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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA776, MARTINEZ CUENCA: GIVE THE ORTEGA GOVERNMENT A BIT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA776 2007-03-22 23:14 2011-06-21 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXRO3087
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0776/01 0812314
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 222314Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9583
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1018
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000776 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/CEN, INR/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2017 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL SNAR
SUBJECT: MARTINEZ CUENCA: GIVE THE ORTEGA GOVERNMENT A BIT 
MORE TIME (C-AL7-00063) 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 32361 
 
     B. MANAGUA 0745 
     C. MANAGUA 0726 
     D. MANAGUA 0242 
     E. 2006 MANAGUA 2077 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli.  Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Sandinista-dissident Alejandro Martinez 
Cuenca believes it is still too soon to assess the 
performance of the Ortega administration, but he is certain 
that Ortega's prime goal is to remain in power indefinitely 
while he leaves First Lady Rosario to run the government.  He 
is concerned that businesses are not restocking their 
inventories and consumers are limiting their spending. 
Martinez Cuenca is skeptical that Chavez will deliver on all 
of his promises to President Ortega, but worries that Chavez' 
influence over Ortega could eventually strain vital aspects 
of Nicaragua's relationship with the United States.  He 
suggests that CAFTA, the MCA, mil-mil relations, and police 
cooperation in combating crime are the four pillars of the 
Nicaraguan-U.S. relationship that bear nurturing and 
monitoring.  End Summary. 
 
Ortega Government: Give it Another Month 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (C) In his conversation with PolCouns and TDY analysts on 
March 21, Sandinista dissident Alejandro Martinez Cuenca 
remarked that it is too early to assess the performance of 
the Ortega administration and that most Nicaraguans are still 
willing to give Ortega the benefit of the doubt for another 
month.  According to Martinez Cuenca (Refs. D and E), some of 
the government's actions thus far are encouraging, including 
its emphasis on health and education -- even though it 
remains to be seen just how much will actually be 
accomplished. 
 
3.  (C) Martinez Cuenca finds other trends disconcerting: 
Ortega's permitting "Mrs. Ortega" to run the government and 
the messy blur between party and state, as evidenced by the 
government's use of party headquarters for its presidential 
offices.  He added that the regime's hermetic style is such 
that even ministers must fight for access to Rosario and 
Ortega.  A vexed minister recently told him that after 
numerous failed attempts to reach Mrs. Ortega by phone to 
arrange a meeting with the President, he appeared at her 
doorstep.  The minister was ordered to leave the building and 
use his cell phone to call the First Lady. 
 
Keep on Eye on Business and Consumer Confidence 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4.  (C) An economist, Martinez Cuenca, believes that both 
consumers and the private sector are maintaining a "wait and 
see" posture vis-a-vis the Ortega government.  He noted, 
however, two "alarming seeds" that could portend choppy 
economic waters ahead: an apparent decline in consumer 
spending and indications that businesses are not restocking 
their inventories -- preferring instead to deposit their 
profits in banks. 
 
And Watch out for U.S. Interests 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5.  (C) Martinez Cuenca also frets that Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez' influence over Ortega will test and eventually 
strain vital aspects of Nicaragua's relationship with the 
United States.  Praising our policy not to be baited by 
Chavez' efforts to drive a wedge between the U.S. and 
Nicaragua, he listed CAFTA, the MCA, mil-mil relations, and 
police cooperation in combating crime as the four pillars of 
the Nicaraguan-U.S. relationship that bear particular 
nurturing and monitoring.  If the Nicaraguan government 
continues to cooperate in these four areas, the bilateral 
relationship will maintain reasonable equilibrium, opined 
Martinez Cuenca.  Nicaragua's Ambassador in Washington, 
Arturo Cruz, could serve as a useful ally in this regard, he 
said. 
 
The Master of Crossword Puzzles 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (C) Martinez Cuenca characterized Ortega as a changed 
man, perhaps due in part to health problems and medications, 
but certainly no longer the statesman of the 1980s.  Rather, 
Ortega is exclusively obsessed with remaining in power and 
leaves Mrs. Ortega to run the government so he can dedicate 
his energies to scheming against his internal and external 
rivals.  Martinez Cuenca likened Ortega to a master of 
crossword puzzles, endlessly recreating and completing a 
mono-thematic, power-based puzzle. 
 
7.  (C) Regarding the ongoing debate over who exactly lies 
within Ortega government's "inner circle," Martinez Cuenca 
was unequivocal: the President and Mrs. Ortega.  He asserted 
that while other Sandinista militants exercise varying 
degrees of influence in the government, the two Ortegas are 
the only two who really count.  For example, Bayardo Arce, a 
pragmatist who harbors presidential ambitions and serves as 
Ortega's senior economic advisor, is out of favor with the 
First Lady, so he has lost his influence.  Indeed, the lack 
of access to the FSLN's two-person inner circle has created 
turmoil in the party, asserted Martinez Cuenca. 
 
8.  (C) Referring to a meeting in January when he had 
predicted that President Ortega would not release Liberal 
Constitutional Party caudillo/convicted money launderer 
Arnoldo Aleman any time soon because he could still exploit 
him, Martinez Cuenca remarked that Ortega's recent decision 
(Ref. B) to accord Aleman unlimited movement throughout the 
country was likely driven by his keeniterest in keeping the 
liberals divided.  However, Ortega still holds the power to 
return Aleman to prison if it suits his interests, he argued. 
 
Media Coverage Favors Pact, Caudillismo, Hinders Opposition 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
9.  (C) Martinez Cuenca criticized the media's inclination to 
spotlight the activities of caudillos Ortega and Aleman to 
the detriment of opposition leaders like Eduardo Montealegre 
-- even media that supposedly opposes the Ortega-Aleman pact 
and questions Ortega's intentions.  He suggested that the 
opposition must gain more media coverage if it desires to 
increase its influence over public opinion. 
 
Rosario's Achilles Heel 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
10.  (C) Although Martinez Cuenca acknowledged that the First 
Lady is capable, intelligent, and organized, he ventured that 
her superstition handicaps her ability to effectively run the 
government.  He explained that despite government assertions 
that its decision not to occupy the Taiwan-donated 
presidential offices was to save costs, "everyone knows" that 
the First Lady's fears that the building is "haunted with bad 
spirits" drove the decision.  (Note: Aleman lost a son and 
two siblings during his tenure in the building, and Bolanos 
lost his brother and a son; his other son Javier just died of 
cancer last week.) 
 
Who's Behind the Wheel? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
11.  (C) Martinez Cuenca believes it is no coincidence that 
Ortega ratchets up his anti-U.S. rhetoric surrounding his 
meetings with Chavez (Ref. C).  Notwithstanding the 
Ortega-Chavez camaraderie, in part driven by shared 
ideologies, in part by Ortega's reliance on Venezuelan aid, 
Martinez Cuenca suspects that Ortega is uncomfortable with 
playing second fiddle to Chavez.  He termed Chavez's piloting 
of Ortega's car during his latest visit to Managua a serious 
symbolic affront to the Nicaraguan leader's pride and 
authority because Ortega would never willingly permit anyone 
to take the wheel.  (Note: Newspapers featured a photo of 
Chavez behind the wheel of Ortega's Mercedes SUV with Ortega 
seated in the front passenger seat.  The incident also caught 
the eye of one of Nicaragua's political cartoonists who 
interpreted it to demonstrate Chavez's domination over the 
Nicaraguan president.) 
TRIVELLI