Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07DILI93, EAST TIMOR ELECTION HICCUPS PERSIST - CORRECTED COPY,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07DILI93.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DILI93 2007-03-07 11:55 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO8234
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0093/01 0661155
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071155Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3337
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0840
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0907
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0800
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0615
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0654
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0734
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0467
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0052
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2684
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000093 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, DRL, IO 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM UN TT
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR ELECTION HICCUPS PERSIST - CORRECTED COPY, 
ADDITIONAL TEXT 
 
DILI 00000093  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
This cable is a corrected version of and replaces Dili 090 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: In a recent briefing for the Embassy, USAID 
contractors and grantees working with East Timor's electoral 
process expressed an array of concerns about the election 
process, especially over the ineffective role of UN advisors to 
the National Electoral Commission (CNE) and the State Technical 
Administration for Elections (STAE), delays in formulizing 
regulations necessary for election education programs to 
commence, and the lack of contingency plans to ensure 
transparent voting in the case security problems force a 
postponement for specific voting sites.  The UN's independent 
Election Certification Team issued its fourth report on February 
16.  The report also reflects concerns about the election, 
noting only limited progress made towards its previous 
recommendations.  Certification of the presidential elections 
therefore appears to be at risk.  The Certification Team also 
expressed continued concerns regarding election security.  With 
the additional deterioration of security seen over the last week 
exacerbating both security concerns and logistical delays, the 
possibility exists that a delay in the presidential election 
date could result, although there has been no formal suggestion 
of this yet.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Emboffs met with representatives from IFES, the 
International Republican Institute (IRI), and the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) on March 2 to discuss East Timor's 
upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections.  IFES and NDI 
representatives told us that some of the more serious problems 
with the elections revolved around what they described as 
inadequate UN advisors to the National Election Commission (CNE) 
and Technical Secretariat for Election Administration (STAE). 
Whereas United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) 
is supposed to have seven advisors with the CNE, in reality only 
one is present.  IFES raised concerns about the quality and 
experience level of these advisors, bluntly saying that IFES 
would not have hired them, while NDI recounted comments by some 
East Timorese to the effect of "since the one [Portuguese] 
advisor is not doing anything, she might as well go home." 
UNMIT failed to respond to IFES requests as early as December 
2006 for clarification on what assistance was needed, so in 
recent weeks IFES has worked directly with the East Timorese 
electoral institutions to address immediate gaps; IFES will 
provide two advisors to CNE to help with candidate registration 
and election complaints, and in late March will add a third 
advisor at the STAE to help with adjudication issues.  (Note: 
Another issue impacting logistical preparations is that as a 
result of the current security situation (septels) UN volunteers 
(UNVs) working in the districts have had their movement limited 
to the towns in which they are resident and have not been able 
to move about the districts in recent weeks.  The UNVs in Same 
area were pulled back to Dili and discussion is underway to send 
them back out again. End note.) 
 
3. (SBU) The IFES representative told us that delays in 
formulating critical regulations were causing delays in the 
voter education process, a problem exacerbated by the tight 
timeline for voter registration.  This tight timeline also 
extends to dispute resolution; the regulations allow only 24 to 
48 hours for issues to be resolved.  IFES has compiled, but has 
not yet delivered to East Timorese election authorities, a list 
of the most pressing points, including six suggested amendments 
to the National Parliament Electoral Law to clarify these 
outstanding issues such as procedures for vote counting, 
procedures for sealing ballot boxes, expanding the definition of 
electoral propaganda to include voice broadcasts (the current 
laws limit the definition to print media), and the methods to be 
employed to ensure that voters are unable to vote more than 
once.  IFES also raised voter registration as a serious problem, 
since there will be little, if any, time allowed for voters to 
determine whether they have in fact been registered, and no 
record kept of who has already voted.  NDI and IFES 
representatives said that this could be a major obstacle to 
resolving challenges to the election.  The STAE is apparently 
selectively addressing some of these concerns. 
 
 
DILI 00000093  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
4. (SBU) When asked about election security, IRI's 
representative indicated that this was a common concern raised 
by district or village level interlocutors, as well as by the 
UN.  The IFES and NDI representatives recounted anecdotal 
reports of parties being forcibly prevented from conducting 
election rallies or raising their party flags in opponent 
strongholds, a common problem in previous elections as well. 
The representatives concurred that these problems were likely to 
worsen for the parliamentary election.  NDI's representative 
noted that there was a distinct possibility that hunger and 
drought could negatively impact election security, and that 
there were no regulations in place to ensure that voters who had 
previously voted in another district could not vote a second 
time in an area where security concerns forced a postponement 
long enough for the indelible ink to wear off. 
 
5. (U) The UN Election Certification Team`s fourth report, 
issued on February 16, reflects many of the same concerns.  The 
team determined that since the major corrective steps 
recommended in the third report have not been taken, the process 
is still unsatisfactory. Specific mention was given to 
outstanding changes to the legal framework, which the team deems 
are required for the election to meet international standards, 
as well as the need for emergency measures to bolster the STAE 
and CNE, which the team concludes have not been provided with 
sufficient time or resources to carry out their respective 
tasks. The team further found that since the CNE has not been 
able to establish its own secretariat or field staffing 
structure, only a few election commissioners and international 
advisors are essentially trying to handle an extremely high work 
load. The team additionally raised questions about the 
registration of internally displaced persons, of which there are 
an estimated 30,000 remaining in Dili alone. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment:  The NGO representatives indicated a 
possibility that the UN Electoral Certification team could 
refuse to validate the elections.  Embassy Dili shares these 
concerns, and is working with USAID and the NGOs to coordinate 
how best to raise these "must have" fixes with the appropriate 
GOET officials.  Emboffs will met with the relevant GOET 
election authorities and again with the NGOs in coming weeks to 
determine whether the GOET is making progress on resolving these 
concerns.  End comment. 
GRAY