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Viewing cable 07MANAMA375, LONE SUNNI OPPOSITION MP UPBEAT ON LEVEL OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAMA375 2007-04-23 14:10 2011-05-04 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Manama
Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9115
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9116
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9117
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9118
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9119
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9120
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9121
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9122
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9123
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9124
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9125
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9126
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9127
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9128
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9122
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9129
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9131
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9562
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9952
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9950
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9951
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9954
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9953
VZCZCXRO3729
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0375/01 1131410
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231410Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6744
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000375

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BA POL
SUBJECT: LONE SUNNI OPPOSITION MP UPBEAT ON LEVEL OF
COLLABORATION IN PARLIAMENT

Classified By: DCM Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

1. (C) In an April 17 meeting with Poloff, Independent MP
Dr. Abdul Aziz Abul, the only Sunni member of the opposition
in the elected Council of Representatives (COR), was
optimistic about real collaboration between parliamentary
members and blocs. He was also optimistic about increased
numbers of Shia being hired by the Ministry of Interior and
the positive ways the Minister was working with leaders in
the Shia community to address concerns about aggressive
police tactics. Abul expressed disappointment for a missed
opportunity for Al Wifaq to address a long-term grievance
about compensation to families of individuals killed in the
unrest of the 1990's. He said that Al Wifaq is concerned
about frustrated and emotional youth who have been carrying
on low-level agitation but who do not listen to the Shia
community's religious and political leaders. COR
oppositionists continue to oppose a royal decree to establish
a commission responsible for complete oversight of the over
$10 billion Qatar-Bahrain causeway. End summary.

2. (C) In a meeting with Poloff April 17, Independent MP Dr.
Abdul Aziz Abul, who is the chair of the Finance and Economic
Affairs Committee and sole Sunni member of the elected COR
who is allied with Al Wifaq's 17 MPs in the opposition,
expressed much optimism about cooperation between
parliamentary blocs and the work accomplished in the first
four months of the new parliament. Abul spoke of his effort
to focus initially on issues for which there can be
cooperation with MPs of other blocs, and said that later he
will raise more difficult issues, such as constitutional
amendments and election district reform. He spends more time
than he would like on constituent services, such as housing
and employment matters, and pointed to the need for a staff
budget to hire someone to follow up on cases. (Note: Al
Wifaq MP Jawad Fairooz confirmed in a separate meeting that
other parliamentary blocs had realized after beginning to
work together that Al Wifaq MPs were not "monsters" but were
rational, reasonable individuals who shared mutual concerns.)

-------------------------------
Politics of Compromise...Almost
-------------------------------

3. (C) In discussing the need for greater cooperation in the
chamber, Abul described a proposal introduced by COR Speaker
Khalifa Al Dhahrani at the end of the day's legislative
session on April 10, calling for government compensation to
owners of property that was damaged during the unrest in the
1990's. The proposal sparked an angry reaction by Al Wifaq
MP Mohamed Al Maza'al, who demanded that compensation for
people who were killed or tortured, nearly all of whom were
Shia, should be the focus of any proposal for compensation.
(Note: There were 40-some people who died in the 1990's
unrest. The Shia community has long called for compensation
for victims. Sunni proposals for compensation typically have
focused on property damage that resulted from vandalism
caused by Shia rioters.) According to Abul, Al Maza'al's
emotional reaction quickly polarized the discussion, spoiling
the opportunity for a win-win outcome for a long-standing,
difficult issue.

4. (C) When Al Dhahrani unexpectedly introduced the
proposal, Abul said he had spoken with first deputy speaker
and head of Al Asala (Salafi) bloc Ghanim Al Buainain, and
asked for his thoughts on the proposal. Having told Abul
previously that Al Asala was not opposed to helping Al Wifaq
realize some of its long-term demands, Al Buainain said that
MPs should vote to approve the proposal first, and then have
committee members introduce amendments that would include
compensation for human losses. Al Buainain had said that Al
Asala was open to supporting some compensation for these
losses, and other blocs had expressed varying degrees of
support. Abul regretted that the blocs had not been given a
heads up that this proposal would be coming, so that they
could have strategized before the session. As he discussed
the matter with fellow MPs from Al Wifaq after the session,
Abul said they realized that they had miscalculated and
squandered an opportunity.

----------------------------
Shias in the Security Forces
----------------------------

5. (C) Abul told Poloff that he is encouraged by meetings
with and statements by Minister of Interior General Shaikh

MANAMA 00000375 002 OF 003

Rashid Bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, particularly regarding the
hiring of Shia. Abul said he believes that the Ministry has
now institutionalized an unbiased process to evaluate all
applicants, give them a series of physical and written tests,
and for those who pass, place them on a list for hiring.
Abul said that there has been a steady, albeit slow, stream
of Shia being hired by the Ministry of Interior. There still
is an apparent glass ceiling preventing Shia from being
commissioned as officers, but Abul pointed out that the
director of the Undersecretary's office was a Shia with the
rank of captain. The Minister has shown flexibility in
recognizing the grievances of the Shia community about
aggressive police tactics and is willing to address these
concerns. In response to Poloff's question about the heavy
police presence during Formula One (F1) activities April
13-15, Abul said that this period was an exception, as the
government did not want to allow protests that could mar the
F1 event. Regarding the Ministry of Defense, Abul said that
Minister General Shaikh Khalifa Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa
continues to adhere to his policy of not hiring Shia.

----------------
Al Wifaq and Haq
----------------

6. (C) Abul said that Al Wifaq was concerned about recent
street protests by Shia youth because efforts to reason with
the youths had not been effective, reflecting badly on Al
Wifaq. The majority of these youth are between the ages of
14 and 19 and do not listen to religious or community
leaders, including Shaikh Isa Qassim and Shaikh Ali Salman,
MP and the head of Al Wifaq. Abul said that Haq Movement
leader Hasan Mushaima had so far been unresponsive to
requests from Shaikh Isa Qassim to get the youth to stop.
Abul saw only very small numbers of Shia defecting from Al
Wifaq to join the Haq camp and said that Al Wifaq still has
time to produce results from the parliamentary process before
larger segments of the Shia community become disenchanted.

--------------------------
Objection to Royal Decrees
--------------------------

7. (C) Abul said that members of the opposition in the COR
continue to maintain their objection to Law by Royal Decree
number 80 of 2006, which authorizes the establishment of a
commission to manage the construction of, and later the
running of, a causeway between Bahrain and Qatar. His
opposition to the decree is that the size of the project
(current projections are BD 4 billion ($10.6 billion) and
will likely rise) warrants the inclusion of increased
oversight of the project, including by the COR. Abul said
that he and others in the opposition support the causeway in
principle, but the large sums of money involved may be
vulnerable to corruption if the project lacks a sufficient
level of oversight. The COR has asked that a cabinet
minister be appointed as liaison between the causeway
commission and the COR, and the GOB proposed Minister of
Finance Shaikh Ahmed Bin Mohammed Al Khalifa to play this
role, likely a suitable outcome, in Abul's view.

------------------------------
Good to Be Working from Inside
------------------------------

8. (C) Reflecting on the parliament, Abul concluded that it
was absolutely the right decision for the opposition to work
within the system rather than continue its boycott. The
boycott sent a message at the time (in 2002), but now he and
Al Wifaq were able to see ways that they can make a real
difference. Abul admitted that he had become more moderate
in his rhetoric and had focused on working together with
other MPs to accomplish common goals. He also commented on
the way that Al Wifaq had matured over the last few months.
The bloc decided not to push hard right away on sensitive
issues, such as election district imbalances, but to "hold
the stick from the middle" (an Arabic proverb) and build a
productive working foundation with other blocs.

---------------------------
Low Caliber of Al Wifaq MPs
---------------------------

9. (C) Abul told Poloff that it was unfortunate that so few
of Al Wifaq's MPs were qualified to serve in the COR. Only
four or five were competent enough in English to be able to
consult research on political and social issues in order to
educate themselves about matters they faced in parliamentary
discussions. Abul said that he regularly consults studies
conducted in the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and Canada, to

MANAMA 00000375 003 OF 003

inform his policy stance on issues of concern. He said that
there was little research available in Arabic on matters
taken up in parliament, and that those MPs who were limited
to Arabic materials were at a disadvantage to others who were
comfortable in English.

-------
Comment
-------

10. (C) Abul's views of parliament's work are among the most
optimistic and encouraging that post has heard. He strongly
believes that if the government offered carrots instead of
sticks to the opposition, it would find a more positive
reaction from the community at large. This represents a
180-degree swing from his previous views, when he was a
committed boycotter and head of the opposition Constitutional
Conference, which championed amending the 2002 Constitution.
It remains to be seen whether his optimism can hold as the
COR gets deeper into the business of legislation, with many
issues cutting along sectarian lines.

********************************************* ********
Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/
********************************************* ********
MONROE