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Viewing cable 07USUNNEWYORK112, KIMMITT RAISES IRAQ COMPACT AND SANCTIONS WITH UN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07USUNNEWYORK112 2007-02-09 01:56 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXRO2548
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUCNDT #0112/01 0400156
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 090156Z FEB 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1304
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0784
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000112 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
EMBASSY BERLIN PLEASE PASS TO DEPUTY SECRETARY KIMMITT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON PREL UNSC IZ
SUBJECT: KIMMITT RAISES IRAQ COMPACT AND SANCTIONS WITH UN 
SYG BAN 
 
 1. (SBU) Summary: On February 6, deputy Treasury Secretary 
Kimmitt met with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to discuss 
the Iraq Compact.  Ban assured Kimmitt that he was "very 
committed" to the Iraq Compact, and that he would seriously 
consider Kimmitt's proposal that the UN host a late 
February/early March meeting in New York to maintain momentum 
for the Compact and to formally distribute the final 
document.  Ban emphasized the importance of overcoming the 
reluctance of Gulf states to participate more fully in the 
Compact.  Kimmitt and Ban later discussed UN sanctions on 
North Korea and Iran; Ban noted that he had recently pressed 
the Iranian Foreign Minister to comply fully with UN Security 
Council Resolutions.  Ban also raised the U.S. shortfall in 
contributing financially to peacekeeping operations.  He 
urged Kimmitt to work with the Congress to fully fund U.S. 
obligations.  Kimmitt said he would look into the matter. 
End summary. 
 
THE IRAQ COMPACT 
---------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Deputy Treasury Secretary Kimmitt met with 
Secretary-General Ban during Ban's first day back from a 
 
SIPDIS 
lengthy overseas trip.  Treasury DAS Saeed, USUN Ambassador 
Sanders and Poloff (notetaker) accompanied.  Kimmitt 
described the situation in Iraq as a "difficult challenge," 
and said Iraq's new democracy needed the strong support of 
the international community.  In this, the role of the UN is 
"exceptionally important," said Kimmitt.  He thanked Ban for 
the UN's role in disbursing assets to assist the Iraqi 
government, and praised SRSG Qazi for his work in Iraq. 
Kimmitt proposed an interim meeting on the Compact, hosted by 
the UN in New York, in late February/early March.  The goal 
of this meeting would be to reenergize the Compact process 
and to formally distribute the final document, Kimmitt 
explained.  The meeting would be open to all UN member-states 
at the level of PermRep, and to members of the Compact 
Preparatory Group at the Deputies level.  Kimmitt said Iraqi 
officials, such as DPM Barham Salih would likely attend. 
Following this interim meeting, a signing ceremony could 
occur some months later, said Kimmitt. 
 
3. (SBU) Ban replied that he was "very committed" to the 
Compact, and that "as a matter of principle," he was willing 
to host this interim meeting.  He added that he was "very 
concerned" regarding the unwillingness of Gulf states to 
fully engage with regard to the Compact.  He wondered if the 
U.S. could encourage Gulf states to overcome their 
reluctance, and asked if the timeframe as outlined by Kimmitt 
was doable, given that member states would need to prepare 
for such an interim meeting.  Kimmitt replied that an interim 
meeting could be well prepared within 3-4 weeks.  Ban noted 
that he had just returned from his overseas trip, and would 
need to consult with his advisers before responding 
definitively.  Kimmitt added that an interim meeting would 
have the added benefit of encouraging the Iraqi government to 
overcome political obstacles to passing important 
legislation, especially the proposed hydrocarbon law.  He 
encouraged Ban to become personally involved in the Compact 
process and to consider visiting Ir 
aq during his March trip to the Middle East. 
 
4. (SBU)  On February 7, Ban's Special Advisor Kim Won-soo 
contacted Ambassador Wolff and informed him that Secretariat 
staff had raised some questions about the proposed interim 
meeting.  Kim said the UN would like to better understand our 
objectives.  Most importantly, what outcome do we hope to 
achieve (i.e., what is the difference between the interim and 
final meetings?).  Would we invite the same number of 
countries to both meetings?  Would we expect the same level 
of attendance at both meetings?  The UN also sought a more 
specific time frame for the meeting, and questioned what 
factors might affect the date.  Finally, the UN asked who 
should sit in the chair for the UN once the Secretary-General 
had opened the interim meeting.  Ambassador Wolff suggested 
SRSG Qazi as a possible candidate.  Ambassador Wolff also 
promised to respond to these questions. 
 
NORTH KOREA/IRAN SANCTIONS 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Kimmitt previewed his upcoming trip to Europe to 
encourage the full implementation of all relevant SC 
Resolutions imposing targeted sanctions against North Korea 
and Iran.  He said that the USG was looking to work with 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000112  002 OF 002 
 
 
other countries in a multilateral context on these issues, 
but would need to see that member states were committed to 
effectively implementing the sanctions resolutions.  Ban 
agreed, and said that he had recently met with Iranian FM 
Mottaki in Addis Ababa, and had "strongly urged" him to fully 
comply with all SC Resolutions.  Ban told Mottaki that 
confronting "the whole international community" was a bad 
option.  Mottaki suggested that Ban might be able to help 
"remove obstacles" with the Europeans.  On North Korea, Ban 
said he was "very encouraged" by recent meetings in Berlin 
and direct contact between North Korea and U.S 
representatives. 
 
THE TWO PERCENT FUNDING GAP 
--------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Ban raised the Congressionally-mandated 25 percent 
funding ceiling for USG contributions to peacekeeping 
operations, as compared to the 27 percent the USG is 
assessed.  Although Ban recognized that Congress is the lead 
actor on this issue, he urged Kimmitt to encourage Congress 
to end the ceiling.  Ban noted that the 2 percent funding gap 
has grown to 500 million USD, including arrears.  Given the 
many tasks the U.S. would like the UN to accomplish, 
including peacekeeping operations and political missions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the continued shortfall is a "great 
problem," said Ban.  Kimmitt, granting that this issue was 
more the State Department's to handle, said he would look 
into the situation given the SYG's request to him. 
 
 
WOLFF