities under each area of 
intervention in the next six months, the agriculture 
sector needs US$8.3 million; livestock sector US$28.6 
million; water and sanitation US$10 million, and health 
and nutrition US$3.4 million. 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
15.  Emergency relief assistance in Kenya has been 
instrumental in saving lives and averting major 
humanitarian crises.  The USG alone provided over US$140 
million emergency assistance over the last year and a 
half through various programs, including food aid and 
non-food relief assistance to drought-affected and other 
 
vulnerable populations -- including refugees who fled 
from neighboring countries due to protracted war and 
insecurity.  The USG also responded to the recent Rift 
Valley Fever outbreak in Kenya by donating 800,000 
critically needed doses of live-attenuated vaccines 
valued at $471,000.  Emergency assistance is critical in 
saving lives and addressing short-term food security 
concerns, and the USG should continue to extend such 
assistance.  However, unless such emergency assistance 
is complemented by urgently needed mitigation and 
recovery programs, short-term emergency assistance alone 
will not have the optimal impact.  This is clearly 
demonstrated by the fact that in spite of large food 
disbursements, food insecurity has risen precariously 
(particularly in the pastoral areas) in Kenya since 
2003. 
 
16.  Key underlying causes of food insecurity in 
pastoral areas need to be addressed comprehensively 
through coordinated mitigation, recovery and long-term 
development programs. In the absence of those programs, 
households are unable to recover completely when 
conditions do improve, due to the cumulative impact of 
droughts and other natural disasters.  Other key issues 
that need to be addressed in a sustained manner include: 
a poorly functioning infrastructure for a livelihood 
(livestock production) that is heavily market-dependent 
as well as for overall economic integration and growth; 
sustained debilitating conflict and extensive land 
degradation due to over-use of scarce resources; a rise 
in destitution and dependency on external assistance; 
and a lack of complementary and/or alternative economic 
opportunities. 
 
17.  However, there appears to be an increasing 
recognition among the donor community, UN Agencies and 
the GoK that comprehensive recovery and longer-term 
development programs are critical to preventing cyclical 
vulnerability and to sustaining food security. In this 
connection, various formal and informal discussions have 
been held among donor groups to map out best strategies 
on how to move this agenda forward with tangible 
political and resource commitment from the GoK. 
USAID/Kenya, as the largest food aid donor (at times 
next to the GoK) in the country, is taking a lead role 
in this discussion, along with DFID, UN agencies, the 
EU, World Bank and other interested donor 
representatives. 
 
18.  Recognizing the need for supplementary assistance 
to finance initiatives which create conditions and 
opportunities for the chronically food insecure, 
USAID/East Africa requested and programmed $19.8 million 
from the International Disaster and Famine Assistance 
("famine Fund") for the Regional Enhanced Livelihoods in 
Pastoral Program (RELPA).  RELPA comprises several 
interrelated components aimed at addressing chronic 
failure of the pastoralist livelihood system in the 
Mandera Triangle - a large, arid region encompassing 
parts of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia, which was the 
epicenter of 2006 hunger crisis in the Horn.  The 
program incorporates a $10 million program (Enhanced 
Livelihoods in the Mandera Triangle) to implement 
activities that are expected to increase the self- 
reliance of the populations in pastoral areas.  RELPA 
also seeks to increase the level of engagement of the 
governments in the target area to focus on longer-term 
development needs of their ASAL populations, under the 
overarching coordination of COMESA. 
 
19. The underlying causes of the prolonged food crisis 
in Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid pastoral and marginal 
agricultural areas clearly go much deeper than emergency 
assistance programs alone can address. The problem is 
fundamentally one of chronic poverty, necessitating 
 
strategies to address the root causes of food insecurity 
on a sustained basis.  This calls for more dialogue with 
and policy actions by the GOK that promote targeted and 
sustained investments in the Arid and Semi-Arid areas in 
order to reduce levels of poverty and extreme 
vulnerability.  Notwithstanding the climate variations 
and the ensuing unreliability of rains, the areas are 
endowed with diverse resources that, if managed 
creatively, could significantly improve the livelihoods 
of the communities at risk. 
 
20.  USAID/Kenya will continue to play an active role in 
the dialogue around understanding the factors underlying 
repeated food crises in various parts of the country and 
in finding new approaches to protect poor people from 
short-term shocks and reduce their food insecurity in 
the medium term.  This discussion will contribute to 
joint GOK-donor commitment to tackling chronic food 
insecurity in a more effective manner. 
 
21.  In the meantime, given the existing emergency food 
pipeline gap, the USG should sustain its relief 
assistance to meet the urgent food and non-food needs of 
1.3 million persons expected to suffer from the 
protracted drought over the coming six months.  A 
specific request for emergency food aid will be 
forthcoming pending further discussions with the GOK, 
WFP and other donors. 
 
RANNEBERGER