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Viewing cable 07ANKARA906, Drowning in Tea Leaves - Turkish Press Coverage of the

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ANKARA906 2007-04-17 10:08 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
null
Dianne Wampler  04/18/2007 05:18:29 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Dianne Wampler

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
UNCLAS        ANKARA 00906

SIPDIS
CX:
    ACTION: PA
    INFO:   ECON AMB DCM POL PMA

DISSEMINATION: PAO /1
CHARGE: PAS

APPROVED: A/PAO: MEMCKAY
DRAFTED: POL: JWEINER
CLEARED: NONE

VZCZCAYI995
RR RUEHC RUEHIT RUEHDA
DE RUEHAK #0906/01 1071008
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 171008Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1769
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 2537
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 1865
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000906 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/SE; EUR/PPD - TDAVIDSON, JRICKERT; INR/R/EUR 
ISTANBUL FOR PAO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC PGOV KPAO TU
SUBJECT: Drowning in Tea Leaves - Turkish Press Coverage of the 
Presidential Elections 
 
REF: Ankara 898 
 
1. Summary:  As the Turkish Presidential election begins officially, 
the media's coverage leading up to the election has been obsessed 
with "will he or won't he,"  playing a guessing game rather than 
conducting any serious analysis of what it would mean for the 
country, should PM Erdogan become president.  The Prime Minister has 
until now, by most critics' accounts, played a cagey game, refusing 
to give any clear indication as to whether or not he will run. 
This, along with an anemic opposition, Turkey's unique brand of 
democratic politics, and the media's reluctance to play a role in 
civil society, has left the media drowning in their own tea leaves. 
End Summary. 
 
Frenzied Oracles 
 
2. Press speculation on whether or not Prime Minister Erdogan could 
become president started in a significant way last fall and has 
continued throughout the last several months, building in intensity. 
 From the beginning, both beat reporters and columnists have asked 
one primary question: "Will he or won't he?" Every utterance from an 
AKP member, in particular from the Prime Minister, is fodder for a 
new front page story.  On the eve of the elections, for instance, 
the PM remarked to journalists, "It doesn't matter whether I'm Prime 
Minister or President, like everyone, I will end up in a grave 
someday."  This, along with other equally opaque comments, was 
sufficient to cause journalists to speculate that he will run for 
President. 
 
3. In contrast, a PM comment six weeks ago that "our lives are full 
of surprises, there might be a surprise" caused reporters to 
speculate that the PM would not run for office.  Commentators, too, 
fill countless column inches looking for signs in every off-the-cuff 
remark.  Some, tiring of the normal speculation, use their columns 
to analyze their colleagues' obsession with the speculation. 
Turkish Daily News columnist Yusuf Kanli said in a recent piece that 
only four people know - the PM and his wife and FM Gul and his wife 
- and they're laughing to themselves.  Meanwhile, Zaman columnist 
Mustafa Unal recently praised the PM for not revealing his 
intentions.  Unal rightly points out that previous presidents Ozal, 
Demirel and Sezer also were announced last minute.  By withholding a 
public announcement, Unal argues, the PM has avoided a damaging 
campaign. 
 
Where's the analysis? 
 
4. The reasons why the media are stuck in the speculative sphere 
include concrete factors such as an anemic opposition that seems 
unable or unwilling to put forth serious policy alternatives.  While 
AKP members are content to throw out ambiguous comments, the 
opposition spits venomous warnings about headscarved women in 
Cankaya (anathema to Turkey's "secular" elite) and raises red 
herring arguments such as the possibility that the PM's past 
criminal conviction (on a freedom of speech charge) could prevent 
him from becoming president.  This leaves the press with little of 
substance to report on.  Even if a journalist might be inspired to 
think beyond the "will he or won't he" question, many journalists 
don't see any constructive reason to do so.  As mainstream daily 
Hurriyet Bureau Chief Enis Berberoglu says, "Why write something 
positive about Erdogan that could be used as propaganda in his 
campaign?" 
 
5. The fact that the president is chosen by the parliament - which 
is firmly controlled by the AKP - also means journalists and even 
normal citizens do not play an active role in the process. 
Journalists, according to MFA Spokesman Levent Bilman, probably 
believe it is a "done deal" so don't see the need to expend any 
serious energy on it.  Others cite the media itself as the major 
factor.  Leyla Tasvanoglu of nationalist daily Cumhuriyet says, "Few 
journalists are serious, they go their own ways."  Business daily 
Dunya columnist Mithat Melen adds, "Editors don't want to upset the 
government, so journalists don't write anything serious," a reminder 
of the convoluted and murky relationships between the government and 
media that play heavily in how news gets reported (reftel). 
 
Islamists vs. Secularists 
 
6. When reporters have moved past the simple will-won't question, 
their reporting has split predictably down secularist-Islamist 
lines.  Columnists for Islamic oriented dailies Zaman and Yeni Safak 
have written with increasing stridency that the debate about the 
presidency is really about elite secularists wanting to exclude the 
country's majority from governing.  Zaman columnist Etyen 
Mahcupyan's view that "the bureaucratic elite feel democracy is a 
regime that reflects their own preferences, not the public's" is a 
typical example. 
 
7. Secularist press reports, both straight reporting and opinion 
pieces, range from mild references to the specter of secret Islamist 
agendas to Cumhuriyet's highly dramatic paid advertising campaign in 
which a black and white picture of a clock appears above the words, 
"the clock is about to turn back 100 years."  Add to this the 
constant speculation of the military's intentions as well as a 
persistent conspiracy theory that the US is really backing an AKP 
candidate, and you have a rich and spicy stew, but without much 
meat. 
 
8. Comment: Until a presidential candidate is announced, the current 
tenor of coverage - speculative and biased - will likely continue 
and even intensify.  Once a candidate is announced, some substance 
may appear but serious analysis is unlikely, given the unique, long 
existing structure of both the political and media systems.  End 
comment. 
WILSON