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Viewing cable 07TOKYO1034, 2007 TIP REPORT: JAPAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO1034 2007-03-12 02:09 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO1981
OO RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHJO RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHVC
DE RUEHKO #1034/01 0710209
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 120209Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1453
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXI/LABOR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/JUSTICE DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 001034 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCRM PHUM KWMN SMIG KFRD ASEC PREF ELAB JA
SUBJECT: 2007 TIP REPORT: JAPAN 
 
REF: STATE 202745 
 
1.  (SBU) Embassy's point of contact on TIP issues is 
Political Officer Scott Hansen, Office Phone:  81 (3) 
3224-5558, Fax:  81 (3) 3224-5322, Email: hansensw@state.gov. 
 
2.  (SBU) Embassy Tokyo has spent a total of 207 hours 
researching trafficking issues, developing and implementing 
TIP programming/training, and coordinating with contacts over 
the past year, in support of this report. 
This total includes: 
 
Ambassador, 1 hour 
DCM, 1 hour 
MC/POL 3 hours 
01-level POL 2 hour 
04-level POL 100 hours 
FSN 07-level POL 100 hours 
 
Total Embassy Tokyo on TIP, 207 hours 
 
3.  (SBU) OVERVIEW OF JAPAN'S EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE TIP: 
 
Note: This report is keyed to Reftel and includes information 
from the Japanese government, international organizations 
(IOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 
 
A.  Japan is a destination and transit country for men, 
women, and children trafficked for commercial sexual 
exploitation. Victims came from China, Southeast Asia, 
Eastern Europe, and to a lesser extent Latin America. There 
continued to be reports of internal trafficking of Japanese 
girls for sexual exploitation. There was also anecdotal 
evidence of growing trafficking-in-persons for labor 
exploitation, including under the guise of the "foreign 
trainee" program. According to National Police Agency (NPA) 
statistics, there were 58 trafficking victims reported in 
2006: 3 were from Thailand, 30 from the Philippines, 10 from 
Taiwan, 1 from South Korea, and 14 from Indonesia. 
 
NPA statistics may underestimate the number of actual 
victims.  There continued to be isolated reports that police 
failed to identify victims adequately. NGOs reported that 
police and immigration officers occasionally neglected to 
classify a woman working in abusive conditions as a victim 
because she willingly entered into an agreement to work 
illegally in the country. In addition, government figures may 
understate the problem because TIP victims are reluctant to 
come forward to Japanese authorities out of shame or fear 
that they will be punished or deported. Local embassies 
assisting victims of trafficking as well as international and 
Japanese NGOs suspect that the number of trafficking victims 
in Japan vastly exceeds NPA statistics. 
 
Human trafficking in Japan is not limited to foreigners.  NPA 
statistics show a significant increase in the commercial 
sexual abuse of Japanese children. Almost all (83.1 percent) 
of the 1,915 documented cases of crimes involving Japanese 
dating websites were sex crimes against children, including 
trafficking for sex. 
 
 
B.  Women trafficked to Japan generally were employed as 
prostitutes under coercive conditions in businesses licensed 
to provide commercial sex services. Sex entertainment 
businesses included strip clubs, sex shops, hostess bars, 
private video rooms, escort services, and mail order video 
services. Brokers in the countries of origin recruited women 
and sold them to intermediaries or employers, who in turn 
subjected them to debt bondage and coercion. 
 
The changing face of the human trafficking business in Japan 
was demonstrated by the fact that fewer trafficking victims 
escaped to private or public shelters this year.  This 
decrease in the number of reported victims may have been 
because government pressure has forced some employers to 
improve conditions within their businesses, especially in 
urban centers, according to NGOs. Restrictions on visas have 
made workers more valuable and their escape more costly, 
forcing some brothel owners to provide better working 
conditions and salary. The influx of women holding spouse 
visas who tend to be familiar with Japan, as well as know 
their rights and some Japanese language, has also put upward 
pressure on hostess-club salaries and conditions. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001034  002 OF 010 
 
 
The decrease in the number of reported victims could also 
have been because conditions in many commercial sex 
businesses have become much more restrictive. To maintain the 
high profits of trafficking women for sex, many brokers have 
shifted into "Delivery Health" services, explained a 
representative from a migrant labor NGO. One advantage of 
this model for the traffickers is that a "bodyguard" 
accompanies the victim to and from the call, eliminating any 
opportunity for escape. Anti-TIP activists say that the 
conditions in rural areas are as bad as ever, far away from 
NGO scrutiny or central government law enforcement activity. 
A former police reporter and TIP researcher told us that 
entrance to the clubs with the worst working conditions has 
become more restrictive, usually by membership or referral 
only. 
 
Brokers were also using more coercive psychological methods 
to control women, minimizing the numbers who attempt to flee, 
sources explained.  Globalized communication meant that 
victims had to fear retaliation against their families more 
than ever, according to one migrant labor NGO.  Most women 
trafficked into the sex trade had their travel documents 
taken away and their movements strictly controlled by their 
employers. Victims were threatened with reprisals to 
themselves or their families if they tried to escape. 
Employers often isolated the women, subjected them to 
constant surveillance, and used violence to punish them for 
disobedience. NGOs reported that in some cases brokers used 
drugs to subjugate victims. TIP activists who work with 
victims also reported that many clubs would wait three months 
before requiring the women to engage in sex.  Because they 
couldn't receive their wages until the end of the six-month 
stay, most women chose to "stick-it-out" and prostitute 
themselves rather than lose three months of investment.  Even 
in hostess clubs that do not provide sexual services, 
punishing women who do not meet quotas psychologically 
compelled them to sleep with clients in order to persuade 
them to become regular customers, said the director of a 
half-way house for former Filipina hostesses. 
 
Debt bondage was another method traffickers used to control 
their victims. Before arrival in the country, trafficking 
victims generally did not understand the size of the debts 
they would owe, the amount of time it would take them to 
repay the debts, or the conditions of employment to which 
they would be subjected upon arrival. Women typically faced 
debts upon commencement of their contracts from three to five 
million yen (USD 26,000 to 43,000). In addition, they had to 
pay their employer for their living expenses, medical care 
(when provided by the employer), and other necessities. 
"Fines" for misbehavior added to the original debt over time; 
in general the process that the employers used to calculate 
these debts was not transparent. According to a website 
maintained by the Ministry of Justice, employers also 
sometimes "resold," or threatened to resell, troublesome 
women or women found to be HIV positive, thereby increasing 
the victims' debts and often leading to even worse working 
conditions. 
 
"Host clubs" were another growing channel for recruitment, 
coercion, and debt control of women who became victims of sex 
trafficking, according to NGO activists. These clubs employed 
male escorts to serve a predominantly female customer-base. 
Male hosts aggressively recruited female customers in popular 
youth hangouts, subway stations, and tourist destinations. 
They targeted their recruitment efforts especially towards 
women in the sex industry or underage girls. Once a woman 
agreed to enter the host club, the pricing structures and 
internal operations of the clubs were designed to create high 
expenses quickly. According to victim-support NGOs, once a 
female customer "ran up her bill" and overspent her limit, 
the male "host" would encourage her to enter or return to the 
sex industry to make enough money to help pay off her debt. 
In some cases the host himself became the victim. The media 
reported one case where organized crime gangsters confined a 
host who had run away from his club. When the host was 
returned to the club, he was forced to pay a large fine. 
 
Japanese women and children falling prey to human trafficking 
also began to receive attention within Japan. According to 
NGOs, the domestic trafficking industry targeting Japanese 
girls and women is highly organized and lucrative for the 
criminal networks. Recruiters were active in subways, popular 
hangout spots for youth, and at schools. Victim-support 
groups reported that children were recruited for exploitation 
 
TOKYO 00001034  003 OF 010 
 
 
in child pornography or prostituted by "compensated dating" 
businesses. The trafficking of Japanese adult women into 
brothels, hostess clubs, and for exploitation in pornography 
was also a serious problem, according to NGOs, often 
involving organized crime. Japanese victims of human 
trafficking face the same abusive conditions that foreign 
victims do: violence, debt bondage, and psychological 
coercion. Because most anti-trafficking NGOs in Japan focus 
on serving women from other countries, domestic victims of 
trafficking generally do not have access to service providers 
who understand the nature of the cases and can meet their 
specialized needs. 
 
The "foreign trainee" program came under increasing scrutiny 
for abuses typical to trafficking-in-persons.  According to 
media reports on investigations into abusive company 
practices, in some companies trainees made less than the 
minimum wage, and their wages were automatically deposited in 
company?controlled accounts. "Forced deposits" are illegal in 
Japan. In addition, trainees sometimes had their travel 
documents taken from them and their movement controlled to 
"prevent escape." 
 
Japan continued to be proactive in addressing 
trafficking-in-persons. The Inter-Ministerial Liaison 
Committee (Task Force) on trafficking and its working level 
sub-committee met regularly in 2006 to monitor the 
implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) to combat 
human trafficking, which includes measures to address the "3 
Ps:" Protection, Prevention and Prosecution. The Diet 
provisionally approved the ratification of the UN Protocol on 
TIP in 2002, but legislators continued to delay passing an 
anti-conspiracy law, preventing approval of the umbrella 
document, the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. 
 
Law enforcement officials continued to improve in 
investigating human trafficking cases.  The government 
conducted training for law enforcement authorities on victim 
identification, protection, and interviewing. The NPA 
organized significant outreach to embassies, NGO groups, and 
academics by hosting conferences including the Meeting on 
Organized Crime in the East Asian Region, the International 
Symposium on Measures to Prevent the Commercial and Sexual 
Exploitation of Children in Southeast Asia, and the Contact 
Point Meeting on Trafficking in Persons. Government officials 
used these conferences to obtain information on new victims, 
gather information on methods and routes of trafficking, and 
improve victim identification and protection methods. 
 
In Osaka and Tokyo, the number of establishments selling sex 
with women under coercive conditions fell, according to 
researchers who study sex trafficking in the cities' red 
light districts. Police took advantage of revisions to the 
Law on Control and Improvement of Amusement Businesses which 
came into effect in May 2006 to shut down egregious violators 
in large numbers.  Restrictions on advertising were also 
being enforced, compelling consultants in the "Sex Service 
Information Centers" that replaced many of the brothels to 
remove the posters from their interior and exterior walls and 
wait for clients inside instead of hawking their service on 
the corners.  A photojournalist who published a book about 
Kabukicho, Tokyo's most famous red-light district, told us 
that this crackdown had noticeably reduced the seedy 
appearance of the neighborhood. 
 
 
C.  The fact that the sex industry has become less visible 
also makes it harder to measure the extent of trafficking and 
harder to investigate it.  Embassy contacts in one 
prefectural police headquarters reported that the police do 
not like to investigate human trafficking cases; it takes too 
many officer-hours to close a case and is not career 
enhancing.  In addition, language barriers during victim 
interviews, restrictions on long-term undercover work and the 
nonexistence of plea-bargaining in Japan impose limitations 
on the ability of police to investigate TIP cases.  NGO 
representatives agree that although the decreasing visibility 
of Japan's trafficking problem is a sign of progress, it 
makes the road ahead even more difficult. 
 
 
D.  The government monitors its efforts to combat trafficking 
both domestically and in the international community, and has 
made this information available in private meetings with U.S. 
and other foreign officials.  The government also shared 
 
TOKYO 00001034  004 OF 010 
 
 
these assessments during international conferences and 
exchanges. 
 
 
4.  (SBU) PREVENTION: 
 
A.  The government recognizes that trafficking is a problem 
in Japan and understands that human trafficking is an 
egregious infringement of human rights. 
 
B.  In April 2004, the Japanese government established the 
Inter-Ministerial Liaison Committee (Task Force) on TIP. 
Headed by the Prime Minister's Assistant Cabinet Secretaries, 
this task force coordinates the TIP-related activities of 
four governmental agencies: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), Ministry of Justice (MOJ), National Police Agency 
(NPA), and Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW). 
 
C.  To raise awareness about human trafficking inside Japan, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Police 
Agency distributed more than 500,000 leaflets, glossy 
brochures, and pamphlets in 2006 that describe the trauma of 
trafficking-in-persons, report what the government is doing 
to combat trafficking, and explain how a victim can find 
assistance.  These materials have been distributed to 
immigration offices and police stations throughout Japan, 
according to MOFA Human Rights Division officials.  This 
program seems to have been successful in raising the 
awareness of working level police and immigration officers; 
NGO representatives say that the increased knowledge of 
trafficking among law enforcement officials has been one of 
the most visible improvements in the last two years. The 
pamphlets also urge Japanese nationals to help victims and 
gives telephone numbers for the police, immigration bureau 
offices, embassies and NGO shelters.  In addition, the 
Cabinet Office distributed 25,000 posters stating that 
"Trafficking-in-persons is a grave violation of human rights" 
and "Prostitution is a root cause of trafficking-in-persons" 
during the last year and a half. These posters were 
circulated nationwide to local governments, police stations, 
and immigration bureau offices. 
 
D.  Japan emphasizes international cooperation in its 
approach to preventing trafficking-in-persons. The government 
dispatched a delegation on anti-human-trafficking measures 
composed of representatives from Task Force ministries in 
January 2007 to Cambodia and Laos, source countries of 
trafficking victims. Delegations were also sent to Indonesia 
and Thailand in 2006, where they had consultations with 
concerned government agencies about efficient 
anti-human-trafficking measures, and learned about local 
conditions from international organizations and local NGOs. 
 
Japan also funded international organizations working to 
prevent human trafficking.  In October 2006, the government 
donated $200,000 to the UNICEF program, "Preventing Child 
Trafficking in Central Asia," and $2 million in March 2006 to 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) project, 
"Economic and Social Empowerment of Returned Victims of 
Trafficking," which focuses on giving protection and teaching 
life skills to trafficking victims in Thailand and the 
Philippines. 
 
E.  Although the NPA has been reaching out to NGOs, the 
relationship between the government and NGOs was mixed. At 
NPA-organized conferences, NGO representatives were given 
wide latitude in making presentations to the diplomatic, NGO, 
and law enforcement community.  NPA, MOFA, and MHLW officials 
also regularly attended meetings and conferences on human 
trafficking organized by NGOs or the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), but these exchanges 
represented the zenith of government-NGO cooperation. 
According to private shelter operators, law enforcement 
officials do not draw on NGO expertise to help with victim 
interviewing. Activists blame traditionally held views and 
cultural norms for the strict separation between law 
enforcement and NGOs. Moreover, the Japanese government has 
moved towards building a victim service infrastructure that 
does not include NGOs. In this system, victim identification 
occurs only through Japanese law enforcement, victim's 
services occur only through publicly funded Women's 
Consulting Centers, and victim repatriation occurs through 
governmental and quasi-governmental bodies. All of these 
vehicles are either directly or heavily associated with the 
government of Japan, and may not be ideal for victim 
 
TOKYO 00001034  005 OF 010 
 
 
identification for victims who do not trust government 
sources or will not feel comfortable telling the truth of 
their situation to government bodies. 
 
F.  One of Japan's greatest successes in combating 
trafficking has been the tightening of requirements for 
entertainer visas. A second round of revisions to the 
criteria for entertainer visas came into effect in June 2006, 
requiring applicants to prove that they have two years of 
experience in the industry, obligating sponsoring 
organizations to pay a higher salary, and placing a heavier 
burden on Japanese clubs to prove their legitimacy. As a 
result, the number of Filipinas entering Japan as 
entertainers has fallen from 7,000 per month in 2004 to only 
1,000 per month this year, according to statistics provided 
by MOFA's Consular Affairs Bureau, whose officials also 
examined immigration patterns from Indonesia and Thailand and 
enacted safeguards to prevent victims of trafficking from 
getting entry visas.  In addition, Japan augmented border 
control by sending document experts to airports in Thailand 
as liaison officers where they train Thai officials to 
recognize fraudulent Japanese travel documents. Immigration 
officials also screen for victims of trafficking via 
Pre-Clearance Systems at some airports in Taiwan and Korea, 
and a Secondary Examination System at the main airports in 
Japan. 
 
G.  As noted in paragraph 3, Japan established the Prime 
Minister's Inter-Ministerial Liaison Committee (Task Force) 
on Trafficking in Persons in April 2004 under the guidance of 
the Prime Minister's Office, which coordinates TIP-related 
activities among the four relevant governmental agencies: 
MOFA, MOJ, NPA, and MHLW.  The group has regular meetings at 
the Director General and working levels. The National 
Personnel Authority and the National Public Service Ethics 
Board are charged with preventing and investigating 
corruption among government officials in Japan. 
 
H.  Japan's "Comprehensive National Action Plan of Measures 
to Combat Trafficking in Persons" was released in December 
2004.  Focusing on prevention, prosecution, and protection, 
the Action Plan established specific programs to fight human 
trafficking and serves as a roadmap for future steps to 
address TIP. Civil society representatives also have served 
as advisors to the Inter-Ministerial TIP task force, which 
formulated the National Action Plan.  The Government posted 
the NAP on the Internet and engages in numerous public 
activities both domestically and internationally to publicize 
the plan.  Specific venues used to disseminate information on 
the NAP are listed above in Section C. 
 
5. (SBU) INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TRAFFICKERS: 
 
A.  The Revised Penal Code was passed by Japan's parliament 
in June 2005, establishing human trafficking for sexual 
and/or labor exploitation as criminal offenses as set forth 
in Article 3 of the UN Protocol on TIP.  The law covers both 
internal and external trafficking.  The law includes measures 
to address all three aspects of U.S. and UN-defined human 
trafficking: the "Act" element, the "Force" element, and the 
"Exploitation" element. 
 
In Japan, the following laws are also available to prosecute 
traffickers: 
 
--Amendments to the Immigration Control and Refugee 
Recognition Act provide a clear definition of "trafficking in 
persons," as called for under Article 3 of the UN TIP 
Protocol.  The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition 
Act amendments specifically criminalize trafficking. Under 
these revisions, foreigners who act as brokers of human 
trafficking may be deported.  In addition, a fine of up to 3 
million yen (USD 25,000) or 3 years' imprisonment can be 
imposed on those who create, possess or provide fake 
passports for foreigners to enter Japan illegally.  The 
revisions oblige airlines and passenger ship companies to 
verify passengers' passports or face a maximum fine of 
500,000 yen (USD 4,167). 
 
--The Prostitution Prevention Law, Article 12, states that a 
person whose business includes forcing another person to live 
at a designated place for the purpose of prostitution shall 
be punished with imprisonment for not more than ten years or 
a fine of not more than 300,000 yen (USD 2,500). 
 
 
TOKYO 00001034  006 OF 010 
 
 
--The Penal Code, Article 223, states that a person who 
kidnaps another by force, threat, fraud, etc., for the 
purpose of profit, immorality, etc., shall be punished with 
imprisonment for one to ten years. 
 
-- The Law on Control and Improvement of Amusement Businesses 
went into effect in May 2006.  (Note that the 2006 TIP Report 
says April.  The correct month is May.) The law requires 
entertainment business operators to confirm that foreign 
workers have work permits.  Entertainment service operators 
who fail to ensure that foreign workers have permits will be 
fined up to one million yen (USD 8,333).  The same penalty 
would apply to those found guilty of distributing sex service 
advertisements in residential mailboxes.  The revision also 
cracks down on aggressive "touts" for clubs. 
 
--The Child Welfare Law, Articles 34 and 60, states that a 
person who keeps a child under his/her control for the 
purpose of harming the child in mind or body shall be 
punished with imprisonment for not more than three years or 
fined not more than 1,000,000 yen (USD 8,333) or both 
imprisonment and a fine. 
 
--The Law for Punishing Acts Related to Child Prostitution 
and Child Pornography, and for Protecting Children, Article 
8, states that a person who buys or sells a child for the 
purpose of prostituting the child, or producing child 
pornography shall be punished with imprisonment for one to 
ten years.  (Note: the law does NOT prohibit the access, 
downloading, or possession of child pornography). 
 
--The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, 
Article 73-2, states that a person who places an alien under 
his control for the purpose of having the alien engage in 
illegal work shall be punished (beginning April 2005) with 
imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine not 
more than 2,000,000 yen (USD 16,667) or with both 
imprisonment and fine. 
 
B.  The following sentencing guidelines apply to human 
trafficking for both sexual and non-sexual purposes: 
 
--Any person who purchases a victim shall be imprisoned for a 
term not less than three months but not more than five years. 
--Any person who purchases a minor victim shall be imprisoned 
for a term not less than three months but not more than seven 
years. 
--Any person who purchases a victim for the purpose of 
profit, indecency, or marriage, or with the intent to do harm 
to life or body of that victim shall be imprisoned for a term 
of not less than one year but not more than ten years. 
--Any person who sold a victim shall be imprisoned for a term 
of not less than one year but not more than ten years. 
--Any person who sold or bought a victim for the purpose of 
transportation to a foreign country (including transportation 
from an overseas country to Japan) shall be imprisoned with a 
definite term of two years or more. 
 
C.  In addition to the laws described in A. and B., the 
following laws provide criminal penalties for recruiters, 
brokers, and business operators who engage in human 
trafficking for labor exploitation: 
 
--The Labor Standards Law, Articles 5 and 117, states that a 
person who forces laborers to work against their will by 
means of violence, intimidation, imprisonment, or any other 
unfair restraint on the mental or physical freedom of the 
workers shall be punished with imprisonment for one to ten 
years or fined 200,000 yen to 3,000,000 yen (USD 
1,667-25,000). 
 
--The Employment Security Law, Article 63 states that a 
person who conducts or engages in an employment exchange, 
labor recruitment, etc., by means of restraint on mental or 
physical freedom shall be punished with imprisonment for one 
to ten years or fined 200,000 yen to 3,000,000 yen (USD 
1,667-25,000). 
 
D.  The minimum sentence for trafficking-in-persons is 
generally shorter than the minimum sentence for rape. The 
punishment for rape in Japan is imprisonment for at least 
three years and up to fifteen years.  The punishment for 
sexual assault is imprisonment for a period not less than six 
months and up to seven years. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001034  007 OF 010 
 
 
E.  Prostitution is illegal in Japan, but narrowly defined. 
Many sexual acts for payment that are considered to be 
prostitution in the U.S. are legal in Japan, regulated as 
"restricted sex-related businesses." Under the Prostitution 
Prevention Law, soliciting the services of a prostitute is 
prohibited, but not criminal. Activities facilitating 
prostitution, including those of brothel owner, operator, 
pimp and enforcer, are criminalized and carry punishments 
including incarceration and fines. Amendments to laws 
regulating sex-related businesses went into effect in May 
2006, further restricting sex business advertising activities 
and the operation of compensated dating and non-store-front 
"virtual" brothels (including call girl services). 
 
F.  The Ministry of Justice provided the following 
prosecution statistics for 2006 cases involving trafficking 
for sexual exploitation: 
 
Arrests:                            78 
Cases sent to the Prosecutor:       22 
Cases actually prosecuted:          17 
Sentences:                          12 
Imprisonment & fine: 3 
Imprisonment: 9 
Suspended Sentences:                3 
 
Terms of imprisonment 
Less 2 years:                       2 
2-3 years:                          5 
3-4 years:                          3 
4-5 years:                          1 
Greater than 5 years:               1 
 
All fines were less than 500,000 yen (USD 4,167). 
 
There were two cases of trafficking for labor exploitation. 
Both are pending in courts. Criminals generally serve more of 
their sentences in Japan than they do in the United States. 
 
G.  Police, government officials, and NGO representatives all 
agree that Japanese organized crime syndicates (the Yakuza) 
are the controlling investors in the sex industry. In 
addition to acting as brokers for trafficked women, organized 
crime syndicates also operate brothels and extort protection 
fees from independent brothel owners. There were no reports 
of direct involvement by government officials in human 
trafficking, but academics and journalists who monitor 
organized crime trends noted that the police rely heavily on 
their organized crime contacts for information and are 
careful not to interfere with operations in a way that might 
compromise these sources. Legal advocates complain that 
without a program to encourage victim testimony, long-term 
undercover work by the police, or the ability to plea 
bargain, it is extremely difficult to make an impact on 
Yakuza activities. 
 
H.  Law enforcement officials continued to make progress in 
investigating human trafficking cases. Several high-profile 
raids were widely reported by the media, and there was 
visible evidence of increased awareness among police and 
immigration officials of the difference between human 
trafficking and illegal immigration, especially in major 
metropolitan areas. NGOs acknowledged the general improvement 
among law enforcement officials, but several activists 
reported that indifference remains widespread outside of 
Tokyo and Osaka. One NGO claimed that in May 2006, police in 
one prefecture refused to raid a club where Columbian women 
were forced to service dozens of clients every day because 
they determined that the women were living as "spouses" with 
their pimps. (See also Overview, Section C.) 
 
Police and immigration officials gather most of the 
information for their investigations by interviewing possible 
victims of trafficking, but the language barrier and quick 
repatriation of victims often impeded these investigations, 
according to victim advocates (See also Section 6). Police 
investigators try to gather information about the broker 
organizations, passport and visa arrangements; routes from 
the country of origin to Japan, and any other relevant 
details. If they can collect enough information they will 
issue a warrant for the arrest of the traffickers. 
 
The police have limited authority to arrange electronic 
surveillance, such as cameras and videos, to facilitate 
investigations of trafficking.  As mentioned in paragraph G., 
 
TOKYO 00001034  008 OF 010 
 
 
the Japanese criminal justice process does not admit evidence 
or testimony from witnesses obtained through mitigated 
punishment or offers of immunity. 
 
I.  During nation-wide police conferences, the National 
Police Agency provided guidance to representatives from local 
police forces on how to investigate TIP cases. Police 
colleges also provided training courses on how to recognize 
and investigate human trafficking and protect victims. The 
Immigration Bureau carried out training programs centered on 
human trafficking countermeasures. According to Immigration 
Bureau officials, these trainings involved lectures from IOM 
lawyers, NGO representatives, and academics. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs also included human trafficking in its 
consular officer training curriculum, emphasizing the role of 
careful visa adjudication as a preventive measure. 
 
J.  Japan actively cooperated with other countries in 
investigating human trafficking cases. Law enforcement 
officials were able to use their relationship with the 
International Criminal Police Organization (IPCO) to secure 
the arrest of a broker in a source country as well as 
initiate protection for the family of a victim back in her 
home country.  Japan also stations an Immigration inspector 
at Bangkok Airport to assist Thai officials in Japanese 
passport and visa document recognition. 
 
K.  The government can extradite trafficking offenders 
subject to conditions specified in the Law of Extradition and 
bilateral extradition treaties. To date, there has never been 
a request from a foreign country to extradite a suspected 
human trafficker. Article 2, item 9 of the Law of Extradition 
prohibits the extradition of Japanese nationals unless a 
specific extradition treaty exists. Japan has concluded 
extradition treaties with the United States and Korea. If an 
extradition treaty does not exist, under Japanese law 
Japanese nationals may still be prosecuted in Japan for 
crimes committed in a foreign country, including 
trafficking-in-persons. 
 
L.  There was no conclusive evidence of direct government 
involvement in human trafficking, but NGO immigration 
activists note that they can get visas for the family members 
of foreign nationals residing in Japan much more easily when 
they employ the services of organized crime "fixers," 
implying that some government officials might be complicit in 
visa fraud. 
 
M.  N/A 
 
N.  Japan is a source country for child sex tourism. 
Japanese courts have extraterritorial jurisdiction over a 
Japanese national who has sexual intercourse with a minor in 
a foreign country in violation of the Act on Punishment of 
Activities Relating to Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography and the Protection of Children. There were no 
Japanese who were prosecuted or convicted under this 
extraterritorial provision in 2006. 
 
O.  See below: 
 
-- ILO Convention 182 was signed and ratified in June 2001 
 
-- ILO Convention 29 concerning forced labor was signed in 
November 1932. 
 
-- ILO Convention 105 on compulsory labor has not yet been 
ratified. 
 
-- The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC) on the sale of children, child prostitution, 
and child pornography was signed in May 2002 and ratified 
April 2004. 
 
-- UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons:  The Diet provisionally approved the ratification 
of this UN Protocol in 2002, but legislators continued to 
delay passing an anti-conspiracy law during the last year, 
preventing approval of the umbrella document, the UN 
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. 
 
6.  (SBU) PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS 
 
A.  Japan continued to expand efforts to protect victims of 
trafficking. In addition to allocating funds to subsidize 
 
TOKYO 00001034  009 OF 010 
 
 
private shelters, the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare 
utilized its pre-existing network of Women's Consulting 
Center (WCC) shelters for domestic violence victims as 
temporary housing for foreign trafficking victims awaiting 
repatriation. Women identified by immigration authorities as 
victims who have overstayed their visas are eligible for a 
special status that allows them to leave the country legally. 
Twenty-seven women received this special status in 2006. The 
government also began paying for victims' medical care in 
2006 and subsidized repatriation via a grant to the 
International Office of Migration (IOM).  The Embassy has yet 
to hear from MHLW how many women were protected in private 
and public shelters last year, but according to the Prime 
Minister's Cabinet Office website, 18 victims were protected 
at WCCs between January and October 2006, and IOM 
representatives told us that they helped 50 women return home 
with the government's support. 
 
Deficiencies remain in Japan's protection of victims, in 
spite of these steps forward.  Originally only used as 
shelters for victims of domestic violence, the WCC shelters 
lacked the resources they needed to provide adequate services 
to TIP victims. Private shelters usually had full-time staff 
able to speak seven or more languages, but the WCCs had to 
rely on interpretation services from outside providers.  Even 
the Kanagawa WCC, referred to by NGOs as the "Cadillac of 
WCCs," had full-time ability to provide counseling only in 
Japanese.  Without counseling in their native language by 
professionals familiar with the special needs of trafficking 
victims, the foreign women staying at WCCs elected to 
repatriate as quickly as possible. (According to MHLW 
statistics, the average stay was 17 days.) Private shelter 
representatives complained that the WCCs are just 
repatriation centers, and not providers of protection or 
rehabilitation. 
 
B.  The Japanese government earmarked USD 100,000 in last 
year for subsidizing victims' stays in private NGO shelters 
that specialize in assisting victims of human trafficking. 
Although 52 victims were protected using this fund in fiscal 
year 2005, very few victims were referred to private shelters 
last year. In addition, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
provided 7.2 million yen (USD 6,000) to a private shelter to 
provide emergency protection to non-Japanese TIP and domestic 
violence victims. Japan also gave $330,000 to IOM in 2006 for 
repatriation and reintegration assistance to victims. 
 
C.  The government continued to work to increase the ability 
of law enforcement officials to identify TIP victims.  The 
Immigration Bureau distributed the WHO Ethical and Safety 
Guideline for interviewing trafficked women to all of its 
offices, and police and immigration officials that raid sex 
businesses were reminded that workers could be TIP victims. 
If officers were unsure about a possible victim, they were 
encouraged to consult with the NPA, WCCs, and/or IOM to 
confirm the identification of the victim and arrange for 
protection. Last year, WCCs referred very few victims to 
specialized NGO shelters. 
 
D.  The government makes efforts to identify TIP victims and 
has policies and procedures designed to respect their 
position and protect their rights. Victims who are in Japan 
illegally are given special status (See paragraph A), and are 
not jailed, fined, or charged with prostitution. 
 
E.  The government encourages victims to assist in the 
investigation and prosecution of trafficking in principle, 
but most victims quickly repatriate.  Although victims have 
the right to file civil suits, very few choose to do so. 
Japan has a law to distribute seized assets to victims of 
crime, but TIP victims are not eligible for this 
compensation. Victims of trafficking are also ineligible for 
social welfare and are generally unable to work, forcing them 
to return to their country of origin, whether voluntarily via 
the special stay permit or by deportation. In addition, fear 
of reprisals, either to themselves or family members, 
prevents many victims from testifying or cooperating with 
investigations. 
 
F.  The government does not provide direct physical 
protection for individual trafficking victims, but WCCs and 
NGO shelters take steps to conceal the location of their 
facilities and work with local police to ensure their 
security.  If the police perceive a possible threat to a 
victim, they may send the victim to another city or 
 
TOKYO 00001034  010 OF 010 
 
 
prefecture for shelter.  There are a number of provisions in 
Japanese law to protect the anonymity of a victim during 
courtroom proceedings when there is a threat to his or her 
safety. If the victim is under 18 years old, the WCC will 
work with a local Child Guidance Center to provide shelter 
and services to the victim. 
 
G.  (See also paragraph 5.I.) The NPA has given official 
guidance to officers outlining how to respond to possible 
trafficking victims, and includes TIP content in its periodic 
training meetings with prefectural police.  Knowledge of TIP 
is required for the promotion examination.  The NPA also 
hosted the International Symposium on Measures to Prevent the 
Commercial and Sexual Exploitation of Children in Southeast 
Asia, attended by police from throughout the country. 
 
Other government agencies have also integrated TIP into their 
training programs.  Specifically, the Immigration Bureau 
brings in NGO representatives to serve as trainers on an ad 
hoc basis and has introduced victim interview materials into 
the curriculum. MOFA teaches consular officers about human 
trafficking before sending them to embassies and consulates 
abroad. 
 
H. There are no reported cases of repatriated Japanese 
nationals. 
 
I.  The U.S.-based NGO Polaris Project began operations in 
Tokyo in 2004, partially funded by GTIP.  They opened a 
telephone helpline in late 2005 and provide victim services 
at limited temporary shelter facilities. 
 
As noted previously, IOM provides voluntary return assistance 
for trafficking victims through a grant by Japan. 
 
HELP and SAALAA each operate shelters for victims of 
trafficking-in-persons. 
 
The Asia Foundation organizes conferences on fighting 
trafficking-in-persons. 
 
The Japan Trade Union Confederation (RENGO) and other unions 
provide assistance to possible victims of labor trafficking. 
SCHIEFFER