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Viewing cable 07NAIROBI1150, COASTAL MUSLIM LEADERSHIP VIEWS: SHEIKH DOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07NAIROBI1150 2007-03-12 12:26 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO5927
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHGI RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #1150/01 0711226
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121226Z MAR 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8170
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0879
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 001150 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
ACCRA FOR NAN STEWART 
DEPT FOR AF/E AND INR/AA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC KE KISL KPAO PGOV PHUM
SUBJECT: COASTAL MUSLIM LEADERSHIP VIEWS: SHEIKH DOR 
 
REF: NAIROBI 628 
 
NAIROBI 00001150  001.5 OF 004 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Sheikh Dor, a vocal leader of Kenya's 
coastal Muslim community, harangues the USG and GoK, cites 
some legitimate grievances concerning biased treatment of his 
community by the GoK, praises the American people and 
threatens to disrupt the World Cross Country Championship in 
Mombasa.  The coastal Muslim community represents six percent 
of Kenya's population.  The Swahili/Arab component of the 
coastal Muslim community (about 60 percent) closely 
identifies with events in the Middle East, while the 
remainder of the community does not.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) PolCouns recently met with Sheikh Muhummad 
Dormuhammad (popularly referred to as "Sheikh Dor") in 
Mombasa.  Sheikh Dor is the Secretary General of the Council 
of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK).  He regularly 
chastises the U.S. and the Government of Kenya (GoK) for 
various "crimes" in his press statements and mosque sermons. 
Along with Professor Busaidy of the Supreme Council of Kenyan 
Muslims (SUPKEM), he is one of the most prominent Muslim 
community spokesmen in Kenya.  Dor came to the interview 
armed with a large binder full of news clippings about 
alleged police abuse of Kenyan Muslims, the purported 
anti-Muslim bias of the GoK, and the supposed anti-Muslim 
agenda of U.S. foreign policy. 
 
Dor Presents his Grievances 
--------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Sheikh Dor made the following points: 
 
-- Kenya's Muslims are a marginalized community, treated by 
the GoK and society in general as second class citizens or 
even as non-citizens.  They must go to great lengths to 
receive their basic rights as citizens, such as provision of 
national identification cards, voter cards and passports, 
while those in the Christian community have no such 
difficulty.  (Comment:  This is a very common complaint by 
Muslims throughout the country.  GoK officials usually do not 
deny it, but rather claim it is necessary since several 
Muslim-majority ethnic groups, such as Somali, Swahili, 
Borana and Arab, are transnational with ethnic communities in 
Somalia, Tanzania, Ethiopia and the Middle East.  However, 
Christian-majority ethnic groups that are also transnational, 
such as the Luo, Maasai, Luhya or Taita, do not experience 
nearly as much difficulty obtaining official documents.  End 
Comment.) 
 
-- The Muslim community is prepared to work with the USG and 
the GoK to find and arrest terrorist suspects if the USG and 
GoK would provide them with credible evidence.  The GoK's 
Anti-Terrorist Police Unit (ATPU), with whom the USG works, 
arbitrarily arrests innocent Muslims.  These police are not 
from the coast.  They do not know us and we do not know them. 
 They make ignorant mistakes or act out of simple malice 
toward the Muslim community.  (Comment:  Arbitrary arrests of 
Muslim men is a very common complaint of coastal Muslims in 
general, not just the clerical leaders.  Dor is correct that 
there are few Coast province natives among the police and 
even fewer coast Muslims.  End Comment.) 
 
-- The GoK detained 37 Muslim Kenyans they claimed had 
supported the Islamic Courts in Somalia and then sent them to 
Somalia and Ethiopia to be interrogated and imprisoned, 
ignoring orders from Kenyan courts for them to be released or 
charged.  If they broke Kenyan law, then let them be tried 
here.  Other foreigners linked to the Somali Islamic courts 
were deported to their home countries.  Only Kenyans were 
treated in this way.  It is further proof that the GoK does 
not consider Muslims full citizens worthy of protection.  "I 
ask that the U.S. Embassy help to get our people back." 
(Comment:  The number of transferees is 17 at most, and it is 
not sure that all these are truly Kenyan citizens.  The GoK 
has now agreed to request the Somali authorities to return 
any transferees who can prove Kenyan citizenship.  Dor sits 
on the GoK-appointed committee to resolve this issue.  End 
Comment.) 
 
-- Once arrested, our men are interrogated by the FBI and 
CIA.  What business do they have interrogating Kenyan 
citizens?  Is this America?  We may be Muslim, but we still 
have our rights as Kenyan citizens living in Kenya. 
(Comment:  It is widely believed in Mombasa that all arrests 
of Muslim men, even if seemingly for criminal offenses not 
related to terrorism, is at the specific instruction of "the 
FBI and the CIA," who then participate in the interrogations. 
 
NAIROBI 00001150  002.5 OF 004 
 
 
 This myth is very difficult to dispel.  It is based on the 
fact that FBI agents did indeed provide extensive 
investigatory assistance to the Kenyan Police in the 
aftermath of the 1998 Embassy Nairobi bombing and the 2002 
tourist hotel bombing outside Mombasa.  That limited period 
of intense cooperation has been mythologized into a tale of 
continuing direct supervision by USG agents of Kenya's 
anti-terrorist police on the coast.  Diplomatic Security's 
Anti-Terrorist Assistance program provides some training to 
ATPU.  End Comment.) 
 
-- We know that the ATPU is no more answerable to Police 
Commissioner Ali than was the special squad used to raid the 
Standard newspaper.  The GoK has put the ATPU under the 
control of the U.S. embassy.  (Note: In March 2006 masked 
Kenyan police raided the Standard media house.  This action 
was taken without the approval of Police Commissioner Hussein 
Ali.  In the aftermath of the public outcry against this 
police action, Ali fired his deputy who had organized the 
raid.  End Note.) 
 
-- Dor made all the usual points from an anti-American Muslim 
perspective opposing USG policy in Israel, Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  He said that "after 9/11 we were all very sympathetic 
toward America, but of course later we learned the whole 
truth of 9/11 as your own people have revealed."  Dor then 
recited delusional conspiracy theories about 9/11 developed 
on various web sites.  He went on, "at first we believed that 
you were fighting back against terrorists, but then we came 
to realize you were making war against Islam because only the 
Muslims can prevent America from achieving worldwide 
domination."  (Comment:  Dor emphasized the American origin 
of his 9/11 conspiracy theories.  The "9/11 Truth Movement" 
has made an enthusiastic convert on the Kenyan coast.  The 
U.S. mission will seek to correct the perception of this 
issue among audiences reached by Dor and others using 
materials developed by the Department's International 
Information Programs.  End Comment.) 
 
A Need for Increased Dialog 
--------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) PolCouns stressed to Dor that there is a need for 
regularizing and intensifying dialog between the U.S. Embassy 
and Mombasa's Muslim leadership.  This in fact is among the 
main reasons the USG plan to re-open a consulate in Mombasa. 
The purpose of the dialog is to clear up mutual 
misunderstandings and incorrect information and perceptions 
as well as to frankly discuss real points of disagreement 
about U.S. foreign policy.  Successful dialog would identify 
points of agreement and potential cooperation.  Dor said that 
he knew of the USG's intention to re-open its consulate in 
Mombasa.  He welcomed that development as a means of 
furthering dialog, "along as the consulate is not staffed by 
the FBI and CIA and is not used as a base to harass and 
oppress us." 
 
5. (SBU) PolCouns challenged Dor to express what his 
organization supports, as his statements in the press only 
list what CIPK is against.  He took the point, but said that 
the press often mischaracterizes his views.  PolCouns 
rejected Dor claims that USG policy is anti-Muslim, pointing 
out actions on behalf of persecuted Muslims in Bosnia and 
Kosovo and on behalf of Tsunami victims in Muslim Indonesia. 
PolCouns also pointed out that whatever the present day 
difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, the prior regimes in 
those two states had murdered a great number of Muslims and 
had misruled and oppressed their people.  PolCouns asked Dor 
if CIPK had ever denounced Sudanese policy in Darfur as it 
had USG policy in Iraq.  Dor claimed that in fact he had 
publicly challenged Sudanese representatives at 
"international fora" he had attended to justify their Darfur 
actions.  "But in Kenya, I focus on the domestic issue of 
police abuse of our people."  (Comment:  Dor's domestic focus 
does not prevent him from regularly castigating the U.S. for 
its policies in the Middle East.  End Comment.) 
 
Threatened Disruption of World Cross Country Championship 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
6. (SBU) PolCouns asked Dor about statements that the Muslim 
leadership in Mombasa will seek to disrupt the International 
Cross Country Championships scheduled to take place on 24 
March unless the GoK releases Muslim detainees in Kenya, 
Somalia and Ethiopia.  Dor said "I was among those who 
lobbied internationally to get the championship in Mombasa. 
We know this event can bring needed resources to our 
 
NAIROBI 00001150  003.5 OF 004 
 
 
neglected community.  But how can we allow it to go on now 
that our brothers have been deported and exiled to Somalia 
and Ethiopia?  We can not sit still as this injustice 
continues, just as you do not sit still when your people are 
abused."  Asked about the nature of the "disruption," Dor 
replied cagily that it will include demonstrations and other 
protest actions to ensure that the GoK "does not ignore us." 
Dor declined to be more specific than that.  PolCouns 
reminded Dor that he had earlier denounced the U.S. Embassy 
travel warning as an "unfriendly act against Kenya," pointing 
out that the press statements about his organization's intent 
to disrupt the games was potentially very damaging to 
Mombasa's tourism industry.  Dor reacted angrily, stating 
that "unlike you, honor and respect is more important to us 
than money."  (Comment:  Earlier that day, Mombasa Muslim 
business leaders had expressed to PolCouns their frustration 
with their community's clerical leadership.  They regretted 
that the clerics "are responsive to their friends and 
financial backers in the Middle East, not to us."  End 
Comment.) 
 
7. (SBU) Dor emphasized numerous times that he has respect 
and affection for the American people, but detests American 
foreign policy.  He recounted his wife's recent trip to the 
U.S. to visit her American resident sister and the glowing 
reports she gave of the thriving American Muslim community 
she encountered there.  At the same time, he reached for 
every rhetorical stick with which to beat the USG.  At one 
moment he asked what right the USG had to appoint itself as 
the world's policeman, while at the next moment he complained 
that the USG had not intervened in Rwanda during the 
genocide.  His manner was intense, nervous and a bit 
irrational, while also at times kindly and avuncular. 
 
Provincial Police Officer Kingori: The Games will Go On 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
8. (SBU) Provincial Police Officer Kingori told PolCouns that 
the Muslim community threats concerning the cross country 
championship were all bluster and posturing.  He summed up 
their stance as "violent words, but peaceful actions."  He 
expressed frustration with the Muslim leadership demands. 
"How can I stop doing things I am not doing?  How can I 
release detainees who do not exist?  Most of their complaints 
are imaginary!"  Kingori, a Christian from central Kenya, 
arrived in Mombasa in late 2006 from his previous posting in 
Nairobi.  He acknowledged that he was still learning the ways 
of the coast.  His take on the Muslim leadership was 
derisive.  "You know these Swahilis and Arabs only marry 
their cousins in order to keep wealth and land within the 
family.  You can see the effects of in-breeding in their 
erratic and irrational behavior."  Kingori then laid out his 
security plans for the cross country games and expressed the 
strong conviction that his force can maintain security for 
the event. 
 
A Note on the Coastal Muslim Community 
-------------------------------------- 
 
9. (U) Coastal Muslims make up approximately 60 percent of 
Kenya's Muslim population and 6 percent of Kenya's overall 
population.  They account for approximately 50 percent of the 
population of Coast province.  This community is ethnically 
mixed and divided amongst competing sects and moderate to 
radical tendencies.  These various ethnicities, sects and 
tendencies often unite when they feel their community's 
interests are directly threatened, although they contend 
against one another for leadership positions in mosques and 
Muslim associations.  Coastal Muslims dominate leadership 
positions in Kenya's two main Muslim associations, SUPKEM and 
CIPK. 
 
10. (SBU) Muslim religious leaders on the coast, especially 
at senior levels, are largely drawn from the Arab and Swahili 
communities, who together make up about 60 percent of coastal 
Muslims.  The remaining 40 percent are Muslims from 
Christian-majority Bantu ethnic groups, mostly Mijikenda and 
Pokomo.  There is a pronounced division within the coastal 
Muslim community between the Arab/Swahili camp on one hand, 
with its middle east connections and preoccupations, and its 
clerical leadership's strident, grievance obsessed public 
posture, and the rest of the community who tend to be much 
more moderate in their rhetoric and are much more concerned 
about domestic issues than they are about American foreign 
policy. 
 
Comment:  Some Legitimate Grievances Amidst All the Angst 
 
NAIROBI 00001150  004.6 OF 004 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
11. (SBU) Kenyan society and officialdom, for the most part, 
clearly perceive Kenyan Muslims as second class citizens or 
not as true citizens at all, and treat them as such. 
Complaints that Kenyan Muslims experience much greater 
difficulty in obtaining official documents than do their 
Christian fellow citizens are widespread and credible. 
Relations with the coastal Muslim community could be improved 
by public advocacy of the principle of equal treatment for 
all citizens under the law.  We will include this theme in 
our public statements. 
 
12. (SBU) Policing on the coast would be more effective if 
more members of the force were native to the region.  We have 
raised this issue with senior police officials in the past, 
however, current GoK policy is not to assign police to their 
home districts so as to avoid conflict of interest and to 
discourage corruption. 
 
13. (SBU)  Additionally, the Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights (KNCHR), a government watchdog organization, is 
charged with investigating complaints of human rights abuses. 
 Greater cooperation and transparency between provincial 
police and the KNCHR could help to mitigate coastal Muslim,s 
concerns about abuse of police power perpetrated against 
their community.  We will follow up with KNCHR leadership on 
this point. 
 
RANNEBERGER