Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM438, CFC VISIT TO ABECHE: MGS CONSTRAINTS AND JEM INTRANSIGENCE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07KHARTOUM438.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM438 2007-03-20 14:01 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0246
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0438/01 0791401
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201401Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6537
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000438 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN US SU
 
SUBJECT:  CFC VISIT TO ABECHE: MGS CONSTRAINTS AND JEM INTRANSIGENCE 
 
REF: (A) KHARTOUM 00396 
 (B) KHARTOUM 00304 
 (C) KHARTOUM 00331 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Members of the AMIS Ceasefire Commission traveled to 
Abeche, Chad to receive an operations update from the local Military 
Observer Group Site (MGS) Commander and to engage the JEM 
leadership.  The MGS faces severe logistical constraints, including 
transportation and communications, which hamper its ability to 
function effectively.  JEM officials reiterated their continued 
adherence to the N'djamena (Humanitarin Ceasefire Agreement) HCFA, 
rejection of the DPA, and demands to be consulted by the AU on a 
range of ceasefire- and political process-related issues.  The visit 
offered another window on the AMIS Force Commander's strengths and 
weaknesses and underscored the limitations of AU political capacity. 
End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
MGS ABECHE NEEDS HELP 
--------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On March 18, the Abeche MGS Commander briefed members of 
the Ceasefire Commission (CFC), including AMIS Force Commander Luke 
Aprezi, CFC Secretariat staff and the EU and U.S. observers, on the 
group site's operations and constraints.  The MGS mission to liaise 
with Chadian and French forces, monitor cross-border refugee 
movement and security around their camps, and maintain awareness of 
rebel and militia activities is severely constrained by numerous 
logistical and administrative challenges.  The MGS Commander 
outlined the lack of communications (no Internet connectivity - AMIS 
relies on UNHCR or local French forces to send email - and only one 
satellite phone), transportation challenges (only eight operational 
vehicles, few spare parts and scant helicopter support), and other 
operational obstacles (broken generators, inadequate medical 
support, poor accommodations, and insufficient funds to pay rent and 
utility bills).  The MGS and Protection Force (PF) Commanders both 
voiced their dissatisfaction that their troops had not received 
Mission Support Allowance (MSA) since November 2006, further eroding 
morale.  The AMIS Force Commander, somewhat defensively, chided the 
MGS Commander for his "incomplete reports" but pledged to try to 
improve the group site's logistical and administrative posture. 
(Note: PAE support does not extend to Chad, leaving the MGS to fend 
largely for itself.  End Note.) 
 
3. (SBU) The MGS Commander also noted that the border monitoring 
force envisioned under the Sudan-Chad Tripoli Agreement was being 
established.  He remarked that Libyan forces - no mention of the 
type, numbers or specific equipment - have already arrived in Abeche 
and are using vehicles with AU (vice AMIS) markings.  (Note: The CFC 
Vice Chairman, French Brigadier General Sintes, noted to S/CRS 
Poloff that French forces in Abeche informed him that at least 20 
Eritrean military personnel are currently in El Geneina, also as 
part of the Tripoli border monitoring force.  End Note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
JEM UNYIELDING IN ITS VIEWS ON DPA, POLITICAL PROCESS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
4. (SBU) Following the MGS Commander's briefing, members of the CFC 
met with Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) political leaders 
Tadjadine Bechir Niam, Osman Ahmed Godul and Ahmed Tugod Lissan. 
Force Commander Aprezi noted that this was his first encounter with 
the JEM officials and proceeded to describe his efforts to bolster 
the effectiveness of the CFC, including through the creation of a 
Second Chamber for non-signatories.  Aprezi summarized recent 
decisions taken in regards to streamlining the CFC and hurdles still 
facing the body (Ref A).  He emphasized his desire for 
"inclusiveness" in the CFC and urged JEM participation in the Second 
Chamber, which collapsed in mid-February (Ref B). 
 
5. (SBU) Niam, who serves as the JEM spokesman, representative to 
the AU and member of the Joint Commission (N'djamena HCFA), began 
his opening salvo by reiterating JEM's rejection of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) and its insistence that the 2004 N'djamena HCFA 
remain the cornerstone of JEM-AMIS relations.  He complained that 
since the signing of the DPA, AMIS had excluded JEM from meaningful 
participation in the CFC and Joint Commission.  Niam argued that the 
signing of the DPA did not abrogate the HCFA, and that without any 
operational or political mechanism to communicate, JEM would remain 
opposed to AMIS engagement.  The JEM spokesman, becoming 
increasingly agitated, laid the blame for "anarchy in Darfur" on the 
shoulders of AMIS, which he accused of complicity with the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000438  002 OF 002 
 
 
Government of Sudan.  Furthermore, he rejected the Force Commander's 
CFC proposals to distribute JEM representatives only at Sector 
headquarters and in areas where they exercised some measure of 
control.  (Note:  As the Government continues to refuse the 
deployment of non-signatories to the Sector level, JEM's views on 
the FC's proposition is a moot point.  JEM insists that it is 
entitled to representation throughout Darfur, as specified under the 
HCFA.  End Note.) 
 
6. (SBU) JEM Senior Negotiator and Chief of External Affairs Ahmed 
Tugod Lissan reinforced Niam's arguments and emphasized JEM's 
perception of AMIS' "failure to consult" and deliberate attempts to 
exclude the rebel group.  He demanded that JEM representatives 
return to the field and asserted that the Force Commander's plan to 
place representatives only in MGS areas where they exerted control 
would lead to more in-fighting as rebel groups vied to expand their 
territories.  He endorsed Niam's recommendations to AMIS, namely to 
(1) improve consultations with JEM; (2) formalize correspondence in 
writing, to include the CFC proposals; (3) reconsider the 
functioning of the CFC and immediately redeploy JEM representatives 
throughout Darfur; and (4) de-link implementation of the ceasefire 
with the issue of DPA signatories versus non-signatories and 
"concentrate on saving lives." 
 
7. (SBU) Lissan noted that JEM was prepared to facilitate AMIS' 
mission as long as the rebel group had a seat at the table in 
accordance with the HCFA.  He declared that the perpetually delayed 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) field commanders' conference in Umm Rai 
(Ref C) would lead to greater divisions within the movements, 
postulating that at least three groups would emerge, led 
respectively by Sharif Hariri, Khamis Abdallah and Ahmed Abdul 
Shafi.  Lissan did not give any indication of JEM outreach to SLA 
rebels, though he claimed that both groups were ultimately united in 
their objectives.  He suggested that the international community 
should sponsor a joint military-political conference rather than 
just one for field commanders, as they lack political experience and 
will only further confuse the situation. 
 
8. (SBU) Regarding efforts by the AU-UN Joint Mediation Support Team 
(JMST) to facilitate political dialogue with the non-signatories, 
Lissan rejected the participation of AU Special Envoy Salim Salim 
and DPA Implementation Team Chief Sam Ibok.  "I have nothing against 
them personally," the JEM leader claimed, "but we cannot accept them 
as they are the ones responsible for the DPA."  Lissam clarified 
that he did not oppose the AU's role in political mediation, just 
those individuals associated with the Abuja negotiations. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (SBU) The visit to Abeche provided another window on Force 
Commander Aprezi's strengths and weaknesses.  Over the past six 
months, he has demonstrated sincerity in reaching out to the JEM and 
SLA Non-Signatories Factions (NSF), meeting with their 
representatives on a regular basis, traveling to their strongholds 
(in Umm Rai, Jebel Moon and Abeche), and pressing the Sudanese 
Government to accept the non-signatories' return to the Sectors. 
His proactive approach, however, also underlines the deficiency of 
AU political capacity and the linkages between the organization's 
political and military branches.  Neither the Deputy Head of Mission 
nor his lone political officer in El Fasher attended the meeting 
(both have been repeatedly ill or otherwise absent) and there were 
awkward moments when the FC was drawn into political territory. In 
contrast to his predecessor, Aprezi has demonstrated an interest in 
hearing first-hand his subordinates' problems.  However, he 
continues to delve into the weeds (e.g., giving a lengthy lecture on 
the necessity of documenting the MGS's generator failure) and is 
unwilling to delegate decision-making authority to the appropriate 
staff officers. End Comment. 
 
HUME