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Viewing cable 07USUNNEWYORK161, UNSC MOVING CAUTIOUSLY ON UN PEACEKEEPING IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07USUNNEWYORK161 2007-03-01 14:47 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXRO1847
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0161/01 0601447
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 011447Z MAR 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1426
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1173
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0964
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0794
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0587
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0232
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000161 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD ET PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC MOVING CAUTIOUSLY ON UN PEACEKEEPING IN 
CHAD/CAR 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 23989 
     B. NDJAMENA 00171 
     C. NDJAMENA 00176 
     D. USUN NEW YORK 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000161  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At February 27 consultations, a majority of 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members advocated a 
go-slow approach toward UN peacekeeping in Chad and the 
Central African Republic (CAR), mindful of Chadian President 
Deby's attitude toward deployment, which so far has been 
equivocal at best (ref B).  No draft resolution on the 
mandate of a force was tabled, although a coalition emerged 
between the French, Ghanaian, Congolese and South African 
delegations on the crafting of an eventual text, something 
the USG might consider joining (see para 9).  While all 
delegates agreed the Darfur crisis was spilling into eastern 
Chad and northeastern CAR, no delegation openly endorsed 
either of the two options for deployment articulated in the 
Secretary-General's February 23 Report (S/2007/97).  Possible 
 
SIPDIS 
steps raised for keeping Deby engaged in peacekeeping 
discussions included an invitation to the GOC to come to New 
York to meet with the UNSC and an engagement with Libyan COL 
Qadhafi, who has mediated recent bilateral agreements between 
the GOC and the Sudanese Government of National Unity.  On 
Darfur, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
Assistant SYG Annabi reported receipt on February 26 of a 
letter from the Sudanese PermRep that expressed hope for the 
normalization of Chad-Sudan relations in the wake of the 
latest Tripoli Agreement and that alluded to the arrival "at 
any moment" of President Bashir's response to the UN and 
African Union's January 24 letter on the Heavy Support 
Package (HSP) assistance to the AU Mission in the Sudan 
(AMIS). END SUMMARY. 
 
EASTERN CHAD: "NOT A CONVENTIONAL PEACEKEEPING ENVIRONMENT" 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
2. (SBU) DPKO A/SYG Annabi followed up on his January 16 
briefing (ref D) and reported the recommendations of the 
second Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) to Chad and CAR, 
which visited the region from January 21 to February 6.  He 
noted that the number of internally displaced persons in 
eastern Chad had increased to 120,000 as of early February, 
due in large part to militia attacks in Dar Sila and 
heightened tensions between populations over scarce natural 
resources.  Annabi reported that the 12 refugee camps in 
eastern Chad remained "easy targets" for recruitment by 
Sudanese rebels and added that IDP sites had reportedly also 
been experiencing similar recruitment. 
 
3. (SBU) Annabi emphasized that eastern Chad was "not a 
conventional peacekeeping environment" and would create 
significant logisitical and operational challenges for any UN 
peacekeeping force that was to be deployed there.  Although 
noting the possible perception of the UN force by Chadian 
rebels as partial to the GOC given the requisite coordination 
it would maintain with the Chadian Armed Forces (ANT), Annabi 
dismissed any need for permission or "guarantees" from these 
rebels assuring the safety of peacekeepers, and made 
reference to a tacit arrangement the French military in 
Abeche have come to with the rebels as a viable precedent. 
He said that in the French case, the rebels obviously 
realized that French forces would not initiate hostilities 
with them but would respond with deadly force if provoked. 
Annabi insisted that in order to be credible, the force must 
focus on protecting civilians and deterring cross-border 
attacks; he was firm that the force should not be mandated to 
interdict or undertake "hot pursuit" operations across the 
border into Sudan, nor should it take on border control 
responsibilities.  Annabi highlighted the standing sovereign 
responsibilities of both the GOC and the GCAR to protect 
their own populations against violence along their borders. 
 
4. (SBU) Annabi spoke at length about his February 5 meeting 
with President Deby, in which Annabi outlined the TAM 
findings, discussed a concept of operations for a UN force, 
and stressed any such force's mandate to protect civilians 
and serve as a deterrent for cross-border attacks.  Deby, 
however, remained unconvinced, as he had in his December 2006 
meeting with Annabi.  Deby had reiterated his preference for 
a civilian-only force (gendarmes and police) without UN 
military peacekeepers and remarked that the only reason the 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000161  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
UN was seeking an operation in Chad was because it was unable 
to deploy one on the Sudan side of the border.  Annabi said 
that Deby felt slighted by the UNSC, which had never 
responded to his repeated appeals for support against "acts 
of Sudanese aggression" (ref C).  In response to Deby's 
request that the TAM's recommendations be submitted to him in 
writing for approval, Annabi had sent an Aide Memoire to the 
Acting FM on February 6 and to the Chadian PermRep upon the 
TAM's return to New York.  The Chadian PR informed Annabi on 
February 26 that he had received an "oral message" from FM 
Allam-mi, which stated the GOC needed more time to study the 
TAM report, reiterated Deby's February 5 position and warned 
against precipitous UNSC action without first conferring with 
the GOC.  Annabi was receptive, as were representatives of 
the Department of Political Affairs, to the idea of inviting 
a GOC official to New York to discuss these issues with the 
UNSC directly. 
 
5. (SBU) Despite Deby's ambivalent stance, Annabi said that 
preparations were underway for a UN force, as well as for the 
advance mission authorized by the January 16 UNSC 
Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2007/2).  Pre-mandate 
authority for the advance mission was expected by the end of 
February, and Annabi confirmed the mission would deploy as 
soon as funding was authorized by the ACABQ.  Annabi 
projected these costs to be $46.9 million for the period from 
March 1 to June 30.  Annabi described the SYG's 
recommendation for a force under "Option B" of his report 
(10,900 troops) as having a lower risk vis-a-vis protection 
of civilians and as being less susceptible to logistic and 
environmental constraints presented by the theater of 
operations.  With regard to Option A, Annabi pointed out the 
traditional difficulties the UN faced in identifying the 
necessary air assets.  Annabi was firm that the police 
concept envisaged for the UN force would depend entirely on 
the existence of a military component for support; without 
this component, Annabi insisted that the force would have no 
dissuasive capacity in the hostile environment along Chad's 
eastern border. 
 
6. (SBU) Annabi put little faith in the bilateral agreements 
between Chad and Sudan, including the latest signed in 
Tripoli on February 22, noting that there had been six such 
accords in the past 12 months, not one of which had been 
implemented.  Annabi reported receipt on February 26 of a 
letter from the Sudanese PermRep that expressed hope for the 
normalization of Chad-Sudan relations in the wake of the 
latest Tripoli agreement and that alluded to the arrival "at 
any moment" of President Bashir's response to the UN and 
African Union's January 24 letter on the HSP assistance to 
AMIS.  Ambassador Sanders mentioned Special Envoy Natsios' 
planned travel to Darfur and Tripoli and asked about UN plans 
to engage Libyan COL Qadhafi, who could not be discounted as 
a player in the Chad crisis (ref B).  Annabi acknowledged 
that there would be merit to the notion of the UN and SC 
Members involving Qadhafi, despite rumors he was not 
"sanguine" about UN deployment in Chad, adding that the GOC 
was very sensitive to Libyan concerns. 
 
MEMBERS TREAD CAREFULLY ON FORCE OPTIONS 
---------------------------------------- 
7. (SBU) While all delegates agreed the Darfur crisis was 
spilling into eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, no 
delegation openly endorsed either of the two options for 
deployment articulated in the SYG's Report.  French PR de La 
Sabliere echoed French comments reported ref B by saying that 
more work remained to be done with President Deby before a 
draft resolution could be circulated, and by calling for the 
need for "transparency" in the drafting process.  De La 
Sabliere hoped for a consensus text and announced plans to 
work closely with the Ghanaian, Congolese and South African 
delegations on a resolution text, inviting any other 
interested Members to join the effort (NOTE: Ghanaian rep 
told Poloff privately after the consultations that the French 
PR had already had a one-on-one discussion with the Ghanaian 
PR on this point and that Ghana would be more than happy if 
we were interested in collaborating on a text.  END NOTE). 
De La Sabliere spoke for most Members when he declared that 
the UN force must be robust enough to have an impact on the 
ground but that the choice of force options was not 
necessarily A or B.  Ghanaian PR Effah-Apenteng, Congolese PR 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000161  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Ikouebe and South African PR Kumalo were all in agreement 
with this approach, with Kumalo making clear that neither 
Option A nor Option B would be viable if political obstacles 
presented by Deby's and rebel groups' perceptions of the UN 
force could not be overcome. 
 
8. (SBU) Among the other P-5 members, UK PR Jones Parry made 
clear linkages between the Darfur and Chad situations, 
insisting the UNSC focus on improving the humanitarian 
situation in Darfur, seek a report from UN Special Envoy 
Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim (NOTE: This report is 
expected during the week of March 12.  END NOTE), and get a 
definitive answer from the AU and the UN on modalities for 
the hybrid operation.  Jones Parry noted that "tougher 
measures" would become "inevitable" if the Sudanese 
Government continued to stall on the HSP and violate UNSCR 
1591 (2005).  Russian Deputy PR Dolgov said his delegation 
had no problem with either Option A or Option B for Chad/CAR 
deployment and was open to discussions on force numbers for 
both.  He, like the Chinese delegate, agreed strongly that 
deployment of any force should be subject to GOC consent and 
that dialogue with Deby is essential.  In response to an 
argument by the Qatari PR that Sudanese consent was required 
for UN deployment in Chad and CAR (consent which Annabi 
replied was not technically required), Dolgov said a 
"positive message" from the Government of National Unity 
(GNU) could go a long way in facilitating the deployment. 
Dolgov hoped that the GNU's response to the SYG's January 24 
letter on the HSP would be positive and that the GNU would 
shoulder its responsibility to its Darfur population.  The 
Chinese rep reported that Beijing was still studying both 
options for Chad/CAR deployment.  Drawing from ref A points, 
Ambassador Sanders said the Department was studying 
operations for deployment, noting that the air assets under 
Option A seemed to lend themselves to the terrain.  She also 
confirmed that the USG stood prepared to assist DPKO with 
recruitment  for force generation for the Chad/CAR operation. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
9. (SBU) It was clear from the tenor of discussions that 
Members favored a cautious approach toward determining a 
mandate for an eventual UN peacekeeping force in Chad/CAR, in 
large part because the Council does not want to repeat the 
"mistakes" of Darfur deployment by proceeding in the absence 
of host country consent.  All agreed that more work remained 
to be done with Deby, and the idea of inviting him or FM 
Allam-mi had considerable traction.  Similarly, the idea of 
proceeding cautiously on the drafting of a resolution for the 
force was popular, and it would make good sense to join the 
fledgling alliance that emerged among France and the African 
UNSC Members in order to have a hand in crafting the mandate 
of the force; USUN would recommend such an approach.  END 
COMMENT. 
WOLFF