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Viewing cable 07TOKYO643, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/14/07

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO643 2007-02-14 08:18 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO7413
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0643/01 0450818
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 140818Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0646
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 2304
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 9846
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 3323
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 9280
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 0837
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5772
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1854
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3251
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 000643 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/14/07 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Views on six-party talks: Narrowing Japan's choices in 
responding to North Korea 
 
(2) Editorial: Don't trust North Korea until it abandons nuclear 
programs 
 
(3) Editorial: Agreement at six-party talks; Move nuclear issue 
forward to find way out of impasse in abduction issue 
 
(4) Editorial: Gov't must carry through principles 
 
(5) Kyuma vs. Moriya 
 
(6) USFJ realignment: Focus on Guam relocation costs; 6 billion 
dollars to be called into question; Typhoons, poisonous snakes also 
factored in for estimated costs 
 
(7) Editorial: Diet debate; Opposition parties should bestir 
themselves 
 
(8) Editorial: Prime minister's Diet replies denying existence of 
social disparity will never move debate forward 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Views on six-party talks: Narrowing Japan's choices in 
responding to North Korea 
 
ASAHI (Page 16) (Full) 
February 14, 2007 
 
By Masao Okonogi, professor at Keio University (specialist on North 
Korean politics) 
 
I think the greatest feature of the latest round of the six-party 
talks is that the United States and North Korea led the talks 
without China's intermediation. Japan must have not expected the 
outcome of the negotiations. 
 
Japan was unable to see any progress on the issue of North Korea's 
abductions of Japanese nationals. Therefore Japan has only two 
choices in responding to North Korea. 
 
The one choice for Japan is to place priority on public opinion, 
which means that Japan will maintain the present hard-line stance 
against Pyongyang, including sanctions. If Tokyo picks this option, 
it should be ready to pay the price of being left behind in the 
implementation of the agreement at the six-party talks, as well as 
in the area of international cooperation. 
 
The other choice is to cooperate with other six party talks member 
countries in providing North Korea with energy and humanitarian aid 
for the time being in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear 
issue in line with the agreement this time around at the 
multinational talks. Under this option, however, it will be 
difficult to convince the Japanese public, which think a great deal 
of the abduction issue. Since Japan agreed to the deal, it will 
likely be pressed to extend energy and other aid to North Korea. 
 
Japan will attach importance to public opinion for the time being, 
but it will likely be gradually forced to cooperate with other 
 
TOKYO 00000643  002 OF 010 
 
 
multinational talks member countries, shifting its policy. 
 
North Korea probably sees through Japan's such intention. The 
Japanese government will be unable to take any action until the July 
House of Councillors election ends. Even if working groups are set 
up, Japan will not be able to participate in the working groups. 
 
However, development in US-North Korea relations will surely have an 
impact on issues between Japan and North Korea. 
 
The United States and North Korea admitted each other's core 
principle at the latest talks. Washington has obtained a basic 
agreement from Pyongyang on denuclearization. The Bush 
administration can play up it has attained more achievements than 
did the Clinton government. 
 
Having conducted a nuclear test, North Korea was able to secure the 
path to gradually receive aid. It was also able to set up a working 
group to discuss normalization of relations with the United States, 
as well as to get compensation. 
 
It can be said that Pyongyang was able to hold fast to its assertion 
that the United States should provide energy aid and lift its 
financial sanctions on it, as well as eventual normalize bilateral 
relations. However, the question in the future is the speed of the 
process. 
 
Speedy progress on denuclearization is needed for the Bush 
administration to impress its achievements in East Asia that can 
write off the deadlock in its Iraq policy, while stressing 
differences with the Agreed Framework concluded between the Clinton 
administration and Pyongyang. Washington also will have to promote 
quickly normalization of diplomatic ties with the North. 
 
North Korea appears to be see this as a good chance to attack the 
Bush government, which is in the final stage of its term. 
 
It is, however, difficult to predict how far normalization will 
progress. It is because progress largely depends on decisions by 
President Bush and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. 
 
The Bush administration will be able to stress the certain level of 
diplomatic achievements if it can resolve the immediate nuclear 
crisis. 
 
The common belief is that chances are that more progress will be 
made under the post-Bush government. 
 
(2) Editorial: Don't trust North Korea until it abandons nuclear 
programs 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
February 14, 2007 
 
Delegates to the six-party talks, which wrapped up on Feb. 13 in 
Beijing, adopted a joint document stipulating initial steps to be 
taken by the five parties and North Korea respectively toward the 
North's denuclearization. 
 
The document is significant as a first step to urge North Korea to 
dismantle its nuclear programs. Keeping in mind the bitter 
experience of the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the 
United States and North Korea, the five parties - Japan, the US, 
 
TOKYO 00000643  003 OF 010 
 
 
China, South Korea, and Russia - must remain cautious until the last 
day of the process of Pyongyang's denuclearization. It is more 
important than before for the five parties to take joint steps from 
now. 
 
The joint document stipulates that the five countries will provide 
Pyongyang with energy aid in return for dismantling its nuclear 
facilities. This pattern, though, is similar to that in the 1994 
accord. 
 
A different point is that the joint document calls for a two-phase 
system in which North Korea shuts down and seals its nuclear 
facilities as the first phase and then disables all existing nuclear 
facilities as the next phase, unlike "the freeze of all nuclear 
facilities" in the 1994 accord. The joint document specifies 
measures to be implemented by North Korea and energy aid provided to 
it by the five countries in each phase. 
 
In the first phase, North Korea is required to shut down and seal 
its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, with the aim of dismantling them 
in the end, and to receive inspections by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency within 60 days. 
 
The five parties drew deeply suspicious North Korea into the 
negotiating table and had it agree to abandon its nuclear programs. 
This can be taken as a one step forward. 
 
In the six-party talks in September 2005, though, North Korea had 
also promised to "abandon its all nuclear weapons and existing 
nuclear programs". Only one year after this promise, Pyongyang 
carried out a nuclear test. Given this, whether North Korea agreed 
to abandon its nuclear programs in all sincerity should be judged 
after the 60-day initial phase. 
 
The two-phase system might be intended to prevent Pyongyang from 
breaking its promise after receiving heavy fuel oil. But that nation 
might come up with more extravagant demands during this period. 
 
The main reason why North Korea agreed on the joint document was 
because the economic and financial sanctions by the US have worked 
effectively. In the second rounds of bilateral talks between the US 
and North Korea in Berlin and Beijing, Pyongyang desperately tried 
to find a way out. There is no need for the US to rush for a 
settlement with such a country. 
 
The US promised to start the process of removing its economic 
sanctions and not to remove them. The US should be cautious about 
lifting the financial sanctions. If the US is in a hurry, North 
Korea might believe that the US, preoccupied with the Iraq and Iran 
issues, softened its stance toward it. It is important (for the US) 
to be always ready to tighten the reins. Even so, the document also 
inserted the wording, "the principle of taking actions in accordance 
with actions," so the North, taking advantage of this, might press 
the US to immediately terminate the sanctions. 
 
The Japanese government is dogged with the difficult challenge of 
how to bring up the abduction issue in the six-party talks. Five 
working groups, including one on normalizing diplomatic ties between 
Japan and North Korea, will be set up under the give-party 
agreement. The document implies that progress should be made at the 
five groups simultaneously. To prevent delayed progress at one 
group, discussion on the abduction issue might be wrapped up. Japan 
must be cautious in making a response. 
 
TOKYO 00000643  004 OF 010 
 
 
 
(3) Editorial: Agreement at six-party talks; Move nuclear issue 
forward to find way out of impasse in abduction issue 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
February 14, 2007 
 
It has been four years since North Korea openly resumed its nuclear 
development program. It even carried out a nuclear weapon test last 
year, deepening the crisis. However, a step has now been taken 
toward finding a breakthrough in this situation. 
 
At the six-party talks held in Beijing, an agreement was reached 
detailing the actions the participating countries should now take to 
reach the goal of North Korea scrapping its nuclear programs. 
 
The agreement is filled with forward-looking contents, as if to 
reverse the previous trend: North Korea is to suspend and seal its 
nuclear reactors and related facilities in Yongbyon and accept 
monitoring by an international agency; each concerned country is to 
offer 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil as energy aid; and additional 
950,000 tons will be extended as the North moves through each stage 
toward abolishing its nuclear programs. 
 
The US will begin the work of lifting the designation of North Korea 
as a terrorist-supporting nation. Japan will launch talks to 
normalize ties with that nation. 
 
The international community has been repeatedly betrayed by pledges 
made by North Korea. It may be too optimistic to view that the 
agreement reached this time will be realized smoothly. However, we 
welcome that a comprehensive agreement was reached to this extent, 
starting with the suspension of the North's nuclear activities. The 
only course now is to make sure, using the agreement as a lever, 
that the North takes steps toward abandoning its nuclear programs. 
 
Some may oppose the idea of offering assistance to North Korea, 
which has continued a brinkmanship diplomacy using nuclear arms as 
the card. However, the only way to find a breakthrough in the 
present situation, where North Korea has gone as far as to conduct a 
nuclear test, is to make a compromise and reward that nation for 
giving up its nuclear programs. This is the reality. 
 
There are, of course many, challenges. 
 
North Korea must reveal all of its nuclear programs, including the 
nuclear weapons that have already been made, and dismantle them. It 
is also necessary for the relevant international agency to monitor 
that process in an effective way. 
 
We want to see a taskforce meeting held as soon as possible to work 
out technical matters. 
 
Uranium enrichment activities by North Korea have brought about the 
present situation, which is called the second nuclear crisis. The 
agreement reached this time does not clearly mention that point. 
 
It will take some more time for North Korea to become able to make 
nuclear bombs using enriched uranium. As such, top priority is 
making North Korea seal its plutonium-based nuclear development. The 
agreement this time has apparently been based on such a stance. 
 
We believe that the decision was rational. This is the issue we must 
 
TOKYO 00000643  005 OF 010 
 
 
face sooner or later in order to realize the total scrapping of 
nuclear arms by North Korea. 
 
The thorny issue is how Japan should respond. The government's 
position is that it will not intend to agree to shoulder the cost of 
heavy fuel oil assistance without progress on the abduction issue. 
 
When the Democratic Party of Japan (Minshuto) questioned the prime 
minister whether that decision would meet national interests, he 
explained, "The matter is being worked out, based on the 
understanding that Japan will not offer heavy fuel oil. Other 
countries understand this position." 
 
However, once North Korea begins the process of abandoning its 
nuclear programs, Japan should get involved in that process in a 
positive manner. That is because national interests in security 
terms largely depend on that. 
 
A Japan-North Korea taskforce will be set up under the six-party 
talks. We must come up with resourcefulness to settle pending issues 
between the two countries. 
 
We want to see efforts to find a breakthrough in the abduction issue 
by moving the nuclear issue forward. 
 
(4) Editorial: Gov't must carry through principles 
 
SANKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
February 14, 2007 
 
The six-party talks over North Korea's nuclear ambitions and other 
issues have now somehow reached an agreement, which came at the end 
of negotiations that faced rough going. Its contents, however, are 
uncertain and murky in many respects. The task in store from now on 
is how to verify North Korea's abandonment of its nuclear programs. 
North Korea must not be allowed ever again to exploit loopholes to 
continue developing nuclear weapons, nor must it be allowed to gain 
time. 
 
In the six-party talks this time, Japan took the position that it 
would not cooperate in aiding North Korea in exchange for its 
shutting down of its nuclear facilities as long as there is no 
progress on the issue of Japanese nationals abducted to North Korea. 
Japan based its standpoint on this principle. In the end, the 
six-party talks saw no progress on the abduction issue. As it 
stands, Japan will not participate in the first phase of energy aid 
that will provide the North with fuel oil amounting to 50,000 tons. 
Japan carried through its principle. We want the government to 
remain committed to this principle. 
 
The six-party members have now decided to set up five working groups 
for the future rounds of talks, including one on bilateral relations 
between Japan and North Korea. This is also a starting point. It has 
at least ensured bilateral talks on the abduction issue and other 
pending issues. Japan should not fail to utilize this forum. 
 
Some people noted that Japan alone would be isolated in the talks of 
all six-party members as Japan was so much caught up on the 
abduction issue. However, that is an idle fear. Abduction is an 
issue that affects the lives of a country's people. Japan, should it 
compromise on this issue, would lose credibility at home and in the 
international community. Japan should not fear being isolated and 
should rather stand in sublime isolation. 
 
TOKYO 00000643  006 OF 010 
 
 
 
The country that is isolated is not Japan but North Korea. This must 
not be forgotten. Abduction is a matter of serious concern. Now, 
China also shares this perception and stands on the side of Japan. 
 
The six-party talks this time agreed on the "first steps" for North 
Korea to give up all its nuclear weapons programs. The six-party 
members will reportedly continue to talk about "additional, phased 
steps" in their five working groups. 
 
In a way, the agreement reached yesterday was unavoidable. That is 
because the near-term danger had to be eliminated. In the end, 
however, the five countries paid for North Korea's wrongdoings, 
including a nuclear test that North Korea intentionally created. It 
is regrettable that such incongruousness went unmentioned. 
 
In due course, North Korea ought to stand strict trial for its 
wrongdoings, including its breach of promise, and for its crimes, 
such as abductions. If that is not the case, we will see the advent 
of criminal states like North Korea. 
 
The biggest key to the North Korea problem is in the hands of the 
United States. It is essential for Japan to keep closely in touch 
with the United States. 
 
(5) Kyuma vs. Moriya 
 
BUNGEISHUNJU (Pages 234-5) (Full) 
March 2007 
 
The Ministry of Defense, only a month after it achieved it 
long-cherished desire to be elevated to a ministry, has already lost 
the confidence of the United States. The biggest problem has been 
the presence of Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma, who from the start has 
made the US angry by his series of "slips of the tongue." Not only 
has it been impossible to set the date for the Japan-US Security 
Consultative Council (2-plus-2 meeting), a meeting between Kyuma and 
Defense Secretary Gates also cannot be arranged. 
 
The first problem arose when Kyuma, commenting on the US' launching 
of the Iraq war, remarked, "Japan's support for the US was never 
formal." Afterward, he corrected himself, saying that he had "not 
done my homework," but from his statement came a budding distrust. 
 
Next, he came out with this thoughtless statement about the 
relocation of the US forces' Futenma Air Station: "It would be 
better to add some needed revisions." The pending issue for over 10 
years had finally been resolved last spring by a meeting between 
then Defense Agency Director General Fukushiro Nukaga and then 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. Anger flared up at the Pentagon, with 
one official saying, "Are they still of a mind to change (the 
agreement)?" 
 
A Japanese newspaper's reporting of the contents of the joint 
Japan-US plan to prepare for a contingency on the Korean Peninsula 
was the last straw. For a plan that even posited the evacuation and 
taking refuge of the US forces to come out publicly was for the US 
comparable to revealing the US' strategy to the enemy. Convinced 
that the "leak" came from Kyuma, the US even strongly protested to 
the Japanese government. 
 
In the backdrop has been discord between Kyuma and Administrative 
Vice Defense Minister Takemasa Moriya. In 1998, when the Defense 
 
TOKYO 00000643  007 OF 010 
 
 
Agency under Nukaga was rocked with scandal, the chance came for 
Moriya to be selected to serve as the chief of the secretariat. As 
vice minister, he created his own long-term administration. However, 
Kyuma and Nukaga were rival politicians within the old Takeshita 
faction of the Liberal Democratic Party. 
 
Moreover, during the Koizumi administration, thanks to his good 
relationship with the prime minister's private secretary Kaoru 
Iijima, Moriya was the drafter of Okinawa policy. The fact that 
Kyuma is making statements that differ greatly from the policy line 
of Moriya is seen by the US side as a strange situation. 
 
Kyuma has a history of doubt being cast on his ability going back to 
the time when the now deceased Seiroku Kajiyama was chief cabinet 
secretary. Voices are rising in the government for an early 
 
SIPDIS 
replacement of Kyuma, with some saying, "Nothing good will come as 
long as we have Kyuma as defense minister." 
 
(6) USFJ realignment: Focus on Guam relocation costs; 6 billion 
dollars to be called into question; Typhoons, poisonous snakes also 
factored in for estimated costs 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
February 10, 2007 
 
Hitoshi Kujiraoka 
 
A cabinet-endorsed bill drafted by the Defense Ministry for special 
measures to realign the presence of US forces in Japan was 
introduced to the Diet yesterday. The focus of Diet deliberations 
will now be on the propriety of costs to be covered by Japan for the 
planned relocation of US Marine Corps troops from Okinawa to Guam. 
The costs are an estimated 6 billion dollars. The mechanism of 
scraping up such a huge amount of money is complicated, and the 
grounds for such estimated costs will also be called into question. 
The bill incorporates a new bounty plan to subsidize base-hosting 
localities to be burdened with further US military functions in the 
process of realigning US forces in Japan. However, local governments 
are crying out against using such a carrot that is obviously 
intended to expedite the work of realigning the US military presence 
in Japan. 
 
The costs for relocating USMC troops from Okinawa to Guam are 2.64 
times higher than to move them to the US East Coast. The total costs 
for this USMC redeployment will be an estimated 10.27 billion 
dollars, with Japan covering 6.09 billion dollars of the total. 
These estimates are based on US military standards. According to the 
Defense Ministry's in-house documentation, the US military sets the 
regional coefficient of construction costs based on the national 
environment and other regional features. With the US East Coast 
being set at 1.0, Okinawa is at 1.43 and Guam at 2.64. 
 
The grounds for 2.64 are described in this way. Guam is a remote 
island in the Pacific, so the US military recounts: 1) there is a 
shortage of infrastructure on the island for the construction of 
facilities, such as roadways; 2) workers must be hired from outside 
the island; 3) the shipping cost of construction and other materials 
is high; and 4) the maintenance cost of facilities is high due to 
the occurrence of natural disasters, such as typhoons, and due to 
the existence of poisonous snakes and other factors. The question is 
whether these grounds are reasonable, and the Diet will likely 
debate on this point. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000643  008 OF 010 
 
 
Furthermore, the Japanese government has worked out a complicated 
scheme of projects to raise 6.09 billion dollars. Of the 6.09 
billion dollars to be covered by Japan, the Japanese government 
plans to invest 3.29 billion dollars in private-sector consortiums 
to be established on Guam as special purpose entities (SPE). This 
investment will be made through the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC). The SPE will construct housing for US military 
personnel. With its housing rent earnings, the SPE will pay back its 
debt to the Japanese government through the JBIC. In addition, the 
Japanese government will also build headquarters and billets. 
 
But it is unclear how much money will be paid back to Japan. "More 
than half of the money will return." So saying, a top-level official 
of the Defense Ministry was upbeat. However, there is no time limit 
set for repayment. One Defense Ministry official expects the money 
to be repaid in 40-50 years because housing rent earnings from US 
military personnel will be appropriated for repayment. However, the 
Japanese government's investment in the SPE, given the life of 
housing, could be irrecoverable. The Japanese government also admits 
in its in-house document that its investment in the SPE is a project 
over an "ultra-long" period of time with low profitability, 
presuming that the government almost cannot expect dividends from 
its investment. 
 
(7) Editorial: Diet debate; Opposition parties should bestir 
themselves 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
February 14, 2007 
 
A question-and-answer session at the Lower House Budget Committee 
involving the ruling and opposition parties made one round. After 
skidding over Health Minister Yanagisawa's statement that women are 
"baby-making machines," Diet debate has at last entered a 
full-fledged war of words. 
 
Naoto Kan, Katsuya Okada and Seiji Maehara, all of whom once served 
as head of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto), took the 
podium. This line-up of heavyweight debaters was probably chosen 
from a desire to stick the knife into the Abe cabinet. 
 
Unfortunately, the debate turned out to be hardly worth hearing. The 
DPJ visibly lacked the skill to attack the ruling parties, allowing 
the prime minister and cabinet ministers easily fending off their 
questions. 
 
First of all, the "politics and money" issue was brought up. It was 
only natural for the DPJ to question Agriculture Minister Matsuoka 
and Education and Science Minister Ibuki about suspicion over their 
office expenses reports. Refuted by them that they declared 
everything honestly, none of the DPJ questioners were unable to make 
attacks any further. 
 
With such ways, it cannot be helped if such suspicion arises that 
the DPJ probably refrained from further pursing Matsuoka and Ibuki 
as they have their own issue of party head Ozawa having declared as 
office expenses more than 400 million yen for the construction of a 
hall of residence for secretaries. 
 
It has been a fortnight since Mr. Ozawa categorically said that he 
is ready to release receipts and related papers. What has become of 
that proposal? It is time for him to do so. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000643  009 OF 010 
 
 
Defense Minister Kyuma stated, "The US opened the Iraq war, based on 
the conviction that there were weapons of mass destruction in that 
country, but that decision may have been wrong." The DPJ repeatedly 
urged him to answer whether he made that statement as an individual 
or as a cabinet minister. 
 
However, it was unable to pursue Kyuma any further when he rebutted 
in unison with the prime minister, "There was a justifiable reason 
for the government to decide to support the use of armed force by 
the US at that time." 
 
The DPJ probably intended to cease upon discord among cabinet 
ministers, but we believe it has the wrong end of the stick 
regarding what people now really want to hear. What is important is 
why the Abe cabinet continues to cooperate for the Bush 
administration's Iraq policy amid growing criticism of the Iraq war 
even in the US and that reason is right or wrong. However hard the 
DPJ criticizes the Kyuma statement, its effort is far from being an 
argument grasping the essence of the issue. 
 
Opposition parties, including the DPJ, sharpened their focus on 
social disparity debate. 
 
To the point made by Kan that the economy has grown over the past 
five years, but wages have gone down, widening income disparity, the 
prime minister countered with the argument that the economic 
recovery has lowered the overall jobless rate and improved the%age 
of new graduates who received job offers. Areas of contention have 
come into sight following the debate on social disparity, but the 
impression is that the debate is still at the threshold. 
 
What disparities should be corrected? What areas is the government 
responsible for dealing with? What areas should be left to companies 
and individuals to work out? Discussion should be pursued after 
properly prioritizing policy proposals, including fiscal resources 
to finance those policies. However, there is a gap between the 
ruling and opposition camps regarding their perception of the 
present state and processes to carry out those policies. 
 
We want both camps to pursue debate on the same wavelength, 
clarifying differences in their points for the next four months or 
so until the session ends. To begin with, we want opposition 
parties, such as the DPJ, which are on the offensive, to bestir 
themselves. 
 
(8) Editorial: Prime minister's Diet replies denying existence of 
social disparity will never move debate forward 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
February 14, 2007 
 
In a meeting of the House of Representatives' Budget Committee 
yesterday, a heated debate was finally launched with such successive 
Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) presidents Naoto Kan, Katsuya 
Okada, and Seiji Maehara, as well as People's New Party Acting 
President Shizuka Kamei taking the floor as questioners. However, 
there was no probing debate. Over the issue of social disparity, in 
particularly, differences between the ruling and opposition parties 
were conspicuous. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has yet to recognize the 
very existence of social disparity. As long as the prime minister 
has no awareness, thorough debate will never be conducted. 
 
In response to a question by Kan, the prime minister said, "If some 
 
TOKYO 00000643  010 OF 010 
 
 
persons and regions are feeling that there is disparity, the Abe 
administration will shed light on the issue. That is one of this 
administration's major policies." 
 
The above remark avoided mentioning if the prime minister even 
admits the existence of social disparity. Kan criticized the prime 
minister's insufficient awareness of the social inequality problem. 
In response, the prime minister said, "Income inequality is widening 
among those people in their 20s or 30s," but he refuted Kan, citing 
such numerical figures as the unemployment rate. 
 
In the former Koizumi administration, Abe assumed such key posts as 
chief cabinet secretary. Given this, the prime minister has said 
that his administration basically succeeds to the Koizumi policies. 
The prime minister might be afraid of recognizing the existence of 
social disparity, which some regard as a "shadow" left behind by the 
Koizumi cabinet. Or he might think it is unwise, ahead of the House 
of Councillors elections this summer, to get on the same stage with 
Minshuto, which is calling for giving priority to redressing the 
social disparity in the current Diet session. He appears to be 
determined not to use the word "disparity," as if he believes that 
using the word itself represents his defeat. 
 
Prime Minister Abe said, "It is natural that inequality exists 
between those who worked hard and others who did not." His view is 
true in a sense. Based on this view, he has proposed a "second 
chance" program to build a society in which fair competition is 
ensured. To that end, the prime minister insists on the need to take 
measures to continue economic growth and to bolster the financial 
footing of companies underpinning the economy. He emphasizes that 
such measures will lead to improving the household sector and the 
job market. 
 
With only such measures, is it possible to settle problems? In the 
session yesterday, as well, the prime minister gave no specific 
account. Meanwhile, Okada emphasized: "Even if economic growth is 
maintained amid the advanced globalization of economic activities, a 
number of people will be left behind. How to cope with the problem 
of bipolarization in society is a political theme facing not only 
Japan but all countries in the world." Many must have felt that this 
message was more persuasive than Abe's. 
 
Minshuto, however, has yet to detail its countermeasures. A bill 
amending the part-timers labor law, designed to improve the working 
conditions for part-time workers, was adopted in a cabinet meeting 
yesterday. On the bill, the prime minister said, "Let's discuss 
which is superior, the Minshuto proposal or the Liberal Democratic 
Party's." The people want to hear such an argument. The ruling and 
opposition parties should look at the present situation, acknowledge 
the part of "shadow," and share the same perception of the problem 
to a certain extent; otherwise, they will never be able to conduct 
probing debate. 
 
Thorough discussion was not conducted on the politics-and-money 
problem, either. Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister 
Toshikatsu Matsuoka, who has been accused of improper accounting of 
his huge political expenses, did not indicate a willingness to give 
an explanation in sincere manner. He only said, "Political 
activities are different, depending on the lawmaker." The opposition 
camp also should be criticized for having allowed Matsuoka to make 
such a reply. 
 
SCHIEFFER