Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07ISTANBUL212, ISTANBUL DEPUTY GOVERNOR - EUR DAS BRYZA

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ISTANBUL212.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ISTANBUL212 2007-03-15 16:20 2011-05-24 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Istanbul
Appears in these articles:
www.tanea.gr
VZCZCXRO6649
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHIT #0212/01 0741620
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151620Z MAR 07
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6743
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000212 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV AM GR TU
SUBJECT: ISTANBUL DEPUTY GOVERNOR - EUR DAS BRYZA 
DISCUSSIONS: HALKI SEMINARY, ARMENIAN GENOCIDE RESOLUTIONS 
 
REF: A. ISTANBUL 0136 
     B. 05 ISTANBUL 1766 
     C. 03-09-2007 BRYZA-FRIEFELD EMAIL 
 
Classified By: Consul General Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Istanbul Deputy Governor for minority 
affairs Fikret Kasapoglu told EUR DAS Bryza during a March 9 
meeting that the Minister of Education had expressed to him 
six months ago a favorable opinion of a proposal to re-open 
Halki Seminary as a two-year high school.  Kasapoglu believed 
the Halki Seminary dispute would eventually be resolved but 
stated it is almost impossible for the government to take 
action during an election year.  The Deputy Governor agreed 
that arguing against congressional Armenian "genocide" 
resolutions by focusing on a potential increase in 
ultra-nationalism and risks to the Turkish-Armenian 
community's security is not constructive.  Rather, Kasapoglu 
suggested focusing on Turkey's tradition of tolerance for 
religious minorities and the fact that Armenians still choose 
to immigrate illegally by the thousands to Turkey.  End 
summary. 
 
2.  (C) EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza met with the 
Istanbul Deputy Governor responsible for minority affairs 
Fikret Kasapoglu on March 9 to discuss Congressional Armenian 
"genocide" resolutions (AGRs) and a proposal to re-open Halki 
Seminary.  Bryza had requested the meeting as a follow-up to 
recent discussions with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and 
PM Advisor Ahmet Davutoglu concerning a proposal to 
re-classify Halki Seminary as a vocational school under the 
auspices of a 1951 regulation, rather than as a private, 
post-secondary school subject to a 1971 Constitutional Court 
decision which ordered all such schools to fall under the 
administration of the State (ref A).  Kasapoglu cautiously 
noted he would be happy to discuss these issues but that as 
an appointed official, he was limited in what he could commit 
to do. 
 
------------------------------- 
ARMENIAN "GENOCIDE" RESOLUTIONS 
------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Bryza stressed that the Administration is working 
hard to convince Congress not to pass AGRs currently being 
contemplated in both the U.S. House of Representatives and 
Senate.  The Administration's position remains that a candid 
discussion about Turkish-Armenian history should take place 
within civil society, he said.  Kasapoglu believes the case 
against AGRs should stress four points: 
 
-- Istanbul's tradition of tolerance for different cultures 
dating back to the beginning of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
-- Despite historical and present political tensions between 
Turkey and Armenia, more than 40,000 economic migrants from 
Armenia still choose to live in Turkey illegally (we 
regularly hear the number 70,000 from GOT officials) 
 
-- The positive, spontaneous, mass public condemnation of 
Hrant Dink's assassination was a sign of the respect people 
have for each other and for different cultures. 
 
-- Turkey's mostly young population find it hard to 
comprehend" what happened during World War I and politicizing 
"genocide" allegations will only inspire hatred. 
 
4.  (C) Kasapoglu further proffered that views in Turkey were 
changing.  Turkish-Armenians were increasingly seen as part 
of society but that certain events (e.g., AGRs) "just make 
things worse."  He stressed Turkey was proceeding with 
reforms on human rights and democratization.  Citing an offer 
he made on behalf of the government shortly after Hrant 
Dink's assassination to provide Mesrob with an armored 
vehicle, Kasapoglu stated both he and the Patriarch agreed 
the need for such security measures would be temporary.  He 
believed the same would hold true in the event an AGR passes. 
 
---------------------------------- 
PROPOSAL TO RE-OPEN HALKI SEMINARY 
---------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Regarding the proposal for re-opening Halki Seminary 
as a vocational school, Kasapoglu stated Education Minister 
Celik told him six months ago that the seminary could be 
opened as a high school and that the Education Ministry 
Director General responsible for private schools recently 
told him the same.  He noted the Foreign Ministry and the 
Board of Higher Education (YOK) were the key institutions 
 
ISTANBUL 00000212  002 OF 002 
 
 
opposed to re-opening the seminary due to constitutional 
challenges associated with the secular nature of the State. 
Kasapoglu stressed the government's adherence to the 
principal of reciprocity and suggested that if Greece had 
taken steps in favor of the Turkish minority in Western 
Thrace -- granting permission to elect muftis, for instance 
-- when it (Greece) first became an EU candidate, "things 
would be better" for the Greek community in Turkey.  Bryza 
noted he was going to Thessaloniki that evening and later to 
Athens, to discuss these issues. 
 
6.  (C) Despite these challenges, Kasapoglu exclaimed he 
personally did not see any reason why Halki Seminary 
shouldn't be open.  Though he is not part of the 
decision-making process, his views are important because of 
where the seminary is located, he said.  The Deputy Governor 
noted however, that it would be almost impossible for the 
government to take such an action during an election year 
because it would be politically polarizing, domestically. 
 
7.  (C) Comment:  That Education Minister Celik is inclined 
to re-open Halki Seminary is nothing new.  He told Turkish 
daily Milliyet as recently as 2005 (ref B) that if it were up 
to him he would "open the seminary overnight."  What is 
significant about Kasapoglu's revelation is that it 
demonstrates the GOT continues to discuss the issue 
internally.  It also suggests the Istanbul Governor's office 
was brought into the conversation shortly after DAS Bryza 
first discussed the vocational school proposal with Davutoglu 
in July 2006.  The fact that Minister Celik specifically 
talked about re-opening Halki as a high school further 
suggests the GOT is taking seriously the proposal to 
re-classify Halki Seminary so that it would no longer be 
subject to the 1971 court ruling that led to its closing. 
 
8.  (C) Comment (continued):  Whether the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate would agree to re-open Halki Seminary as a high 
school likely depends on the details associated with the 
agreement and the level of autonomy that would be granted the 
Patriarchate in determining the school's enrollment and 
curriculum.  It is also not clear whether such an arrangement 
would be sufficient to graduate clergy under existing 
Patriarchate regulations.  The Ecumenical Patriarchate 
continued to operate a high school on the Heybeli Ada 
compound even after the seminary closed its doors in 1971 but 
was eventually forced to close the school in 1984 due to 
insufficient enrollment.  End comment. 
 
9.  (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message in substance (ref 
C). 
JONES