Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07ADDISABABA1271, DEVELOPMENT AND EXERCISING AVIAN AND PANDEMIC RESPONSE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ADDISABABA1271.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ADDISABABA1271 2007-04-24 08:37 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXYZ0017
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #1271/01 1140837
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240837Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5812
INFO RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA
UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 001271 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR G/AIAG, AF/EX, AND DS/IP/AF 
USAID/W FOR AFR/SD, BGH/AI, AFR/ESA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ET KFLU TBIO AMED EAID EAGR SENV XW
SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT AND EXERCISING AVIAN AND PANDEMIC RESPONSE 
PLANS IN ETHIOPIA 
 
REF:  a) STATE 50514; b) Addis 1042 
 
1. SUMMARY:  Post's inter-agency Avian Influenza Committee met March 
29 to review the situation in Ethiopia with respect to a possible 
outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in the country 
(reftel b).  The GOE's recent revamping of its National Task Force 
for the Prevention and Control of Avian Influenza highlight that 
addressing other emerging zoonotic/epizootic diseases, such as Rift 
Valley Fever (which has occurred in neighboring Kenya and Somalia), 
may be a greater immediate concern for Ethiopian authorities. The 
government does not have plans to test their National AI 
Preparedness Plan but continues to support active surveillance in 
high risk areas throughout the country.  Although HPAI has been 
confirmed in several states bordering Ethiopia (Sudan and Djibouti), 
there is no evidence of HPAI in Ethiopia.  Ethiopia remains at risk 
for HPAI, but risk of transmission may not be as high as originally 
stated, largely because Ethiopia has few large-scale poultry farms, 
and there is no cross-border movement of poultry into Ethiopia. 
USAID, CDC, FAO, WHO, and DFID continue to work with the Ethiopian 
government to prepare for and respond to potential future AI 
outbreaks, through supporting surveillance, prevention, and training 
activities. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. Emboffs, CDC, and USAID representatives reviewed the HPAI 
situation in Ethiopia and the region at Post's March 29 AI Committee 
meeting chaired by DCM (reftel b).  USAID highlighted that HPAI has 
been confirmed in Sudan, Djibouti, Egypt and Nigeria.  While 
Ethiopia remains at risk for HPAI, risk of transmission may not be 
as high as originally stated, largely because Ethiopia has few 
large-scale poultry farms, and most families have only 6-12 chickens 
on their compounds.  Compounds in rural areas also tend to be widely 
dispersed with little inter-mixing of poultry from household to 
household.  Additionally, and perhaps most important, there is no 
cross-border movement of poultry into Ethiopia. 
 
---------------------------------- 
GOE CONDUCTING ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE 
---------------------------------- 
 
3. The Ethiopian government, through assistance from FAO, is 
conducting active surveillance of farms (both household and poultry 
production) around the country, with a particular focus on border 
areas with Sudan and Djibouti.  In mid-March 2007, samples collected 
from a poultry disease outbreak in Ethiopia's western 
Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State were submitted to the National 
Animal Health Research Center (NAHRC).  Preliminary results indicate 
negative findings for HPAI, although replicate samples were sent to 
Weibridge, UK, for further analysis. 
 
4. Surveillance teams from the FAO and the GOE's Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (MOARD) are deployed throughout 
the country.  In March, a team from Dire Dawa Veterinary Laboratory 
conducted active AI disease surveillance by administrating 
structured questionnaires in Dire Dawa Provisional Administrative 
Council, Harari Region; and in Shinile and Erer districts, of the 
Somali Region.  The team visited 3 small-scale poultry farms and 
interviewed 84 farmers, none of whom reported observing any unusual 
mass die-offs or illnesses in either domestic or wild birds in the 
past 60 days.  The team also collected information about livestock 
populations, veterinary infrastructure, and manpower.  Surveillance 
teams are also briefing communities on AI risks and the need to 
report any bird diseases immediately to nearby agriculture offices 
or other designated authorities. 
 
------------------------------------- 
PREPAREDNESS 
------------------------------------- 
 
 5. A National AI Prevention and Containment Plan has been developed 
and disseminated by the original national AI Task Force with input 
from relevant groups such as government agencies, private sector, 
civil society, USAID, CDC, FAO, and WHO.  The plan includes 
containment measures including vaccination of domestic poultry and 
culling. The plan has been costed and an implementation plan has 
been developed. 
 
6. At this time the Government does not have plans to test the 
preparedness plan. However, as stated above, the government 
maintains active animal surveillance in key high risk areas. 
Through active surveillance, teams collected samples from poultry at 
least once in the past six months in 75-100% of target areas. 
Currently, on average it takes 7-12 days from the onset of 
"significant" deaths in poultry or wild birds associated with 
clinical symptoms consistent with H5N1 to the collection of clinical 
samples for H5 or H5N1 diagnosis by rapid diagnostic or laboratory 
testing.    Average number of days from receipt of clinical samples 
from an outbreak with "significant" bird deaths associated with 
clinical symptoms consistent with highly-pathogenic H5N1, it takes 5 
 
- 9 days to either confirm or rule out H5 or H5N1 avian influenza as 
the causative agent using a rapid diagnostic or laboratory testing. 
 
 
7. Mission points of contact are:  Judith Robb-McCord, 
USAID/Ethiopia Health Officer (251-11-551-88) and Carolyn Greene, 
CDC/Ethiopia Deputy Director for Programs (251-11-4669566). 
 
YAMAMOTO