Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07BERN258, IRAN: SWISS POLDIR AMBUEHL TELLS EUR A/S FRIED HE \

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07BERN258.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BERN258 2007-03-16 07:49 2011-03-14 06:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bern
Appears in these articles:
http://www.letemps.ch/swiss_papers
VZCZCXRO7217
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHSW #0258/01 0750749
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160749Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3815
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
2007-03-16 07:49:00	07BERN258	Embassy Bern	CONFIDENTIAL		VZCZCXRO7217\
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\
DE RUEHSW #0258/01 0750749\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
P 160749Z MAR 07\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3815\
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE\
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE	C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000258 \
 \
SIPDIS \
 \
SIPDIS \
 \
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017 \
TAGS: PREL KNNP PARM UNSC SZ
SUBJECT: IRAN: SWISS POLDIR AMBUEHL TELLS EUR A/S FRIED HE \
IS GOING TO TEHRAN \
 \
Classified By: Ambassador Peter Coneway, Reasons 1.4 b/d \
 \
------- \
Summary \
------- \
 \
1.(C/NF) Swiss State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Michael \
Ambuehl told visiting EUR A/S Fried and Ambassador Coneway on \
March 9 that he planned to visit Tehran the week of March 12, \
claiming that IAEA DG ElBaradei had encouraged Ambuehl to \
tell Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Ali Larijani that Iran was \
facing its "last chance."  A/S Fried and the Ambassador \
cautioned strongly against the visit, noting that a Swiss \
visit could be misinterpreted and used by Iranian officials, \
particularly given Bern's status as U.S. protecting power in \
Tehran.  Ambuehl assured the USG that his message would be \
identical to that of the UN Security Council and IAEA, namely \
that Iran must suspend all enrichment activities and accept \
its international obligations.  Ambuehl's staff informed \
Embassy on March 12 that he was on his way to Tehran and \
would provide a readout immediately upon return.  End \
summary. \
 \
------------------------------ \
"Last Chance" Message for Iran \
------------------------------ \
 \
2.(C/NF) Swiss State Secretary Michael Ambuehl met with A/S \
Dan Fried and the Ambassador on March 9 at Zurich Airport, \
joined by Swiss DFA Americas Desk official Urs Hammer and \
Poloff.  Ambuehl told A/S Fried that he planned to fly to \
Tehran the week of March 12 to meet with Iranian Nuclear \
Negotiator Ali Larijani.  Ambuehl said that he wanted to \
brief A/S Fried and the Ambassador in order to keep the USG \
fully apprised of Swiss activities, per Ambassador Coneway's \
request.  His purpose, he said, would be to push Iran to \
accept the three "modalities" demanded by the UN Security \
Council and IAEA, namely: \
 \
-- Suspension of all enrichment activities, with "no tricks;" \
-- Transparency with the international community; and \
-- Acceptance of rights and obligations as defined by the \
IAEA and UNSC resolutions. \
 \
3.(C/NF) Ambuehl said he had been encouraged to travel to \
Iran by IAEA DG ElBaradei, with whom he had spoken three \
times in recent days.  ElBaradei told Ambuehl that he had \
spoken with Secretary Rice and suggested that "we have to use \
the Swiss" to urge the Iranians to abide by UNSC resolutions. \
 Notably, ElBaradei had not conveyed what the Secretary's \
response (if any) was.  In any event, Ambuehl would tell the \
Iranians that this was their "last chance."  He acknowledged \
that a Swiss effort would have only a 30 percent chance of \
success, but described the visit as low-risk, high potential \
gain. \
 \
--------------- \
Counterargument \
--------------- \
 \
4.(C/NF) Ambassador Coneway challenged Ambuehl to describe \
what if anything new the Swiss could tell the Iranians.  It \
was a delicate time in the stand-off between the P5 plus 1 \
and Iran; silence would be the best policy by Switzerland. \
Moreover, Tehran would be unlikely to see this as a "last \
chance."  A/S Fried told Ambuehl firmly that the USG had been \
concerned by some Swiss actions.  Side initiatives could \
encourage the Iranians to game the unity of the international \
community.  Bern's status as U.S. Protecting Power could also \
cause Iran to misconstrue Swiss actions. \
 \
5.(C/NF) Ambuehl insisted that his prospective visit would \
not undermine the P5 plus 1.  His points would be exactly the \
points agreed to by the UN Security Council and supported by \
the IAEA.  Iran's rebuff of the Swiss initiative would be \
recognized as further evidence of Tehran's intransigence. \
 \
6.(C/NF) A/S Fried reiterated that the international \
community had finally gained traction against Iran.  It was \
important to let the pressure work.  A/S Fried urged Ambuehl \
to make no firm plans until we could speak to officials in \
Washington.  In any event, Ambuehl should make clear to the \
Iranians, if he does in the end go, that he did not speak for \
the USG.  Ambuehl said that this went without saying. \
Ambuehl asked for understanding of the difficult situation he \
was in (we surmise this means the directive from Foreign \
Minister Calmy-Rey to engage with Iran on this issue). \
Options other than a flat "no" would be appreciated.  A/S \
Fried and Ambassador Coneway agreed to get back to him as \
soon as possible. \
 \
 \
BERN 00000258  002 OF 002 \
 \
 \
--------------------------------------------- - \
Ambassador Coneway's follow up call to Ambuehl \
--------------------------------------------- - \
 \
7.(C/NF) Using points provided by P staff, Ambassador Coneway \
called Ambuehl that night with the message that the USG had \
made its opinion clear.  There was nothing new in the Swiss \
proposal and the visit presented many opportunities for \
misinterpretation.  The decision to go would be a sovereign \
Swiss decision to take.  If Ambuehl chose to go, the \
Ambassador stressed, it must be clear that he was not acting \
on the USG's behalf. \
 \
8.(C/NF) Ambuehl's initial response was that he would \
consider the USG points.  However, his diplomatic advisor \
Stephan Estermann called DCM on March 12 to announce that \
Ambuehl was on his way to Tehran and would provide a briefing \
upon his return. \
 \
------- \
Comment \
------- \
 \
9.(C/NF) A/S Fried and Ambassador Coneway were very clear in \
their expression of concern about Ambuehl's planned travel to \
Tehran.  However, it is obvious that the Swiss think there is \
at least the chance that the engagement of a "disinterested" \
non-member of the P5 plus 1 could offer Tehran a face-saving \
way to give into the UN Security Council - a belief \
apparently reinforced by ElBaradei.  Ambuehl was noticeably \
uncomfortable not taking the USG's advice.  But, there is \
little surprise in his decision to go forward with the visit, \
given the clear mandate he has received from Swiss Foreign \
Minister Calmy-Rey. \
CONEWAY \