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Viewing cable 07TOKYO742, MEETING WITH MEXT TO DISCUSS PROPOSED BILL ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO742 2007-02-22 05:18 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO4151
RR RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0742/01 0530518
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220518Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0873
INFO RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 9355
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 2400
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 3418
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 0917
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0427
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000742 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MEXT TO DISCUSS PROPOSED BILL ON 
NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
 
 
 1. SUMMARY. On January 30, 2007, Embassy EST section met 
with MEXT officials to glean additional information on the 
Government of Japan (GOJ) plan to submit to the Diet a bill 
intended to prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism. The 
bill is being introduced to the Diet to ratify the U.N. 
International Convention for The Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism, signed by Japan in 2005. During our 
discussion, MEXT passed a written outline of the proposed 
law, offered potential reasons why the Diet could reject or 
delay the passage of the bill, and provided a justification 
for the exclusion of Article 8 in the Convention. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Main Points of the Nuclear Terrorism Bill 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2. MEXT provided Embassy EST with a document highlighting the 
key elements of the new law and Embassy Tokyo PAS/Translation 
Services provided the translation below. In general terms, 
the nuclear terrorism bill will call for an indefinite prison 
sentence for acts of dispersing radioactive substances for 
terrorist activity. (NOTE: An indefinite sentence, muki 
choeki, means one must spend at least 10 years in custody 
before they can be eligible for parole. After 10 years, a 
judge determines the number of remaining years left in one's 
sentence. However, according to a Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 
official, approximately 60%-70% of parole requests are not 
approved. In such cases, the criminal could remain in prison 
until his or her death. Under Japan's penal code, there is no 
life imprisonment but muki choeki does appear to be similar. 
It is the most severe punishment available, second only to 
the death penalty, which remains legal in Japan. In less 
severe terrorist-related crimes, the judge can hand down a 
definite sentence, yuuki choeki. This means that one can 
spend a minimum of 2 years and up to a maximum of 20 years in 
prison. Finally, the MOJ official concluded that no matter 
the degree of cruelty, capital punishment is not an option in 
nuclear terrorist-related proceedings. END NOTE.) Terrorist 
activities include detonating nuclear bombs, scattering 
radioactive material from the air, mixing radioactive 
material with food, and flushing such material down the drain 
to contaminate the environment. 
 
BEGIN TEXT: 
 
In order to properly secure facilities under the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism, we are preparing the legislation that is 
needed to punish such acts as causing a chain reaction of 
atomic particles from nuclear-fuel materials that would 
endanger people's lives, bodies, and property. 
 
(Tentative Title) Outline of a law related to punishments for 
crimes, etc., that would cause danger to the lives of people, 
etc., due to the release of radioactivity. 
 
1. Outline 
 
Provisions will be prepared marking the following act 
punishable by law: 
 
(a) Releasing radioactivity that would endanger people's 
lives, bodies, and property 
 
(b) Endangering people's lives, bodies, and property by a 
chain reaction of atomic particles from nuclear-fuel 
materials (nuclear reactor) 
 
(c) Preparatory acts leading to acts described in (a) and (b) 
 
(d) Construction or possession of devices and the like that 
would release radiation, or the possession of radioactive 
material 
 
(e) Attempts to carry out acts described in (a), (b), and (d) 
 
(f) Other acts (Threatening to use or coercing use of 
radioactive materials) 
 
Steps leading up to the signing of the Convention: 
 
The purposes of the Convention are to make such acts as the 
possession and use of radioactive material or explosives, 
nuclear devices, etc., crimes; and set punishments for such 
criminals, and procedures for handing them over, etc. 
 
February 1997: Negotiations began in the United Nations 
 
TOKYO 00000742  002 OF 002 
 
 
(Proposed by Russia) 
 
April 2005: Adopted by the UN General Assembly 
 
September 2005: Signing begins at the UN Summit Meeting 
--Prime Minister Koizumi (at the time) signed together with 
other G8 members. Over 100 countries have signed the 
Convention. 
--The Convention will go into effect when 22 countries have 
ratified it (As of January 1, 2007, 11 countries had ratified 
the pact.) 
 
2. Date to go into effect 
 
The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism sets the day it will go into effect in 
Japan. 
 
END TEXT 
 
------------------------------- 
Process for Submitting the Bill 
------------------------------- 
 
3. The nuclear terrorism bill is being drafted in 
consultation with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology (MEXT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), Ministry of Justice (MOJ), and the Cabinet Office 
(CAO). After the draft is complete, the Cabinet Office will 
issue a final approval and then submit it to the Diet 
sometime in March. MEXT pointed out that the bill is likely 
to pass but warned that unforeseeable domestic political 
events, such as the summer elections, could possibly delay or 
even reject the bill altogether. MEXT also mentioned that the 
DPJ opposition party could try to stall the bill. However, 
according to a DPJ staffer in charge of foreign/security 
policy matters, Kenji Sasaki, there is no current move to 
oppose the bill because the party is preoccupied with budget 
problems and political scandals. Sasaki elaborated further 
and stated that there is a chance that the party may decide 
not to discuss the bill at all during the Diet session 
because there are more urgent, pressing bills for DPJ to 
consider. 
 
---------------------- 
Exclusion of Article 8 
---------------------- 
 
4. MEXT asserted that the nuclear terrorism bill is based on 
the main points outlined in Article 2 of the Convention, 
which specifically deal with penalizing terrorist-related 
criminal offenses. The bill, however, does not tackle broader 
nuclear security preventive measures addressed in Article 8. 
MEXT stated that physical protection measures related to 
nuclear facilities are already covered in its Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation Law and are generally consistent with IAEA's 
INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 recommendations. (NOTE: So far, Japan has 
not incorporated into its national legislation two key 
elements proposed in the INFCIRC/225/Rev.4. namely, the 
posting of armed guards and conducting of full background 
checks. Because Japanese law prohibits posting armed guards 
at Japanese nuclear facilities, round-the-clock armed 
security is provided by the Riot Police Unit (anti-firearms 
squad) and by Japan Coast Guard patrol boats. Customs is also 
playing a role by actively installing sophisticated equipment 
to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials. Regarding 
background checks on employees with access to nuclear 
materials/facilities, Japan's privacy act restricts nuclear 
facilities to conduct such investigations. There are on-going 
discussions within the GOJ concerning the feasibility of 
adopting and executing background checks. However, an 
official at the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, stated 
that the implementation of such measures will be extremely 
difficult given Japan's rigid legal system and lengthy 
interagency coordination. END NOTE.) 
SCHIEFFER