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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM407, CFC Week of March 5 -- Fireworks Follow the Killing of Two

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM407 2007-03-16 13:18 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO7630
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0407/01 0751318
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161318Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6477
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000407 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN US SU
 
SUBJECT: CFC Week of March 5 -- Fireworks Follow the Killing of Two 
AMIS Soldiers 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The killing of two Nigerian soldiers by Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA)/Minawi soldiers in Graida dominated the 
Cease-fire Commission (CFC) this week, with tensions rising between 
the faction and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in both 
the CFC and in the sectors.  The CFC investigation report states 
that the attack was perpetrated by SLA/Minawi, although it includes 
a statement by the sector representatives that they are being 
falsely accused.  The Force Commander called his sector heads to El 
Fasher after the attack to tell them that they are not to patrol in 
sectors where factions cannot assure their safety.  There are rising 
accusations that AMIS has lost its neutrality.  The events again 
highlight the need for material and advisory support for the 
SLA/Minawi.  The one piece of good news on that front was that the 
first tranche of non-military humanitarian aid was delivered to the 
signatory factions on March 12.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) The CFC meeting on March 7 was the first since the killing 
of two AMIS soldiers in Graida on March 5 during a carjacking. 
SLA/Minawi representative Adam Ali War began the meeting by 
protesting that the proposed agenda referencing "friction with 
SLA/Minawi faction" was too strong and "at sectors" too general and 
asked that these phrases be removed.  CFC Chairman Aprezi became 
enraged in response to War's protest.  He told Ali War that he was 
free to walk out, but the CFC would discuss the issue of the conduct 
of SLA/Minawi forces in the sectors in the wake of the killing of 
two Nigerian soldiers.  Ali War held his ground, stating that he 
would not leave but that he believed the phrasing was unfair and he 
could not allow the meeting to continue.  This discussion, with 
certain variations, lasted over two hours, with all factions and 
observers pitching in at times to reinforce the Chairman.  The U.S. 
representative opined that he thought the word "friction" was far 
too diplomatic and should be strengthened.  UN and EU observers 
continually pressed SLA/Minawi to take responsibility.  Only the 
Sudanese government was silent. 
 
---------- 
KEY THEMES 
---------- 
 
3. (SBU) During the discussion and in the days following several 
themes emerged: 
 
-- Threat to Close Down Ops in Insecure Areas: The FC told the 
factions that if they could not give his soldiers absolute 
affirmation that they can control the area where they operate, the 
AU soldiers would not leave the wire, stating "nobody kills my 
soldiers and goes free, I will close down Minni areas...If we do not 
have the cooperation in areas, I will close them down, no patrols, 
no escorts."  Aprezi brought all his sector commanders in for a 
conference on March 8 when he reiterated that force protection is 
his number one concern.  On March 12, there were only eight 
confidence building patrols, down from the normal 20 to 25.  (Note: 
The FC is not alone in his caution.  The EU representative and UN 
representative both told S/CRS Poloff that EU security regulations 
prohibit EU employees from going to any areas controlled by 
SLA/Minawi.  End note.) 
 
-- A Knife's Edge of Stability: The most chilling exchange occured 
when the FC told SLA/Minawi that AMIS was preparing to return to the 
field and confront the SLA/Minawi faction in Graida when he ordered 
them to stand down.  Ali War was taken aback and accused the FC of 
picking a fight with his faction.  The exchange eventually wore Ali 
War down, and he said he was sorry for what happened and would 
cooperate in the future to stop such incidents.  UNMIS Light Support 
Package Commander Von Staden told S/CRS Poloff that many areas 
existed where tensions were high between AMIS and the SLA/Minawi 
faction.  One international observer heard a rumor that in Sector 
Two the Nigerian contingent might be planning an operation to avenge 
the killings. 
 
-- AMIS Loss of Neutrality: In a meeting with A/S Lowenkron on March 
10, an SLA/Minawi political leader said that his faction believes 
AMIS is no longer a neutral force.  CFC EU Vice Chairman said that 
over the past several days each of the CFC faction representatives 
have told him that they no longer see AMIS as a neutral party. 
 
 
-- SLA/Minawi Loss of Control in the Field: On 5 March, just prior 
to the big incident, SLA/Minawi commander stopped an AMIS fuel 
convoy near Graida to demand fuel.  An SLA/Minawi CFC representative 
on the convoy sided with his colleagues and asked that the convoy 
fuel the SLA/Minawi vehicles.  The next day in Um Barru SLA/Minawi 
soldiers threatened to stop AMIS vehicles leaving the MGS gate after 
they were not allowed to place one of their vehicles with armed men 
in an AMIS convoy.  The same day, SLA/Minawi soldiers beat up an 
 
KHARTOUM 00000407  002 OF 002 
 
 
AMIS water truck driver. 
 
-- Support to SLA(MM) Faction: The Sudanese Government distributed 
the first round of non-military logistical support stipulated in the 
DPA on March 12.  The faction believes it is far too little. 
SLA/Minawi in North Darfur received 1,000 bags of sorghum, 150 bags 
of lentils, 100 bags of sugar, 150 cans of oil, 50 bags of salt. 
The other factions received a lesser amount proportional to their 
numbers. 
 
--------------------------------- 
FOLLOW UP WITH SLA/Minawi FACTION 
--------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) S/CRS Poloff met with War and SLA/Minawi commander Ahmed 
Gardiya Khamis at the Peace Secretariat on March 8.  They were 
subdued, sought guidance, and promised to work within the CFC to 
improve the situation.  Ali War reiterated that the movement is 
often blamed before investigations are completed.  He said there are 
bandits and breakaway factions and challenged the assertion that the 
SLA/Minawi movement is losing control in the field.  He said they 
have been expecting humanitarian assistance through AMIS per the 
DPA, and suggested that the Sudanese government strategy was to 
starve the movement. 
 
5. (SBU) S/CRS Poloff agreed that there were serious problems with 
DPA implementation.  He suggested that SLA/Minawi should take the 
following actions to improve its public image and its 
effectiveness: 
 
-- Conduct independent investigations: when an attack occurs in an 
area that is understood to be under SLA/Minawi control, they should 
conduct their own investigation and share their findings. 
 
-- Issue Statements: SLA/Minawi should be more proactive in putting 
its message out, e.g. a message of condolence and condemnation when 
AMIS soldiers are killed.  (Note: Minawi issued a statement on March 
13 condemning the attack in Graida, reaffirming its commitment to 
the CFC, and calling for a complete investigation of the incident. 
End note.) 
 
-- Field Commander's Coordination:  It would help to maintain 
control over the force if there were periodic meetings with all 
field commanders.  AMIS could help with transportation, and Minni 
and others in the SLA leadership could use the gathering to stress 
issues of command and control.  AMIS and the international community 
could be invited as observers and to underscore specific messages, 
e.g. facilitation of humanitarian access. 
 
-- Delineation of Areas: The SLM should define its areas of control 
and disseminate this information. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: The recent humanitarian assistance to the 
signatory factions is welcome.  However, sustained pressure on the 
Sudanese Government is necessary to ensure this is not a one-time 
event.  SLA/Minawi needs more non-military logistical support, 
advisors, and training to start the transition from an insurgent 
force. 
 
POWERS