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Viewing cable 07PORTAUPRINCE522, PREVAL: CHAVEZ VISIT A MESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PORTAUPRINCE522 2007-03-16 19:16 2011-06-01 14:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Port Au Prince
Appears in these articles:
http://www.haitiliberte.com
http://bit.ly/mDfYBE
http://bit.ly/mcuO3r
VZCZCXRO8080
PP RUEHQU
DE RUEHPU #0522/01 0751916
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161916Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5626
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 1468
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1291
RUEHQU/AMCONSUL QUEBEC PRIORITY 0752
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1166
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 000522 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR 
DRL 
S/CRS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR LAC/CAR 
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) 
TREASURY FOR MAUREEN WAFER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID XM XL HA VE
SUBJECT: PREVAL: CHAVEZ VISIT A MESS 
 
REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 492 
     B. PORT AU PRINCE 433 
     C. PORT AU PRINCE 266 
     D. PORT AU PRINCE 78 
 
PORT AU PR 00000522  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  To hear President Rene Preval tell it, 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' visit to Haiti on March 12 
was a logistical nightmare and  an annoyance to the GoH. 
Chavez thwarted Preval's efforts to keep the public profile 
of the visit low key.  In the aftermath of the visit, Preval 
told Ambassador and others that he is skeptical of Chavez's 
promises, especially on delivery of gasoline through the 
Petrocaribe agreement.  Secretary General of the Presidency 
Fritz Longchamps told Polcouns that the GoH viewed the Chavez 
visit as the price to pay for whatever assistance Venezuela 
provides to Haiti.  Aside from new and renewed pledges of 
assistance (ref A) Chavez made concessions on several points 
allowing Haiti to more easily implement Petrocaribe, 
according to Michael Lecorps, the head of the GoH office 
tasked with Petrocaribe.  Preval and company may be 
overselling their irritation toward Chavez for our benefit, 
but Preval has consistently voiced wariness of Chavez in 
conversations with Emboffs going back to the early stages of 
the presidential campaign in 2005.  In any case, it appears 
that Preval will do what it takes to elicit assistance from 
Chavez, but has otherwise shown no interest in joining Chavez 
in his broader "Bolivarian agenda."  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  Preval told Ambassador the evening of March 13 that 
Chavez was a difficult guest.  The Venezulean did not have a 
GOH invitation but insisted on coming to mark Venezuelan flag 
day (ref C) and only the arrival of two advance planes two 
days before the visit gave Port au Prince warning Chavez was 
on his way.  After finally arriving at the Palace, Chavez 
made Preval and his team wait 40 more minutes while he spoke 
to Castro by telephone.  Responding to Ambassador's 
observation that giving Chavez a platform to spout 
anti-American slogans here was hard to explain given our 
close relationship and support of Haiti and of Preval's 
government in particular,  Preval stressed that he had worked 
hard to stop much of Chavez' proposed grandstanding.  He 
vetoed a Chavez-led procession/demonstration from the airport 
to the Venezuelan Embassy (substituting a wreath laying at 
Port-au-Prince's monument to Bolivar) and limited the length 
of the press conference.  Chavez, for his part, insisted that 
the press conference proceed as scheduled,  thus cutting into 
bilateral meeting time.   Preval added that he, Preval,  is 
"just an independent petit bourgeoisie" and doesn't go for 
the grand gestures that Chavez favors.  Haiti needs aid from 
all its friends, Preval added,  and he is sure that the US 
understands his difficult position.  The President was 
uncomfortable with the exchange, later noting that Haiti's 
chattering classes will claim that the Chavez visit led to 
cancellation of a rumored visit here by President bush. 
 
3. (C) According to UN SRSG Edmund Mulet (who hosted an 
ebullient Preval for dinner following  the capture of Cite 
Soleil gang leader Evans Jeune later in the week),  Preval 
told him that he didn't trust Chavez to follow through on his 
promises and requested that the Cuban ambassador participate 
in the sessions.  The Cuban government went further in 
sending Vice President Esteban Lazo Hernadez, who had 
participated in other trilateral meetings with Haiti and 
Venezuela.  Preval also told fomer UNSRSG Juan Gabriel Valdez 
(visiting here on behalf of the OAS) that he was appalled by 
Chavez's behavior at the airport and on the way to the 
palace. He refused to get out of the car when Chavez insisted 
on greeting his demonstrators in the street on his way in 
from the airport.  Preval and others in the government 
believe that the Venezuelan Charge d'Affaires orchestrated 
and paid for the demonstrations by Famni Lavalas militants at 
the airport, the Venezuelan Embassy, and the palace, which 
numbered roughly 1,000 and also called for the return of 
former President Arisitide. 
 
4.   (C) ''Now that this trip is over, a great weight has 
 
PORT AU PR 00000522  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
been lifted off my shoulders,'' Longchamps told Polcouns on 
March 14, stressing that Haiti had to host Chavez if the GoH 
was going to get any aid and assistance from Venezuela.  The 
GoH does not expect that Chavez will follow through on most 
of his promises, but even half, or a quarter, would be 
significant.  The most valuable use of Venezuelan aid, 
according to Longchamps, would be funding for salaries, 
supplies, medicine, and shelter for the Cuban doctors and 
advisors currently working in Haiti: the GoH hopes this 
funding will come from the USD 20 million humanitarian 
reserve fund that Chavez re-pledged.  Longchamps told 
Polcouns that Haiti has about 300 Cubans working officially 
in Haiti, of whom 90 percent are doctors.  Also, Longchamps 
recalled, Preval brought the Cubans to Haiti during his first 
term, and the continued success of this program is important 
to the President.  Longchamps added that the trilateral 
cooperation bureau that Cuba and Venezuela promised to set up 
in Port-au-Prince is ''just an idea,'' with no definite plans 
for implementation.   Haiti has no plans to join the 
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (known as ALBA), 
Venezuela's free trade zone. 
 
5.  (C)  The Petrocaribe agreement, through which Haiti would 
get a 25-year loan on 40 percent of the fuel it purchases 
from Venezuela is still in discussion stages, and Preval told 
Valdes that ever since the initial shipment in May, 2006, 
Venezuela has made no real attempts at progressing with the 
agreement.  Apparently the two countries signed off on a few 
details during Chavez' visit (which Longchamps told Polcouns 
the GoH pressured Chavez into signing), such as allowing 
Haiti's oil industry to ship the product (Venezuela had 
insisted on the shipping rights until now), and giving the 
oil companies the right to receive the product in place of a 
state-owned oil company, as previously stipulated by 
Venezuela (ref D).  Industry representatives claim that 
despite the progress made during Chavez' visit, the agreement 
would still take over a year to implement and suspect that it 
will never take place at all.  The head of Haiti's 
Petrocaribe office (known as the monetization bureau), 
Michael Lecorps, confirmed that Venezuela doubled its 
commitment to 14,000 barrels per day and pledged to work with 
the oil industry in Haiti, an unprecedented move on Chavez' 
part, according to Lecorps. 
 
6.  (C)  Comment.  The Ambassador and Polcouns have voiced 
concern to senior officials that Chavez had used his visit as 
a platform for an attack on Haiti's closest and steadiest 
bilateral ally, most recently with PM Alexis yesterday.  It 
is clear that the visit has left a bad taste in our 
interlocutors' mouths and they are now into damage control. 
Preval himself has no love for Chavez: Valdes reminded us 
that during a private Preval visit to Venezuela prior to the 
2006 elections, Chavez blind-sided him with a draft statement 
pledging support for the return of Aristide. Preval has yet 
to forgive him, according to intimates.  At no time has 
Preval given any indication that he is interested in 
associating Haiti with Chavez' broader "revolutionary 
agenda."  We believe that the GOH will continue to argue that 
hosting Chavez was an unavoidable consequence of Preval's 
effort to solicit aid from any quarter, and that Preval did 
his best to rein Chavez in.   Preval himself will continue to 
focus his public remarks on Venezuelan (and Cuban) assistance 
for Haiti -- it is neither in his character -- nor in his 
calcuation -- to repudiate Chavez, even as the Venezuelan 
abuses his hospitality at home. 
SANDERSON 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================