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Viewing cable 07NAIROBI1389, QUARTERLY FRAUD SUMMARY - NAIROBI (CORRECTED COPY)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07NAIROBI1389 2007-03-28 07:04 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #1389/01 0870704
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280704Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8561
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0278
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 4936
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 9213
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 4764
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 1855
UNCLAS NAIROBI 001389 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/CA 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
PASS TO KCC 
PASS TO INL/HSTC 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC KCRM KE
SUBJECT: QUARTERLY FRAUD SUMMARY - NAIROBI (CORRECTED COPY) 
 
REF: A. 06 Nairobi 3733 B. 06 NAIROBI 2782, C. 06 NAIROBI 2509, D. 
 
06 NAIROBI 1650, E. 06 NAIROBI 817, F. 06 NAIROBI 740, G. 05 STATE 
205073, H. 05 NAIROBI 4523, I. 05 NAIROBI 3627 
 
1. (U) Summary.  The following report replies to Ref G reinstitution 
of the quarterly fraud report covering the current condition of 
consular fraud in Kenya, with specific reference to fraud trends in 
non-immigrant visa, immigrant visa, and diversity visa applications 
as well as cases of American Citizen Services, adoption, and passport 
fraud.   Other areas covered include cooperation with the host 
government, and areas of particular concern.  The review concludes 
with an overview of FPU staffing and training. End Summary. 
 
------------------ 
COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Post's fraud environment remains complicated. Post 
continues to implement anti-fraud measures to combat NIV, IV and DV 
fraud.  Relatively large appointment backlogs and ongoing short 
staffing mean that Nairobi continues to look for efficient means of 
fraud prevention. 
 
3.  (SBU) Brokers: Post believes that current wait times for NIV 
appointments result from brokers who are booking large numbers of 
appointment slots as placeholders and selling them to prospective 
applicants.  Nairobi is experiencing an average "no-show" rate of 
roughly 40 percent and we have heard that various booking agents and 
cyber cafes are charging between $7 and $30 for appointments that 
are offered free on the Embassy website.  Brokers cancel 
appointments that they have set and then capture the newly opened 
appointment slot, filling it in with the buyer's information.  Post 
is working to change the way appointments are cancelled to combat 
this issue, and in the time being is scrutinizing online appointment 
data. 
 
----------- 
NIV FRAUD - STUDENT VISA FRAUD, GROUP FRAUD, AND IMPOSTORS 
----------- 
 
4. (SBU) Students: CCD text searches of sponsor names continues to 
allow Nairobi to routinely catch F1 student applicants using 
recycled bank statements that have been presented by other 
applicants, claiming the sponsors as their own aunts and uncles. 
The number of fraudulent high school certificates presented by 
applicants has dropped somewhat, due largely to the lack of student 
visa applicants. 
 
5. (SBU) Fictitious NGO:  Thanks to a poison pen, Post uncovered a 
fraud ring that had created a fictitious NGO, the "International 
Centre for Environmental Social and Policy Studies."  CCD Text 
Searches revealed 5 issuances since late 2006 to applicants who, in 
retrospect, had been well coached in their cover stories as NGO 
workers.  This combined with invitations to real conferences in the 
U.S. allowed the applicants to dupe adjudicating officers.  The cost 
of this "service" is approximately $1,000 per applicant according to 
the poison pen.  Attempts to contact the applicants and the supposed 
NGO have resulted in dead ends. 
 
6.  (SBU) Numerous poison pens regarding a Kenyan alien smuggler led 
Post to deny a large group of applicants ostensibly traveling for 
tae kwon do competitions.  The poison pen indicated that the leader 
charged $6,000 per applicant to present applicants as members of the 
traveling sports groups.  The poison pen further explains that the 
applicant collects all passports of persons that he smuggles in an 
attempt to thwart any attempts by Embassies to verify return of the 
applicants. 
 
7. (U) Altered Biometrics: In the past quarter Nairobi has 
apprehended two NIV applicants who changed their biometric 
information, then fraudulently obtained genuine Kenyan passports to 
hide previous overstays or inadmissibilities.  The first applicant 
was caught by an FR hit which revealed a facial match for differing 
names and DOBs (James Githui MWAURA, 16-MAY-1945 and James Gachuhi 
MWAURA DOB: xx-xxx-1947).  The second applicant changed his name 
enough to obfuscate his identity but did not change his DOB which 
led the adjudicating officer to search for a record of the "near 
hit" refusal.  A CCD comparison of the two cases revealed the same 
person. 
 
---------- 
IV FRAUD - SOMALIS MARRYING SIBLINGS 
---------- 
 
8. (U) IV relationship fraud remains high, particularly in K1, K3, 
and IR1 petitions.  Post has become much more liberal in its 
requests for DNA testing to exclude sibling relationships, 
particularly among cases involving Somali applicants given the 
general lack of any relationship evidence in this applicant group. 
As a result, in the past quarter Nairobi has confirmed four separate 
cases in which DNA confirmed a sibling relationship for applicants 
claiming to have be spouses.  In one case the applicant and 
petitioner, after being told that DNA confirmed they were siblings, 
locked lips in an effort to convince the adjudicator that the DNA 
tests were incorrect.  The adjudicator was not swayed. 
 
9. (U) Nairobi has experienced a large growth in Ethiopian and 
Eritrean K1 and K3 applicants.  Post is very suspect of applicants' 
claims of residence in Kenya, as most of them claim to be studying 
in Kenya and all produce a school ID from the same "school."  Post 
maintains its previous concerns that these cases appear to be more 
along the lines of business transactions between petitioners and 
applicant families in the U.S; however, Nairobi has not been 
successful in providing sufficient proof that would allow DHS to 
affirm our recommendations for revocation.  Sudanese refugees 
resident in Kenyan and Ugandan camps also continue to commit fraud. 
Sudanese IV applicants produce poorly-executed altered photos and 
fraudulent documents with great regularity. 
 
10. (SBU) Recent detailed poison pen information, confirmed by FPU, 
reveal that an Amcit petitioner had petitioned for his daughter as 
his wife.  Worse yet, the poison pen indicates that the long-absent 
father returned 20 years later from the U.S. to find his wife had 
passed away.  He then had a child with his daughter, which is 
confirmed by ACS records. 
 
---------- 
DV FRAUD - GHOST MARRIAGES CONTINUE 
---------- 
 
11.  (SBU) As the 2007 DV season wears on, Nairobi has again noticed 
many commonalities between ghost marriages from western Kenya, 
particularly from the Kisii tribe.  Post notes that, despite the 
length of relationship claimed by applicants and their add-on 
spouses, the tangible relationship proof is usually generated in a 
very short period of time.  Our concerns are backed up by several 
poison pens detailing the process.  In two cases, the adjudicator 
noticed that both Kisii couples featured in casual relationship 
photos in each others' cases, though the applicants claimed not to 
know each other.  Desperate "pop-up" applicants have begun to resort 
to very graphic photos in an effort to prove long term relationships 
as well. 
 
12.  (SBU) In other "pop-up" or ghost marriages, Nairobi has 
received a fair number of photo-substituted relationship pictures in 
the past quarter.  These are usually produced by members of the 
Kikuyu tribe.  In a recent case, both applicant and spouse were 
listed on the original electronic DV submission; however, a poison 
pen revealed that the principal applicant and spouse were brother 
and sister-in-law, and the family planned to send them to the U.S, 
have them divorce, and then petition for their true spouses.  The 
poison pen in this case came from one of the spouses that would have 
been left behind in Kenya. 
 
------------------------ 
ACS and PASSPORT FRAUD - BECOME AN AMERICAN FOR $4,500 
------------------------ 
 
13. (SBU) CBP officials shared information with Post through an 
I-275 turnaround report regarding a Kenyan national who stated her 
true identity was Mary MUTHONI, DOB 08-JUN-1965; however, she 
attempted to reenter at the Boston port of entry in December 2006 on 
U.S. Passport 142102512 as Puerto Rican-born Maria Del Carmen Ruiz 
Catalan, DOB 31-OCT-1964.  Mary appears to have been out of status 
in the U.S since her initial arrival in 2000, when she entered as a 
"look-alike" on someone else's U.S. Passport.  Passport 142102512 
used in the December entry was fraudulently obtained.  According to 
the applicant she paid $4,500 to a person working at a picture 
studio in Boston who gave her a social security card and a birth 
certificate in her new identity.  Mary then fraudulently obtained a 
genuine identification card from the State of Maine, and finally 
fraudulently procured a genuine U.S. passport.  The applicant's 
PIERS record remains in the system.  Post's review of CCD and NIV 
records indicates no applicant with this biometric information was 
interviewed for a visa. 
14. (SBU) Post recently worked on the repatriation of an Amcit and 
his children who had fled from Somalia due to recent fighting in the 
country.  In the course of the family's flight from Mogadishu to 
Kenya, the mother died somewhere in southern Somalia, as witnessed 
by her 5 year old daughter.  Neither her body nor her passport were 
recovered.  In March, her passport resurfaced in the hands of a very 
high quality "look alike" impostor who was apprehended by airline 
authorities in Dubai.  AmEmbassy Dubai is in the process of 
recovering the passport from law enforcement authorities who are 
prosecuting her. 
 
-------- 
ADOPTION 
-------- 
 
15. (U) Nairobi has not encountered significant fraud related to 
adoptions in this quarter. 
 
--------------- 
ASSISTING USCIS 
--------------- 
 
16. (U) Post's fraud unit continues to act as a resource for 
domestic USCIS investigators verifying documents for Kenyans 
attempting to change status in the U.S.  The majority of document 
verification requests continue to involve fraudulent divorce 
decrees.  Nairobi notes with concern that documents "certified" by 
the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), office of State 
Counsel, Legal Division often turn out to be fraudulent.  Post has 
taken the issue up with MFA but received no response. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
HOST GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO BE COOPERATIVE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
17.  (U) Nairobi continues to receive excellent cooperation in fraud 
prevention from Kenyan Immigration. 
 
---------------- 
AREAS OF CONCERN 
---------------- 
 
18.  (U) Post believes that Kenyan ports will continue to be a 
transit point for third-country nationals attempting to travel on 
fraudulent documents.  Nairobi also believes that, following recent 
fighting in Somalia, potentially malevolent applicants may attempt 
to apply for visas in Nairobi. Such persons may have significant 
resources and may attempt to commit identity fraud in their attempts 
to procure a visa.  As such, following the recent OIG's 
recommendation, Post is strongly considering the purchase of a 
powerful anti-fraud tool: the Foster and Freeman VSC4Plus with 
Document Imaging Software Suite, at an installed cost of roughly 
$33,000.  We believe the VSC4Plus would greatly enhance Post's 
anti-fraud posture and would enable us to expand on our anti-fraud 
cooperation with host-government authorities. 
 
--------------------- 
STAFFING AND TRAINING 
--------------------- 
 
19. (U) The FPU unit includes one full-time FSN, Francis Marawoshe, 
who is currently undergoing FSI training, and three back-up FSNs 
with collateral duties.  Due to unexpected short staffing among the 
officers, Post's fraud prevention efforts at the officer level have 
been diminished.  The current Fraud Prevention Manager with 
collateral duties is Etienne LeBailly, who received FPM training in 
December 2005.  Post also has an A/RSO-I with collateral duties. 
 
RANNEBERGER