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Viewing cable 07TOKYO1314, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/23/07

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO1314 2007-03-23 08:06 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO3327
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1314/01 0820806
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230806Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1999
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 2826
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 0361
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 3875
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 9713
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 1315
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6280
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2357
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3667
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 001314 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/23/07 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) In 1965, "Japan, ROK concluded a secret pact on sovereignty over 
Takeshima," ROK monthly reports; Both sides tacitly approved each 
other's claim on Takeshima 
 
(2) Japanese diplomacy at crossroads: Tokyo Christian Institute 
Prof. Tsutomu Nishioka 
 
(3) University of Shizuoka Prof. Shunji Hiraiwa: DPRK trying to 
grasp which direction the US is going to move? 
 
(4) Six Nago municipal assembly members to submit resolution calling 
for withdrawal of Futenma basic agreement 
 
(5) Schwab coastal relocation: Nago fisheries cooperative concurs on 
survey 
 
(6) Has Prime Minister Abe turned defiant? Recent heavy use of 
interrogative form 
 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) In 1965, "Japan, ROK concluded a secret pact on sovereignty over 
Takeshima," ROK monthly reports; Both sides tacitly approved each 
other's claim on Takeshima 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
March 20, 2007 
 
Yuichiro Nakamura, Seoul 
 
The South Korean magazine Monthly JoongAng, which went on sale March 
19, has an article that quotes an informed source as saying, "Japan 
and South Korea signed a secret pact in January 1965 that allowed 
each side to claim Takeshima (Dokdo in Korean)." 
 
According to the monthly, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lawmaker 
Sosuke Uno (who later became prime minister), on a special mission 
of Ichiro Kono, who had been in charge of the secret-pact 
negotiations with South Korea when he was construction minister, 
traveled to South Korea and handed over to then President Jeong Il 
Gwon a secret pact that concluded: "We regard the unresolved 
(Takeshima) issue as having been resolved." Reportedly, then 
President Park Chung Hee approved the pact. Both countries also 
agreed in the pact that the Japan-South Korea Basic Agreement signed 
in June of that year would not mention the Takeshima issue. 
 
The secret pact included such accompanying provisions as: (1) Japan 
and South Korea would allow each other to claim the Takeshima isles 
and would not raise any objections to the other's arguments; and (2) 
South Korea's occupation of Takeshima would be maintained, but it 
would not increase the number of guards nor construct any new 
facility. 
 
The file with the secret pact was kept in South Korea until it was 
reportedly burned by President Chun Doo Hwan after Park Chung Hui 
was assassinated. One concerned official at the time admitted the 
existence of the secret pact and said: "It was smart to have signed 
the Japan-South Korea Basic Treaty." 
 
(2) Japanese diplomacy at crossroads: Tokyo Christian Institute 
 
TOKYO 00001314  002 OF 005 
 
 
Prof. Tsutomu Nishioka 
 
SANKEI (Page 7) (Full) 
March 23, 2007 
 
Comments by Tsutomu Nishioka, professor at Tokyo Christian 
Institute 
 
With the United States sudden shifting to a position that "the 
nuclear issue and the financial sanctions are two different 
matters," the six-party talks at one point appeared to be unfolding 
rapidly. But later the talks were broken off without any clear 
prospect for their resumption, with the North Korean delegates 
returning home angry that the frozen bank account had not remitted. 
If the issue of the transfer of money is resolved in the days ahead, 
will North Korea really shut down its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon 
and accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA)? Or will that country make even more demands? The very 
framework of the six-party talks are now in the hands of North 
Korea. 
 
It was a big mistake for Washington, persuaded by Pyongyang's 
willful behavior, to have accepted its demand to an immediate 
transfer of the frozen funds. The US Treasury Department has let 
Macao authorities handle the financial issue, but the State 
Department, impatient to make great strides, forcibly switched 
policy. To the extent that it created confusion in the international 
financial order, the State Department tried to resolve the financial 
issue with a political decision, but it only ended up embarrassing 
itself. 
 
This follows the same pattern as the mistake by Japan's Foreign 
Ministry in an effort to resolve issued through discussions in 
September 2000, when then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited 
Pyongyang. From the beginning, North Korea has had no intention to 
accept the demand it scrap its nuclear ambitions. 
 
It was the right course for Japan to have taken in the series of 
negotiations a resolute stance. North Korea is trying to leave Japan 
out of the loop by actively courting the US and trying to create a 
"honeymoon" relationship. But Japan must not be taken in by this 
trick. It is important that Japan not be shaken by such acts. 
 
The Bush administration is split into two groups when it comes to 
policy toward North Korea. One group is centered on the State 
Department, which insists on the need for dialogue. The other group, 
led by Vice President Cheney and the Defense Department, stresses 
the need for continued sanctions. At present the State Department 
has the lead, but this approach will not be successful. Simply 
making concessions will not resolve any issue, as evidenced by the 
what has just happened. 
 
Japanese diplomacy is now at crossroads. It is important for Japan 
to continue sending a message to the US and the rest of the world 
that the abduction issue and the nuclear issue must be resolved 
together and simultaneously. 
 
(3) University of Shizuoka Prof. Shunji Hiraiwa: DPRK trying to 
grasp which direction the US is going to move? 
 
YOMIURI (Page 7) (Full) 
March 23, 2007 
 
 
TOKYO 00001314  003 OF 005 
 
 
Comments by Shunji Hiraiwa, professor of contemporary Korean studies 
at University of Shitzuoka 
 
North Korea insisted on the need to confirm whether the frozen funds 
at Banco Delta Asia (BDA) would actually be transferred to it. The 
North did so because it thought how the US would handle the funds 
would symbolize its negotiating posture. Supposedly, the North 
Koreans were trying to see whether the US would again move toward 
tightening sanctions upon watching America's response to its 
hard-line attitude. 
 
Following America's (financial) crackdown, the confrontation between 
Washington and Pyongyang regarding the North's illicit funds 
continued over the past year or two. In the six-party talks this 
time, the North won Ameria's promise of a full transfer of the 
frozen funds and also secured the position of leading the talks. 
North Korea should have concluded that this outcome was a "big 
victory." 
 
In this round of talks, the US tried to persuade the North to soften 
its attitude by using a reconciliatory measure of returning the 
frozen funds, but this approach failed. In the days ahead, the US 
will ask host China to demonstrate more of its power of 
coordination, but what effect that will have is unpredictable. 
 
(4) Six Nago municipal assembly members to submit resolution calling 
for withdrawal of Futenma basic agreement 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 2) (Full) 
March 23, 2007 
 
Nago 
 
Six members of the Nago municipal assembly will today introduce in 
the municipal assembly a resolution calling off the basic agreement 
between Nago City and the central government on the plans for the 
construction of a V-shaped airstrip for an alternate facility of the 
US Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station. The resolution will be debated 
in a plenary session set for this morning. 
 
The sponsors of the resolution are six members of the opposition 
parties: Yoshitami Oshiro, Toru Gushiken, Yoshiyuki Nakamura, Toshio 
Kamiyama, Minoru Yabiku, and Kenichi Tamaki. 
 
Regarding the planned construction of a V-shaped runway, the 
resolution says: "Three local areas, Henoko, Kushi, and Toyohara, 
will be placed in the same situation as the Futenma airfield. There 
will be a significant impact on the natural environment of the 
reclamation of Oura Bay." The resolution calls on Mayor Yoshikazu 
Shimabukuro to call off the basic agreement. 
 
(5) Schwab coastal relocation: Nago fisheries cooperative concurs on 
survey 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 1) (Full) 
March 23, 2007 
 
NAGO-The Nago Fisheries Cooperative Association held a meeting of 
its directors yesterday, in which all those present resolved to 
concur on the government's proposal to look into the current state 
of sea areas along with its plan to build an alternative facility in 
a coastal area of Camp Schwab in the city of Nago for the US Marine 
Corps' Futenma Air Station. Later in the day, the fisheries 
 
TOKYO 00001314  004 OF 005 
 
 
cooperative sent its letter of agreement to Tsutomu Sato, director 
general of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency's Naha 
bureau. With the fisheries cooperative's agreement in written form, 
the DFAA's Naha bureau will shortly apply to the Okinawa prefectural 
government for its proposed use of public waters. "We will get into 
step with Nago City," says Hiroshi Kohagura, chief of the fisheries 
cooperative. "Okinawa Prefecture and Nago City have agreed," he 
added, "so there's no reason for us to reject the proposal." 
 
According to the Nago Fisheries Cooperative Association, the DFAA 
has plans to conduct a survey of sea areas ranging from Oura Bay to 
Kushi in Nago City, including the islands of Birajima and Nagashima 
that lie off Cape Henoko. The survey is intended to look into the 
habitats of dugongs and corals, including seaweed beds. In addition, 
the DFAA will also check wave force. According to the DFAA's 
explanation given to the fisheries cooperative, the survey will be 
conducted for over one year, and it will take three months to set up 
equipment and other necessary installations. 
 
The resolution adopted by Nago's local fisheries cooperative will be 
attached to the DFAA's application in written form to Okinawa 
Prefecture for its use of public waters as an interested party's 
agreement. In addition, the DFAA Naha bureau will also ask for Nago 
City's agreement in written form. 
 
The DFAA has informally notified Okinawa Prefecture and Nago City of 
a plan to conduct a survey of egg-laying corals and other conditions 
as a preliminary survey prior to an environmental assessment. The 
survey area is based on a 1999 cabinet decision. In addition, the 
DFAA is also planning to look into an extended sea area that was 
previously planned for a site situated about 2.2 kilometers off 
Henoko's coastal populated areas. 
 
Nago City is poised to accept the survey, with one of its officials 
saying: "If the survey is intended to look into the current state of 
an extensive area including the islands of Nagashima and Birajima, 
that would not be directly linked to an environmental assessment 
premised on the government's plan (to build a V-shaped pair of 
airstrips), so we would not oppose it." 
 
At this point, the Okinawa prefectural government is reluctant to 
receive the DFAA's environmental assessment plan. However, the 
prefectural government takes it that a private contractor will carry 
out the preliminary survey on its own responsibility and judgment. 
 
(6) Has Prime Minister Abe turned defiant? Recent heavy use of 
interrogative form 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
March 23, 2007 
 
There has been a change in the way Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has 
been speaking. For example, his questions pressing reporters for 
answers have increased. In the wake of his cabinet's slump in the 
polls, "Abe seems to be thinking that since his popularity has 
continued to drop, he will do what he wants to do." It seems that a 
change in his remarks is related to his stance of assuming a defiant 
attitude. 
 
The following is an exchange between Abe and a reporter on the 
evening of March 15: 
 
Reporter: Do you think reform of the public servant system is 
 
TOKYO 00001314  005 OF 005 
 
 
necessary? 
 
Abe: Do you think the reform is unnecessary? 
 
Reporter: I think it is necessary. 
 
Abe: You can say that again. Since many people think so, I will do 
it. 
 
Reporter: What are merits for the public? 
 
Abe: I think it is the voice of the people that the public servant 
system should be reformed. Don't you think so? 
 
Reporter: Yes, I do. 
 
Abe: So, I don't want you to ask me that. 
 
When pointed out by a reporter on March 9 that there was smoldering 
dissatisfaction among party members, Abe came back, responding, 
"There is no such dissatisfaction in our party. Do you know who that 
person is?" 
 
According to a survey by the Mainichi Shimbun, Abe responded to 
questions by reporters at the Kantei 11 times using an interrogative 
form in the first three months after he assumed office, but he did 
so 25 times or more in the last two and a half months (from Jan. 5 
through Mar. 22). 
 
Ritsumeikan University Prof. Shoji Azuma, who wrote a book focused 
on expressions by the successive prime ministers, analyzed Abe's 
heavy use of the interrogative form: "It makes him sound 
provocative. Criticized for 'being a prime minister who lacks 
leadership,' he might have turned defiant." 
 
According to Azuma, former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
frequently used the interrogative form. He pointed out: 
 
"Koizumi used the interrogative form many times to shrink the 
distance between audiences and him. Abe, however, has used it in 
order to take the offensive. He seems to want to appear bullish." 
 
Comparing Abe during the first three months to the recent two and a 
half months, the number of times he used the word "anyway" decreased 
from 28 times to 13. He often used the expression "anyway or 
whatever" when he was questioned about such issues that he may have 
been embarrassed to hear, such as the Issue of the government's 
pre-selecting questioners for town meetings, or the reinstatement of 
postal rebels into the LDP. For example, asked on Nov. 14 last year 
if there was a suspicion the government had given money to attendees 
at public hearings, Abe responded: "I have yet to receive such a 
report. Anyway, we will have to investigate strictly." 
 
Prof. Azuma explained about his remark: "He used a bureaucratic 
expression. It is the objective way of speaking that is used when a 
person is not confident." The professor analyzes that Abe is not 
trying to show a bullish posture by refraining from using bearish 
expressions. 
 
SCHIEFFER