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Viewing cable 07USUNNEWYORK259, UN FORCE IN CHAD: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07USUNNEWYORK259 2007-03-30 23:50 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXRO6915
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0259/01 0892350
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 302350Z MAR 07 ZDK
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1630
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1221
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0638
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0250
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000259 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UN FORCE IN CHAD: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 36994 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000259  001.8 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a private meeting with the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), Minister of External Affairs 
of Chad Ahmad Allam-mi stressed the GOC was still in the 
"exploratory phase" of its deliberations on possible UN 
peacekeeping in eastern Chad and was open to discussion on 
the military component for an eventual force.  However, he 
outlined the GOC vision of such a force as one with a 
humanitarian and protection mandate based not on UNSC 
Resolution 1706 (2006), but rather on the September 20 
African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
Communique.  He emphasized the GOC commitment to ongoing 
dialogue with the UN and the international community on the 
issue and supported the dispatching of a UN preparatory 
mission to Chad.  Allam-mi feared a worsening of the 
humanitarian situation in eastern Chad if the crisis there 
were "internationalized" to the extent of appearing hostile 
to regional players.  He reverted to the traditional GOC 
position of placing all blame for instability in eastern Chad 
on the persistence of the Darfur crisis and on Sudanese 
interference with Chadian rebels, showing little faith in 
attempts at reconciliation with Chad's eastern neighbor. 
Members seemed content with the prospect of continued 
dialogue with the GOC and called for the UN to re-engage. 
USUN recommends pushing the UN for the dispatching of 
elements of the advance mission authorized in the January 16 
PRST to intiate movement on eventual deployment of a UN 
peacekeeping operation in eastern Chad.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) In a private meeting with the UNSC, Minister of 
External Affairs of Chad Ahmad Allam-mi explained the GOC's 
(i.e., President Deby's) position on deployment of a UN force 
to Chad's eastern border region with Sudan.  He prefaced his 
explanation by recalling the GOC's desire to re-locate all 12 
refugee camps from the border but offered no elaboration on 
any GOC plan for this re-location when asked by Ambassador 
Sanders.  Noting the complicated situation that exists in 
eastern Chad, including "murderous attacks" by the janjaweed 
which have resulted in the exodus of thousands of Chadians to 
Darfur, Allam-mi said the GOC had welcomed offers of 
assistance from the international community to protect 
refugees and humanitarian workers at risk in eastern Chad. 
Even Deby himself had agreed "in principle" to deployment of 
an international force for this purpose, Allami-mi went on, 
under the condition that it deploy with full respect for 
Chadian sovereignty. 
 
3. (SBU) Allam-mi then turned to a member of his delegation 
to outline the Chadian vision of such a force, a vision 
centered around police forces supported by gendarmes, both of 
whom should be under the auspices of an international police 
force for training and monitoring purposes.  The mandate of 
this mission would be solely to protect refugees and 
humanitarians to reinforce security in, between and around 
refugee camps and to secure safe passage for humanitarian 
convoys.  Only later in the course of Q & A with Members did 
Allam-mi specify that IDPs would also be included in this 
category, but he was clear that refugees, not/not IDPs, were 
the GOC's main protection concern.  The total number of 
police and gendarmes proposed was 2,316: 120 in each of the 
12 camps (1,440), 11 operators for each of 36 tanks at each 
of 12 camps (396), 20 civilian police for each of the 12 
camps (240), 190 for convoy protection and 50 for 
headquarters.  Air assets were envisioned for the force, 
according to Allam-mi.  While he rejected both options for 
deployment presented in the February 23 SYG Report (repeating 
several times that deployment should be based not on OP9 of 
UNSCR 1706 but rather on the September 20 AU PSC Communique), 
Allam-mi said the GOC did not have a definitive position on 
the UN presence (adding that the Council of Ministers had yet 
to take a decision) and was open to discussion on its 
military component.  Allam-mi agreed with Ambassador Sanders 
and Ghanaian Permanent Representative (PR) Effah-Apenteng 
that the UN force must be able to execute its mandate and to 
protect itself. 
 
4. (SBU) Allam-mi emphasized the GOC commitment to ongoing 
dialogue with the UN and the international community on the 
issue and supported the dispatching of a UN "preparatory 
mission" to Chad (NOTE: It was unclear whether Allam-mi was 
referring to the advance mission MiNUTAC authorized in the 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000259  002.6 OF 003 
 
 
January 16 UNSC Presidential Statement.  END NOTE).  He 
favored an eventual UN presence that would be of "modest" 
size so as to avoid creating an "internationalization" of the 
situation in eastern Chad that would provoke regional 
players, citing action that Libya had taken to try to calm 
the situation.  Allam-mi feared that Sudan would see a robust 
force as an attempt to cross the border into Darfur and would 
accordingly retaliate, as it was already doing in violation 
of the Tripoli Accords by arming Chadian rebels and bombing 
sites in the northeastern region of Chad's border.  Given 
these bombings, Allam-mi contended Sudan was incapable of 
adhering to the terms of the Tripoli Accords, which called 
for a joint Chad-Sudan border force.  Allam-mi claimed the 
GOC was fighting the janjaweed along its eastern border, 
resulting in modest IDP returns.  He offered the support of 
Chadian security forces to the eventual UN operation but was 
emphatic that the international presence play no part with 
Chad's internal rebellion. 
 
5. (SBU) Members were content with the prospect of continued 
dialogue with the GOC.  Congolese PR Ikouebe and Ghanaian PR 
Effah-Apenteng called for a "meeting of the minds" between 
the UN and the GOC to find an "imaginative" solution to 
securing the east.  French PR de La Sabliere was concerned by 
the apparent disconnect between GOC and UN visions of eastern 
Chad peacekeeping and called for a meeting with the UN 
Secretariat to find a solution.  He called for a new UN 
 
SIPDIS 
mission to the region to conduct technical discussions with 
Chadian authorities, a call seconded by the Chinese, UK and 
Russian delegates.  To this end Ambassador Sanders, drawing 
from reftel points, urged the immediate dispatching of the 
advance mission authorized by the Council in its January 16 
Presidential Statement. 
 
6. (SBU) Several delegations called for respect for GOC 
sovereignty.  The Chinese, Russian and Qatari representatives 
insisted on GOC consent before any UN deployment in eastern 
Chad.  The French PR said that no further action on 
deployment could be taken without GOC endorsement.  The 
Qatari delegate stressed that the GOC bore primary 
responsibility for the protection of its civilians but did 
not rule out external assistance from neighboring states and 
the international community.  Employing a traditional stall 
tactic, he raised the possibility of seeking Sudanese 
concurrence on the idea of a UN border force, an idea echoed 
by Russian Deputy PR Dolgov.  Allam-mi acknowledged that 
provisions of the Tripoli Accords calling for such 
consultation had gone unimplemented, and he reiterated that 
the solution to eastern Chad's problems lay in solving those 
in Darfur. 
 
7. (SBU) No next steps were explicitly outlined.  The French 
Mission circulated a "discussion paper" in advance of 
Allam-mi's briefing, but no action was taken on it during or 
after the March 23 session.  Based on Members' reactions, it 
was premature to begin deliberations on an eventual 
resolution - Allam-mi in fact thanked the UNSC for not having 
hastily tabled a resolution - until the UN returns to Chad to 
continue discussions with the GOC. 
 
8. (SBU) Poloff and Miloff subsequently met with DPKO Police 
Division and Chad Operations Office to talk about next steps 
in the wake of Allam-mi's proposal.  DPKO police planners are 
moving forward but are opposed to the idea of deploying any 
police into a hostile environment without military back-up. 
They mentioned that they had personnel ready to go for the 
advance mission authorized in the January 16 PRST (MiNUTAC), 
whenever that mission might deploy.  Poloff asked what was 
preventing these officers from going to Chad to initiate such 
technical discussions, since the Council authorized this 
departure back in January and since the police component was 
the one thing to which the GOC did not object and which would 
be necessary regardless of what the military component would 
or would not ultimately look like.  Poloff argued that 
sending out such a team (for which funding already existed) 
could be seen as a confidence-building measure to get the 
dialogue going with the GOC, which had indicated through 
Allam-mi it was open to dialogue on the peacekeeping plan 
presented, and to lay the groundwork for adding on further 
peacekeeping layers to the eventual force.  DPKO Police 
replied only that dispatching police would appear to be 
acquiescing to GOC demands. 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000259  003.6 OF 003 
 
 
 
9. (SBU) DPKO Chad Operations Officer said he was working on 
a draft letter from the SYG to President Deby that was 
intended to take Deby up on his offer of dialogue on details 
of UN peacekeeping in eastern Chad.  He agreed with Poloff 
that a third Technical Assessment Team would not be necessary 
and that MiNUTAC should be used as the vehicle for dialogue 
with the GOC.  DPKO was concerned that Allam-mi's plan 
considered IDPs as an afterthought and would make sure this 
issue would not be neglected in any UN conversations with the 
GOC. 
 
10. (SBU) USUN recommends pushing the UN for the dispatching 
of elements of the advance mission authorized in the January 
16 PRST to intiate movement on eventual deployment of a UN 
peacekeeping operation in eastern Chad.  UN police experts 
could discuss with GOC counterparts plans for policing 
refugee camps and humanitarian corridors that would serve 
Chadian interests by training local police.  The planners 
would need to stress, however, that this benefit does not 
come for free and would require military back-up to ensure 
protection and sustainability. 
WOLFF