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Viewing cable 07BERN259, IRAN: SWISS POLDIR AMBUEHL'S BRIEFS ON HIS MOST \

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BERN259 2007-03-16 12:23 2011-03-14 06:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bern
Appears in these articles:
http://www.letemps.ch/swiss_papers
VZCZCXRO7543
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHSW #0259/01 0751223
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161223Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3817
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
2007-03-16 12:23:00	07BERN259	Embassy Bern	CONFIDENTIAL	07BERN258	VZCZCXRO7543\
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\
DE RUEHSW #0259/01 0751223\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
O 161223Z MAR 07\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3817\
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE	C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000259 \
 \
SIPDIS \
 \
SIPDIS \
 \
STATE FOR P, NEA, ISN, EUR \
 \
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017 \
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC SZ
SUBJECT: IRAN: SWISS POLDIR AMBUEHL'S BRIEFS ON HIS MOST \
RECENT VISIT TO TEHRAN AND REQUESTS MEETING IN WASHINGTON \
 \
REF: BERN 258 \
 \
Classified By: DCM Carol Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d \
 \
------- \
Summary \
------- \
 \
1.(C) Just back from three days in Tehran, Swiss DFA State \
Secretary Michael Ambuehl on March 16 briefed Ambassador \
 \
SIPDIS \
Coneway on his meetings with Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Ali \
Larijani and asked for Embassy support for a meeting in \
Washington with U/S Burns and/or other senior Department \
officials next week (week of March 19).  Ambuehl described \
the senior Iranian officials as "feeling cornered, but \
remaining intransigent" on the suspension of enrichment. \
Nonetheless, Ambuehl believes there is hope the Iranians will \
agree to talk.  While Ambuehl made it clear that he had "no \
scoop" for us (his words), Embassy Bern believes a \
senior-level briefing in Washington would offer an \
opportunity to gain Ambuehl's insights and provide the \
Department an opportunity to reinforce the USG position on \
Iran with the Swiss.  End Summary. \
 \
---------- \
"No Scoop" \
---------- \
 \
2.(C) As he had previewed to EUR Assistant Secretary Fried on \
March 9 (reftel), Swiss State Secretary of Foreign Affairs \
Michael Ambuehl, with DFA Near East/Africa chief Livia Leu, \
traveled to Tehran March 12-15 to underscore to Iranian \
officials the need to abide by the UN Security Council and \
IAEA demands.  Ambuehl advised that IAEA DG ElBaradei had \
encouraged him to make the trip.  In a March 16 briefing for \
the Ambassador, DCM, and Poloff, Ambuehl said that he had met \
twice with Nuclear Negotiator Larijani and his deputy Sayyed \
Ali Monfared, again separately with Monfared, and with Deputy \
Foreign Minister Jalili (whom Ambuehl described as seemingly \
out of the nuclear picture now). \
 \
3.(C) Ambuehl said he had reiterated his previous message to \
Larijani that Iran must comply with UN Security Council \
Resolution 1737, or face further sanctions.  Larijani's \
reaction, Ambuehl said, was "irritation with the Swuss \
insistence."  Ambuehl said Larijani was similarly irritated \
following telephone calls from Swiss Foreign Minister \
Calmy-Rey and (Ambuehl understands) German Foreign Minister \
Steinmeier.  Ambuehl assured us he had made clear to Larijani \
that the visit was a Swiss initiative, with backing from the \
IAEA.  Ambuehl shared with the Ambassador a paper he had \
passed to the Iranians describing the Swiss proposal (para \
7).  According to Ambuehl, Larijani said Iran could accept \
all points in the paper, except the most important point -- \
suspension of all enrichment-related activities. \
 \
------------------- \
Briefing Washington \
------------------- \
 \
4.(C) Notwithstanding Iran's intransigence on the enrichment \
issue, Ambuehl said that the "hours" of meetings yielded some \
interesting insights.  He said he hoped to brief Washington \
as soon as possible -- as early as Monday, March 19 -- if \
Under Secretary Burns and/or other appropriate senior \
officials would be available.  The Ambassador asked Ambuehl \
if he had heard anything from Iran that he hadn't heard \
before.  Ambuehl replied that he had no actionable \
recommendations for the USG, but thought his readout would be \
of value to the Department.  He could not say he was \
encouraged, neither was he discouraged, but felt it would be \
worthwhile "to reflect to the US in exact terms" what the \
Iranians said.  The Ambassador thanked Ambuehl for both the \
preview of the visit to A/S Fried and the briefing \
immediately after.  He agreed to convey Ambuehl's request to \
the Department and get back to him. \
 \
------- \
Comment \
------- \
 \
5.(C) Given ElBaradei's putative role in the Ambuehl visit to \
Tehran, we gather that the Swiss initiative echoes \
ElBaradei's views, and may have been previously conveyed to \
Tehran by ElBaradei.  While Swiss side efforts give us cause \
for concern, the fact that Larijani appears to have rebuffed \
the Swiss could be helpful in convincing fence straddlers in \
the international community that the Iranians are \
intransigent. \
 \
 \
BERN 00000259  002 OF 002 \
 \
 \
6.  Embassy Bern believes it would be constructive for \
Department officials to receive State Secretary Ambuehl the \
week of March 19.  Ambuehl made it clear that he (and one or \
two others) would travel any time and would ask for no more \
than an hour.  The meeting could allow Ambuehl to share in \
greater depth the Iranian reaction to the Swiss proposal and \
provide the Department an opportunity to reinforce the USG \
position on Iran with the Swiss.  End comment. \
 \
------------------- \
Text of Swiss Paper \
------------------- \
 \
7.(SBU) Following is the text of the Swiss non-paper passed \
to Larijani: \
 \
Guiding Principles and Mechanism to Relaunch the Negotiations \
 \
Step 1: Informal Talks \
 \
The parties will hold informal talks in order to agree on the \
following guiding principles which will serve as a basis to \
relaunch negotiations: \
 \
1.  In order to create the necessary confidence: \
 \
-- Iran will suspend all its enrichment-related activities as \
required by the UNSC and the IAEA and to be verified by the \
latter; \
 \
-- The P5 plus 1 will simultaneously suspend the \
implementation of the UNSC sanctions and will ensure that the \
Iranian nuclear issue will not be considered by the UNSC, but \
that the file will be returned to the IAEA. \
 \
The parties will agree on the date of the entry into force of \
this double suspension, which will last until the end of \
negotiations in step 2, but no longer than six months unless \
otherwise agreed. \
 \
2.  Iran will adopt a policy of maximum transparency in its \
cooperation with the IAEA.  To this end, Iran will present a \
timetable to the IAEA with a view to resolving all remaining \
outstanding issues. \
 \
3.  The P5 plus 1 recognize and affirm Iran's right to \
peaceful use of nuclear energy under Article IV of the NPT \
and in accordance with Articles II and III of the NPT.  The \
modalities ensuring Iran's access to nuclear energy for \
peaceful purposes, as well as the timing and modalities of \
the exercise of certain aspects of this right, namely the \
sensitive part of the fuel cycle, will be agreed in the \
negotiations under step 2, in conjunction with the \
confidence-building measures that need to be undertaken in \
Iran. \
 \
Step 2: Negotiations \
 \
As soon as the commitments regarding the double suspension \
and the time-table are implemented, step 2 begins. \
 \
The parties will enter into negotiations in good faith with \
the aim of achieving a comprehensive settlement ("package") \
including nuclear issues and non-nuclear areas, such as \
economic cooperation, international security, and political \
dialogue, with a view to streamlining and strengthening \
cooperation between the P5 plus 1 and Iran. \
 \
The three guiding principles and the mechanism for \
relaunching the negotiations will be incorporated in a joint \
declaration signed by the P5 plus 1 and Iran. \
 \
End text of Swiss paper. \
CONEWAY \