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Viewing cable 07AITTAIPEI691, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS, DPRK, IRAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07AITTAIPEI691 2007-03-27 09:54 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0691/01 0860954
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 270954Z MAR 07
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4627
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6532
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 7776
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000691 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - LLOYD NEIGHBORS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS, DPRK, IRAN 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies continued to 
focus news coverage March 27 on the 2008 presidential elections, on 
the alleged scandal involving the privatization of the Taiwan 
Television Enterprise, and on other local issues.  In terms of 
editorials and commentaries, an op-ed piece in the mass-circulation 
"Apple Daily" provided a unique perspective on strategic thinking in 
U.S.-Taiwan relations.  The articles pointed out that how Beijing 
determines its future national status will have a strong impact on 
the U.S. position and its corresponding policies toward China.  An 
op-ed piece in the limited-circulation, pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times," on the other hand, discussed the 
appointment of Taiwan's incumbent Mainland Affairs Council Chairman 
Joseph Wu as the new TECRO chief.  The article said "Wu's mission 
will be a daunting one.  He will have to engage in substantive 
diplomacy, restore mutual trust between Washington and Taipei and 
help bolster friendly and mutually beneficial relations between the 
US and Taiwan."  With regard to North Korea, a column in the 
pro-status quo "China Times" said the real substantive change now 
happening in Northeast Asia is that Pyongyang, sensing China's 
threats against its regime, has started to keep its distance from 
Beijing and to develop relations with Washington proactively.  A 
separate "China Times" column discussed Iran and said Iran's 
determination to confront the United States is far stronger than 
what the public have imagined, because the Iranians firmly believe 
that the United States intends to cheat, oppress and even destroy 
their nation.  End summary. 
 
2. U.S.-Taiwan Relations 
 
A) "Strategic Thoughts on U.S.-Taiwan Relations" 
 
Xue Litai, research fellow at Stanford University's Center for 
International Security and Cooperation, noted in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 520,000] (3/27): 
 
"Beijing normally appears willing to compromise when dealing with 
issues involving the United States, but the Taiwan issue stands out 
as the most dangerous exception.  The conflicts surrounding Taiwan's 
status have far exceeded the issue of national dignity. ...  It is 
obvious that in the foreseeable future, the question regarding which 
direction cross-Strait relations will slide toward -- as judged from 
the bigger strategic picture and regardless of other factors -- at 
least involves Beijing's policy about how it will determine China's 
future national status, and as to what ensues, the United States' 
perception and judgment of China's national position as well as its 
corresponding policies [derived from such perception].  When 
discussing the future direction of cross-Strait relations and the 
hidden reality of Washington's Taiwan policy in the past, scholars 
and officials from all three sides rarely talk about the possible 
impact of China's national positioning on the U.S. position and its 
relevant policies.  But this is in reality the crucial point.  To 
put it more straightforwardly, this layer is the real truth beneath 
the surface, whereas the 'policies' and 'positions' are merely ways 
of saying it. 
 
"Taipei is showing enormous energy as it manages to survive while 
sandwiched between the two giants - the United States and China - 
and is able to make one move after the other.  Even though both 
Beijing and Washington want to prevent a big war of the century, 
they cannot exclude the possibility of both sides making a military 
showdown over the Taiwan issue.  Every side is watching with its 
eyes wide open as cross-Strait relations slide toward a precipitous 
cliff, but no one can do anything about it." 
 
B) "Though Challenges Ahead for Wu" 
 
Li Thian-hok, a freelance commentator based in Pennsylvania, 
commented in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
[circulation: 30,000] (3/27): 
 
"... [Joseph] Wu is familiar with President Chen Shui-bian's ideas 
and vision for Taiwan and has the full confidence of the president. 
There is therefore cause for optimism that the new envoy will be 
able to contribute to the restoration of mutual trust between 
Washington and Taipei in the critical last year of Chen's 
presidency. ...  One of Wu's first tasks -- even before he leaves 
for the US -- will be to ensure that Chen ceases making such 
provocative statements by explaining to him the difficult situation 
the US is facing.  US military forces are bogged down in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and extrication appears years away.  If there is a 
conflict over Taiwan, the already overstretched US military might 
not be able to join the battle in time. 
 
"In another scenario, the US would arrive late on the scene and take 
heavy casualties.  In any event, the US President George W. Bush 
administration feels that any decision to involve the US military in 
battle against the PLA in the Taiwan Strait should be made by 
Washington, not by Taipei.  Taiwan must be sensitive to US fears 
that any action by Taiwan could be perceived by Beijing as a move 
 
toward formal independence and trigger a conflict at a most 
inopportune time.  This does not mean, however, that Taipei should 
kowtow to each and every whim of the Bush administration, which is 
so preoccupied with the Middle East quagmire that it pays little 
attention to the growing potential for conflict in the Taiwan 
Strait, with or without provocation by Taiwan. ... 
 
"Wu's second task as representative to the US will be to educate the 
US policy elite on the objectives and strategy of the pan-blue 
opposition, which seeks Taiwan's annexation by China at the earliest 
opportunity.  Hence, their consistent opposition to the acquisition 
of US weapons, which are badly needed for the defense of the nation. 
 Through its united front tactics, China is effectively interfering 
in Taiwan's domestic politics.  Even though the Taiwan Relations Act 
purports to protect the human rights of Taiwanese -- including their 
right to determine their own future -- Washington may be reluctant 
to get in the middle of partisan bickering between the DPP and the 
pan-blue opposition. ... 
 
"It is unreasonable for the US to hold Taipei to its 'four noes, one 
without' promise when the US is unable to persuade Beijing to 
renounce the use of force and cease its active preparation for war. 
Washington should be reminded that while, in the short term, the US 
may need to avoid conflict with China over Taiwan, its long-term 
strategic interests require Taiwan to resist annexation by the PRC, 
because once Taiwan falls, it would be very difficult for Japan to 
resist becoming a vassal state of China.  US forces will then have 
to be withdrawn from Asia and the US' political, economic and 
strategic interests in the Western Pacific would sustain 
incalculable losses. 
 
"Yet to sustain their morale and will to resist Chinese aggression, 
Taiwanese must have hope that their struggle to maintain their 
freedoms has a chance of success, with support from allies such as 
the US and Japan.  This means Washington must be careful in its 
dealing with Taipei, lest it give the impression that the US is 
working with Beijing to undermine Taiwan's sovereignty and 
democracy.  Washington should weigh the inherent dilemma between its 
short-term goal of avoiding war in the Taiwan Strait and the 
longer-term objective of denying China's hegemonic ambitions in 
Asia.  Preserving Taiwan's freedoms is also the way to steer China 
toward peaceful development.  Wu should urge the Bush administration 
to consider dropping its insistence upon the 'four noes, one 
without' -- for Chen and his successor.  Wu's mission will be a 
daunting one.  He will have to engage in substantive diplomacy, 
restore mutual trust between Washington and Taipei and help bolster 
friendly and mutually beneficial relations between the US and 
Taiwan." 
 
3. DPRK 
 
"Keeping a Distance from Beijing, Pyongyang Starts to Embrace 
Washington" 
 
Deputy Editor-in-Chief Kuo Chen-lung noted in the International 
Column in the pro-status quo "China Times" [circulation: 400,000] 
(3/27): 
 
"The interaction between North Korea, the United States, and China 
in the past, to put it simply, was that the United States could do 
nothing about Pyongyang, while the latter relied on China.  As a 
result, whenever the United States sought help from China, China 
could use North Korea as a bargaining chip to take advantage of the 
United States in international relations or even cross-Strait 
relations.  But the sudden change in Washington-Pyongyang relations 
recently has not only surprised Japan and South Korea but has also 
astounded China. ... 
 
"The real substantive change happening in Northeast Asia is: 
sensing China's threats against its regime, Pyongyang starts to keep 
a distance from Beijing and to develop relations with Washington 
proactively.  Judged from this perspective, Kim Jong-il's move to 
spend the Lantern Festival at the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang did 
not signify his appreciation toward China over the latter's 
assistance to North Korea, as the world has imagined.  Instead, it 
was a diplomatically perfunctory move simply to give China face." 
 
4. Iran 
 
"Iran Still Will Not Yield to the UNSC Resolution" 
 
The "International Outlook" column in the pro-status quo "China 
Times" [circulation: 400,000] wrote (3/27): 
 
"... Iran's determination to resist the United States is far beyond 
what the world has generally imagined, and in order to confront the 
United States, Iran resists all Western policies against itself as 
well.  What happens here is neither the clash of civilizations, as 
Samuel Huntington has pointed out, nor conflicts between Islamic and 
 
Christian culture, but the fact that Iranians firmly believe that 
the United States intends to cheat and oppress and even to destroy 
their nation.  As a result, the usually divided Iran is tightly 
united now.  President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is not stupid; he is so 
anti-U.S. because he understands the Iranians' emotions at this 
moment.  Thus, the stronger the pressure imposed by the Western 
world gets, the less possible it is for Iran to yield. ..." 
 
WANG