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Viewing cable 07CASABLANCA73, FRAUD SUMMARY - CASABLANCA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07CASABLANCA73 2007-04-10 13:19 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Casablanca
VZCZCXRO9713
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHCL #0073/01 1001319
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101319Z APR 07
FM AMCONSUL CASABLANCA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7679
INFO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 7942
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 1715
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 7943
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3721
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0546
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0959
RUEHAT/AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM 0011
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0289
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CASABLANCA 000073 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP - SEXTON, CA/VO/F/P, NEA/MAG, PRM 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC FOR FPM JSCHOOLS 
DAMASCUS FOR RCO HICKEY 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGER 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC MO
SUBJECT:   FRAUD SUMMARY - CASABLANCA 
 
CASABLANCA 00000073  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  All consular operations for Morocco are located at 
Casablanca, which is a medium-fraud post where the impact is greater 
on Immigrant Visas (IV) than on Nonimmigrant Visas (NIV).  Post's 
FPU consists of a (part-time vice consul FPM and one FSN Fraud 
Investigator (FSN/FI).  The majority of visa applicants are 
Moroccan--some dual nationals with European or Canadian passports. 
Post also sees a small number of third-country nationals from 
francophone West Africa and several Arabic speaking countries. 
 
DV fraud consists of occasional fraudulent educational documents or 
fraudulent claims to perform qualified jobs.  Fraudulent 
relationships are seen in both DV and IV cases, making up the 
majority of fraud that post sees.  Post has also seen an increase in 
IV workload and fraud, many in cases involving internet 
relationships.  Post has not discovered serious fraud trends among 
NIV applications--other than bogus work, bank, or salary statements 
which are easily detected on the line due to their poor quality. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS:  Morocco has long porous borders and an 
extensive coastline.  Demographic and economic conditions continue 
to provide fertile ground fraud as the young unemployed seek better 
opportunities in the industrialized West.  Approximately thirty 
percent of all college undergraduates are unemployed or 
underemployed.  In addition, Morocco's geographic proximity to 
Western Europe has historically made it a convenient embarkation 
point for smugglers and narcotics traffickers.  The Spanish enclaves 
of Ceuta and Melilla, along the Mediterranean coast and the relative 
proximity of the Spanish Canary Islands further exacerbates the 
allure for illegal immigrants, making Europe an easier and less 
expensive target for illegal migration than the United States. 
 
With Moroccan nationals having been convicted of organizing 
terrorist activities and attacks in Morocco and in third countries, 
Morocco is a "country of concern" under the Department of Homeland 
Security's Visa Security Program. 
 
The relationship between post and the Interior Ministry and Police 
infrastructure is positive.  FPU works closely with state-owned 
Royal Air Maroc (RAM) and Moroccan immigration authorities when the 
authenticity of a U.S. travel document is in question.  RAM 
officials and immigration officials at Casablanca's Mohammed V 
airport have been particularly vigilant and effective in detecting 
visa fraud and contacting post.  These cases mostly involve West 
African nationals attempting to transit to the U.S. 
 
The fraud level is low in obtaining Moroccan passports, birth 
certificates and national identification cards from official 
sources.  The Moroccan authorities take identification fraud very 
seriously.  Any official corruption related to providing false 
identification is prosecuted aggressively, with punishments for 
falsifying a Moroccan national identification card ranging to a 
maximum 5 years imprisonment.  This also holds true for educational 
documents from official government sources as noted in the DV fraud 
section below. 
 
The passport and registry offices process passport applications 
carefully but slowly.  This process takes at least 6 months for the 
Moroccan police and passport authorities to investigate each case. 
Due to this delay, bribery of local officials to place one's 
passport application in the front of the queue for commune review, a 
police investigation, or printing is a very common form of 
corruption.  To our knowledge, however, bribery related to altering 
identities in a passport is rare due to the severe legal 
ramifications. 
 
B. NIV FRAUD:  NIV fraud generally involves false work documents, 
fake or inflated bank account information and disinformation about 
pertinent 214(b) details.  Normally these situations are handled at 
the window, although the FSN/FI will occasionally use online checks 
with tax authorities or call an employer to verify the applicant's 
claims.  Fraudulent documents often contain grammatical and 
typographical errors and lack the required tax authority number. 
Even stationery from legitimate businesses tends to look 
unprofessional, so post often looks more closely at bank statements, 
which are more difficult to falsify. 
 
 
CASABLANCA 00000073  002.4 OF 003 
 
 
The major Moroccan-American communities in the U.S. are in the 
Washington D.C., Boston, Orlando, and New York areas, with growing 
communities in the Denver, Los Angeles and Houston areas. 
Applicants for those destinations who claim no acquaintances in the 
U.S. are likely to be concealing friends and family members who may 
have overstayed visas. 
 
In addition, post processes a number of Q-1 visas for young 
Moroccans to work for a year at the Marrakech restaurant in the 
Epcot Center at Disney World in Florida.  Return rates traditionally 
had been very poor.  In recent years, however, post has worked 
closely with the local American representative from the Walt Disney 
Corporation to implement new standards for potential applicants. 
These include requiring enrollment in one of Morocco's many tourism 
schools, internship experience in the hospitality industry, an 
intermediate ability to speak English, and a preference for 
applicants without relatives in the U.S. 
 
C. IV FRAUD:  Post has seen a continued increase in the number of 
sham marriages in Fiance(e)(K) and Spouse (IR-1 or CR-1) 
cases-often, but not always, relationships that have begun via the 
Internet.  Usually these involve older American women and young 
unemployed Moroccan men with relatives in the U.S.  The American 
woman petitioner is generally 8-20 years older than the beneficiary, 
does not speak French or Arabic, has little or no travel outside the 
U.S., and met the beneficiary--who speaks little or no 
English--online or via his relative in the U.S.  Often the only time 
the two have actually met is when the petitioner traveled to Morocco 
for an engagement ceremony and/or marriage.  Rarely do they return 
to Morocco after a short visit to "get married." 
 
In such cases, fraud is easiest to identify where the applicant 
cannot conduct the interview in English, cannot provide basic 
personal information about the petitioner such as the place of work 
or residence, and cannot produce evidence of the petitioner's trip 
to Morocco or their ongoing communication.  Another indicator of 
possible fraud is the nature of the engagement and/or wedding 
ceremony photos submitted.  Even in poorer Moroccan communities, if 
genuine, both occasions are marked by large multifaceted ceremonies 
involving dozens of family members and friends, with several meals 
served and elaborate decorations and clothing.  A hastily-taken 
picture of a few relatives and the betrothed couple sitting in a 
living room or restaurant frequently alert the interviewing officer 
that the relationship requires further investigation. 
 
D. DV FRAUD:  Post has seen a dramatic decline in DV fraud as far as 
qualifications are concerned.  The main area for fraud in DVs is now 
in questionable relationship for recently added DV-2s. 
 
E. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD:  Post has not identified any cases of ACS 
or Passport Fraud during the past year.  Post has seen a few cases 
where the parents claim not to be married, but have a child with a 
birth certificate naming both parents.  Such documents are not 
issued unless the couple is married.  These few cases do not affect 
transmission of citizenship, but may reflect attempts to conceal a 
Moroccan wife when the now-Amcit husband was involved in a sham 
marriage to an Amcit to obtain citizenship. 
 
F. ADOPTION FRAUD:  Post has not had any adoption cases in the past 
year and has no associated fraud to report. 
 
G. ASLYUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD:  Post encountered one 
incident towards the end of the year of asylee fraud.  A Moroccan 
who had falsely obtained asylee status seven years ago under the 
claim that he was a Kurdish-Iraqi was detained at the Casablanca 
airport upon arrival. 
 
H. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES:  The FPU and RSO 
have extensive contacts and a generally positive relationship with 
several Ministries in the Government of Morocco.  The FPU 
coordinates the verification of Moroccan and American travel 
documents with the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible 
for all urban police services, immigration and customs.  This 
includes verifying suspect LPR credentials and/or visas presented by 
West African nationals transiting Morocco to the U.S. via RAM's 
direct flight to New York.  In addition, immigration authorities at 
Morocco's airports will verify if and when a traveler entered or 
 
CASABLANCA 00000073  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
left Morocco. 
 
The FPU also verifies Moroccan birth certificates forwarded by 
post's visa units and other USG agencies such as DHS Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents investigating immigration 
violations with the Ministry of the Interior.  The same office is 
also helps our ACS unit following up welfare/whereabouts and other 
inquiries. Finally, the FPU verifies police certificates and 
possible wanted persons in Morocco with the National Security 
Directorate, the bureau of the Ministry of the Interior responsible 
for all police operations in Morocco's cities. 
 
As noted above, the FPU also works closely with the Ministry of 
Justice to verify Moroccan marriage and divorce certificates at the 
request of the visa units.  This entails calling the court at which 
the certificate was issued and requesting their verification.  In 
most cases, the court will issue a formal letter or an official note 
through the Ministry of Justice verifying the result.  This has been 
particularly useful in combating sham DV and IV marriages. 
 
The FPU continues to maintain a long-standing relationship with 
government-owned RAM airline.  In many circumstances, it is actually 
a RAM representative that identifies a passenger bearing a 
fraudulent US or Moroccan travel document and notifies the 
immigration or police authorities at the airport. 
 
After the May 16, 2003 Casablanca bombings, the Moroccan Parliament 
passed a new terrorism law that significantly increased the 
penalties for forgeries and the fraudulent production of government 
and private documents.  The punishments are most serious for 
government documents, such as passports, national identification 
cards, and police and educational certificates, with the penalties 
ranging from a minimum six month jail term to 5 years for serious 
offenses. For private documents, punishments range from 6 months to 
two years, depending on the harm done with the fraudulent documents. 
 These crimes and visa fraud are prosecuted by the Moroccan 
authorities, as all individuals referred to the police by the FPU 
were sentenced to at least a six-month prison term. 
 
I. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN:  The number of suspect and actual 
sham relationships continues to rise on the IV line. These include 
inter-family relationships, such as marriage to a first cousin and 
Internet relationships.  While first-cousin marriages are culturally 
accepted in Morocco, it is rare that the beneficiary can provide 
evidence of a non-familial relationship with the petitioner.  The 
workload volume on IV relationship cases has increased since 2005 
with IR-1 numbers up 48%, CR-1 numbers up 3.4%, and K-1 numbers up 
44%. 
 
K-3 numbers have declined; however post attributes this decline to 
processing issues--CR/IR-1s were arriving at post before K-3s in 
several instances-and other forms of fraud.  Additionally, anecdotal 
evidence from current IV applicants and American Citizen petitioners 
at post indicates that numerous previous K-1 recipients were 
actually already married to the petitioner, but using the K-1 to get 
to the U.S. quicker.  Thus, post began this year to require official 
confirmation of the beneficiary's singlehood-a certificate issued by 
Moroccan authorities. 
 
J. STAFFING AND TRAINING:  The FPU consists of a single FSN Fraud 
Investigator (FI) and an FPM vice consul who also serves as the ACS 
Chief.  In addition to general NIV and ACS training, the FI has 
attended regional fraud prevention courses at Nicosia in 1996, Rome 
in 1999, and FSI in 2007.  Morocco remains in the top ten countries 
worldwide for Diversity Visa entrants.  As a result, demand for the 
FSN/FI's knowledgeable, fraud-related interpretation assistance on 
the visa line is increasingly occupying his time.  In addition, due 
to his experience, he backs up most FSN positions in the section. 
GREENE