Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07USNATO150, AU PSC COMMISSIONER DJINNIT ADDRESSES THE NORTH

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07USNATO150.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07USNATO150 2007-03-07 17:23 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Mission USNATO
VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNO #0150/01 0661723
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY TEXT ADX: 8C9C51 MSI7576 600)
P 071723Z MAR 07
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0586
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0134
RHMFIUU/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/CDR USJFCOM NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0367
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
UNCLAS USNATO 000150 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y  (ADDING CAPTION) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MASS NATO PREL AU SU UN
SUBJECT: AU PSC COMMISSIONER DJINNIT ADDRESSES THE NORTH 
ATLANTIC COUNCIL 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: In a disappointing March 2 address to the 
NAC,  African Union Peace and Security Council Commissioner 
Said Djinnit said the AU "highly appreciated" support 
received from NATO, including assistance with airlift, 
capacity building, and "important" lessons learned training, 
and welcomed ongoing support to the AU Mission in the Sudan 
(AMIS) as needed.  However, Djinnit ducked questions about 
how to take NATO-AU cooperation to the next level, and has 
apparently grown cold on the idea he pushed earlier for a 
framework agreement to enable cooperation.  Djinnit did not 
ask for specific assistance to the African Union Mission to 
Somalia (AMISOM), saying the AU is still "working out details 
and modalities" of that mission. Regarding the draft NATO-AU 
framework agreement, Djinnit suggested the two organizations 
should gain more experience cooperating on the ground before 
moving forward with this agreement.  Djinnit suggested a role 
for NATO in building the capacity of the fledgling African 
Standby Force (ASF), in order to "increase its capacity to 
carry out peacekeeping operations."  He repeatedly asked for 
assistance in the form of logistics and financing for 
peacekeeping operations.  The Secretary General emphasized 
that NATO stands ready to provide increased support to the 
AU, including to the planned AU-UN "hybrid" package for 
Darfur.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) In opening remarks, the SYG said that the 
"deteriorating" situation in Darfur was putting pressure on 
the international community to act; at the same time, he 
noted some progress at the political level.  The SYG noted 
that, in conjunction with the EU, NATO had airlifted more 
than 24,000 AU troops to and from Darfur.  In addition, NATO 
had carried out capacity-building training with 200 AU 
officers, mentored an information assessment cell, and 
provided lessons-learned trainers.  NATO stands ready to 
provide increased support, including to the planned AU-UN 
"hybrid" package for Darfur.  The SYG mentioned the AU note 
verbale sent in January requesting assistance with AMISOM, 
adding that NATO is still waiting for specifics. 
 
3. (SBU) Djinnit said the AU "highly appreciated" the support 
it received from NATO, mentioning airlift, capacity building, 
and "important" lessons learned training.  Djinnit noted the 
AU's current request for NATO assistance to AMIS will expire 
in June 2007.  While the AU expects increased UN involvement 
over the next months, Djinnit said, he hoped that NATO could 
provide further assistance if needed.  The Commissioner said 
the AU is still "working out details and modalities" of 
AMISOM, and only a general letter had been sent to partners. 
Some AU Allies remain "sensitive" to aspects of the AMISOM 
mission, he added, particularly the political and security 
situation on the ground in Somalia. 
 
4. (SBU) Djinnit said two Ugandan battalions were in a "high 
level of readiness" to deploy to Somalia, and that he 
expected some of these troops on the ground in a few days. 
He added that the AU intends to run AMISOM for a short period 
only, with a follow-on mission provided by the UN.  Djinnit 
argued that deploying these first two battalions could help 
build support for the overall mission from allies and 
partners.  He complained of a lack of logistic and financial 
support for AMISOM, noting that only the U.S. and the UK had 
offered both, while France had offered assistance in training 
and equipping troops.  In the end, he said, any solution in 
Somalia will need to be political, adding that the AU is 
pressing the transitional government to be more inclusive. 
 
5. (SBU) Djinnit described his vision of an "African Peace 
and Security Architecture" which, among other concepts, would 
involve building the capacity of the ASF.  He suggested that 
NATO be involved in the training of this force in order to 
"increase its capacity to carry out peacekeeping operations." 
 Training of this force would be done in Addis Ababa. 
Djinnit said the AU cannot remain "indifferent" to conflicts 
in Africa, stressing the need to act quickly in certain 
circumstances.  However, the AU still has a "gap in capacity" 
to carry out such missions.  He called on the international 
community to provide logistical and financial support to AU 
peacekeeping operations, saying the AU would need "hundreds 
of millions" of dollars. 
 
6. (SBU) Ambassador Nuland welcomed the growing impact of the 
AU as a force for peace and stability, and also welcomed 
Djinnit's efforts to increase planning capacity and overall 
capability.  She stressed that NATO will continue to provide 
support to the AU and encouraged establishment of a strategic 
partnership between NATO and the AU.  In this regard, 
Ambassador Nuland queried Djinnit on the NATO-AU framework 
agreement, which had been forwarded to the AU as an informal 
draft (an idea which originated with the AU as a way to 
smooth joint work).  Djinnit responded that there are 
"sensitivities" in NATO-AU relations, and that the two 
organizations first need to work together on the ground more, 
to "combine a pragmatic and formal approach."  Referring to 
this agreement, French Ambassador Duque said NATO needs to 
"avoid hastily getting involved in drafting this or that 
agreement." 
 
7. (SBU) The Spanish PermRep asked about the timeline for 
deployment of the AU-UN "hybrid" force, expressed concern 
that it may not deploy until the summer of 2008, and asked 
how pressure could be increased on the Sudanese government to 
accept this force.  He also asked for Djinnit's views on 
combating terrorism in Africa.  The Dutch Ambassador asked 
for specifics of how NATO could assist the ASF.  The UK 
PermRep suggested that NATO engage in long-term capacity 
building with the AU, adding that the AU appears to have 
challenges moving from decision making to the actual 
implementation of operations.  He also queried if NATO's 
current liaison arrangements to the AU are sufficient. The 
Norwegian PermRep said that NATO is ready and able to provide 
support to AMIS, including for any additional requests from 
the AU.  He asked how NATO could "build trust" within the AU. 
 The German PermRep noted that coordination within the 
international community in Darfur could be better, and asked 
Djinnit for his views on how to improve this.  The French 
Ambassador said the AU is contributing to peace and stability 
in Darfur, adding that it is necessary to examine the 
correlation between what the AU needs and what NATO provides; 
assistance needs to closely follow needs expressed by the AU. 
 
8. (SBU) In response to PermReps' questions, Djinnit said the 
AU remains concerned about terrorism in Africa. The AU is 
taking a "firm stand" against terrorism and "religious 
extremism" and has developed an action plan, "open to any 
partnership."  He noted that internal coordination within the 
AU is difficult, making it challenging to transmit requests 
for assistance to Allies; in addition, not all Allies agree 
to such requests, further complicating AU decision making. 
On Darfur, he noted the proposed "heavy" support package will 
need "substantial" military enablers.  He described the AU as 
being "overwhelmed" by conflicts, and that while the 
political will existed, the capacity to intervene was lacking. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment:  Djinnit did not take full advantage of his 
address to the NAC to make specific, concrete requests of 
NATO.  While he asked for general assistance to AMIS and the 
ASF, he was reticent on NATO assistance to AMISOM, as well as 
the NATO-AU framework agreement (which Djinnit himself had 
originally requested). This may reflect internal AU politics, 
and perhaps opposition on the part of some AU allies to 
closer ties with NATO.  However, this sort of reticence, 
coupled with the slow pace at which the AU formally requests 
assistance, is hindering NATO's ability to provide worthwhile 
and needed cooperative efforts.  End Comment. 
NULAND