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Viewing cable 07KINGSTON385, CONTRABAND ENFORCEMENT TEAM DISCUSSED WITH CUSTOMS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KINGSTON385 2007-03-20 15:16 2011-06-01 09:30 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kingston
Appears in these articles:
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110601/lead/lead3.html
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKG #0385/01 0791516
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201516Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4498
INFO RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 000385 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INL/LP (BOZZOLO) AND WHA/CAR (BUDDEN) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2017 
TAGS: SNAR PGOV JM
SUBJECT: CONTRABAND ENFORCEMENT TEAM DISCUSSED WITH CUSTOMS 
COMMISSIONER 
 
REF: KINGSTON 309 
 
Classified By: DCM JAMES T. HEG FOR REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D) 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Acting NAS Director (NASDIR) followed up 
earlier conversations with Assistant Commissioner Cecil Brown 
and Contraband Enforcement Team (CET) Director Karl McKen 
(reftel) by meeting with Commissioner of Customs Hector Jones 
on March 9.  The purpose was to get the Commissioner's 
position on issues affecting the future of CET including the 
future location of their office, shortage of human resources, 
the Customs Services ability to maintain mobile x-ray 
machines that NAS plans to procure and the status of 
NAS-funded polygraphs.  Jones failed to provide definitive 
responses on most of these issues.  End Summary. 
 
CET OFFICE LOCATION 
 
2. (SBU) Last summer, Commissioner Jones told NASDIR that the 
building from which the CET currently operates would be 
destroyed (per plans by the Jamaica Port Authority) and they 
would be moved to Berth 11, which was being renovated.  DHS 
personnel engaged in implementing the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) would, he said, be co-located with CET in 
Berth 11.  Recently, it came to NASDIR's attention that this 
was no longer the plan.  The Port Authority apparently told 
Jones that Berth 11 should house all of Customs (not just 
CET) and the CSI personnel. There would be space for 77 
personnel at that site. 
 
3. (SBU) Jones advised, on March 9, that Berth 11 will not 
provide all the office space required by Customs.  Therefore, 
he had decided to move some CET personnel into Berth 11, 
where the CSI people would operate.  The balance, he said, 
will need to remain where they are.  Jones stated that he had 
requested the Port Authority to renovate another building 
(which had been identified for destruction) for future use of 
all CET and CSI personnel.  That building is currently 
occupied by Container Services, Ltd. and is referred to as 
the CSL building.  According to Jones, the Port Authority 
agreed to let Customs lease CET's existing building for 
another year, pending renovation of the CSL building. 
 
4. (C) The Commissioner explained that he wants CET and CSI 
to have a "sterile environment" in which to work.  That, he 
said, would not be the case with Berth 11.  Customs brokers 
and others from the private sector will be milling around 
Berth 11, since regular Customs is there as well.  Comment: 
Jones' explanation for the change sounds good, but other 
sources have indicated that the Port Authority has not agreed 
to renovate the CSL building and still intends to destroy it. 
 It appears that Jones backed off on his earlier commitment 
regarding the CET in favor of insuring that regular Customs 
personnel are adequately accommodated.  Post needs to clarify 
with the Port Authority of Jamaica whether CET will be 
allowed to to stay where it is for another year and whether 
they really intend to renovate the CSL building for CET.  End 
Comment. 
 
STAFFING 
 
5. (C) Leading up to the issue of a shortage in CET staffing, 
NASDIR pointed out that intelligence suggests that drug 
traffickers are focusing on transporting cocaine and 
marijuana by containers.  For that reason, NASDIR said, the 
interdiction role of the CET has taken on increased 
importance.  In addition, NASDIR pointed out that, between 
the Airport Interdiction Task Force (which should begin 
operating next week) and CSI, the demand for CET personnel 
had increased.  Nonetheless, NASDIR cited the fact that 
around 12 authorized positions have not been filled for many 
months.  It has been speculated, NASDIR suggested, that 
failure to attract qualified applicants could be attributed 
to a perception that CET jobs are higher-risk than those of 
regular customs.  At the same time, the pay scale and 
benefits are the same for both.  NASDIR asked if it would be 
possible for CET to get a special allowance in order to 
attract applicants.  Jones said he did not think pay/benefits 
was the problem (although he offered no other explanation). 
He said CET people get to work lots of overtime, implying 
that was an economic incentive to apply for CET jobs.  Jones 
concluded that he would consider the allowance. 
 
6. (C) Comment:  NASDIR confirmed with Brown that CET 
personnel are able to work overtime.  However, Brown stated 
that has not attracted applicants.  Based on information from 
other sources, it appears that Jones has no real intention of 
seriously considering a special allowance for CET personnel. 
His attitude on staffing, like his attitude about office 
space for CET, is one of indifference or worse.  Morale is 
 
low in CET thanks in large measure to Jones. And, perhaps 
that is a major factor in CET's inability to attract 
qualified applicants.  End Comment. 
 
MOBILE X-RAY MACHINES 
 
In response to a request from CET last year, NAS plans to 
purchase two mobile x-ray machines (mounted on the back of 
vehicles).  Jones was asked if Customs can give assurance 
that these machines/vehicles will be kept in good repair by 
Customs.  He said Customs would fund a maintenance contract 
for them and issue guidelines for their use.  Jones claimed 
he will get the money for this from the Customs budget.  At 
the same time, he wondered whether the purchase cost included 
the first year's maintenance.  NAS is looking into that, but, 
other than a warranty, it is not likely. 
 
POLYGRAPHS 
 
7. (C) NASDIR explained to the Commissioner that of seven CET 
people who were polygraphed last September, only two were 
deemed to have passed.  Polygraphs, at that time, were in 
conjunction with forming the Airport Interdiction Task Force. 
 The Task Force will need six CET people.  Another 21 are 
slated to be polygraphed the week of March 19.  According to 
Jones, there was no problem in staffing the Task Force as 
four other CET personnel had passed polygraphs administered 
earlier by the Canadians.  Comment:  That is true, but most 
occupy sensitive positions within CET, some in Montego Bay. 
McKen would prefer to keep them where they are.  End Comment. 
 
8. (C) Going a step further, NASDIR also told Jones that CET 
Director Karl McKen had been polygraphed in January 2007 and 
that he had passed.  But, NASDIR expressed concern about the 
fact that Lenworth Levers, who had been acting CET Director 
for the last four months of last year, failed the polygraph 
in September. While NASDIR said he realized that failing a 
polygraph did not constitute grounds for firing personnel, 
the Commissioner should give some thought about what to do 
with polygraph results.  In the case of Levers, for example, 
NASDIR said we would find it very difficult to deal with him 
if he were to occupy the position of acting CET director 
again. 
 
9. (C) Jones asked to get the polygraph results.  NASDIR told 
him we would provide a list of names of persons polygraphed 
with a notation by each name as to whether they passed or 
failed.  Comment:  That should be provided to Jones by next 
week.  It remains to be seen what if anything he intends to 
do with the information.  Moving CET people who fail back 
into regular Customs will aggravate the staffing shortage in 
CET, which is another reason Jones needs to get off the dime 
and come up with a plan to attract applicants for CET 
positions.  End Comment. 
 
POSTSCRIPT 
 
10. (C) On March 13, NASDIR met briefly with Mrs. Vinette 
Keene, Director General of the Tax Administration 
Directorate, and Jones' immediate supervisor. Although the 
purpose of the meeting was to reconfirm an interest on her 
part for training for some of her tax staff, NASDIR mentioned 
his meeting with Jones.  Before he could get into a full 
discussion of that meeting, Keene proceeded to explain that 
she had a problem with Jones.  She indicated that, last year, 
she decided that he must take leave from September into 
January.  He resisted, and, according to Mrs. Keene he said, 
"people kill people for things like this."  Keene said there 
was a witness to his threat against her.  Jones did take the 
leave, however.  In the meantime, Keene filed a report with 
Deputy Police Commissioner Mark Shields.  Shields passed the 
complaint to Les Green, who is another International Police 
Officer and heads Organized and Serious Crime.  Keene said 
she had heard nothing back from Green on the matter.  When it 
was time for Jones to return to work, Keene tried 
unsuccessfully to extend his leave for a couple more weeks. 
Her boss, Finance Secretary Colin Bullock, approved Jones' 
return to work even though she is the immediate supervisor. 
According to Keene, she at least expected Bullock to meet 
with the two of them in order to work things out.  At 
minimum, Keene expected an apology from Jones for threatening 
her.  She never got it.  What is more, she claims she came 
under enormous pressure to leave Jones alone from several 
ministers of the government, including Minister of National 
Security Peter Phillips. At the conclusion of the meeting 
with Mrs. Keene, she asked if NASDIR would let Mark Shields 
know that she had never gotten a response from Les Green. 
Comment: According to Shields, Green attempted unsuccessfully 
to contact Keene by telephone.  He said Green would try 
again.  Shields also indicated there was considerable 
 
political interest in protecting Jones. End Comment. 
 
 
 
 
 
JOHNSON