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Viewing cable 07TOKYO599, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/09/07

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO599 2007-02-09 08:10 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO2753
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0599/01 0400810
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090810Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0572
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 2284
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 9829
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 3300
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 9257
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 0820
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5754
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1835
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3234
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 000599 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/09/07 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Interview with former US envoy to six-party talks: Freezing of 
old nuclear reactors insufficient; Offer of assistance to DPRK not 
to precede 
 
(2) Cabinet adopts USFJ realignment special measures legislation 
 
(3) US military to carry out paradrop training at Camp Schwab 
 
(4) Defense Ministry overtures several plans to eliminate Futenma 
airfield's danger 
 
(5) Presence of too many councils making Kantei-led promotion of 
policies difficult 
 
(6) LDP urgently needs "silver bullet" for elections; alarmed by 
unaffiliated voters shying away from the party 
 
(7) Editorial: Put measures to deal with global warming at top of 
cabinet's agenda 
 
(8) Editorial: Do not miss rising mood for resuming WTO trade 
liberalization talks 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Interview with former US envoy to six-party talks: Freezing of 
old nuclear reactors insufficient; Offer of assistance to DPRK not 
to precede 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 8) (Full) 
February 9, 2007 
 
Interviewer: Tsuyoshi Sunohara 
 
The six-party talks to discuss North Korea's nuclear arms programs 
were resumed in a more positive atmosphere than expected yesterday. 
Will this round be able to reach some kind of agreement? The 
following are questions and answers exchanged with former US 
Assistant Secretary of State (for East Asia and Pacific Affairs) 
James Kelly, the top US negotiator in the six-party talks in the 
first-term Bush administration. 
 
Q: What is you view about the ongoing round? 
 
A: "Every sign appears very positive at this point. I think the 
ongoing round will go ahead in line with the September 19 agreement 
in 2005. However, I think it is necessary to strictly examine what 
will be proposed and the meaning of the proposal." 
 
Q: There are news reports saying that North Korea would halt the 
operation of its graphite-moderated reactors in return for a 
provision of 500,000 tons of heavy oil. 
 
A: "I don't think that is everything the North Koreans want. We know 
what they want. What we don't know is what they will implement. If 
they don't do anything about their conventional weapons, plutonium, 
and enriched uranium, and they only freeze the reactors, they 
wouldn't receive ample assistance and reward. Neither the US 
Congress nor our ally Japan would give support to such a North 
Korea. Nor would China, South Korea, and Russia offer financial aid 
to it." 
 
TOKYO 00000599  002 OF 009 
 
 
 
Q: Judging from what has been reported to date, it seems likely that 
an undesirably altered version of the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed 
Framework might come out, don't you think? 
 
A: "I think that is because of North Korea's 'opening demand.' You 
had better not think that such a demand is everything." 
 
Q: Do you think the current response by the Bush administration 
means a policy shift from the previous one of not holding a direct 
dialogue with North Korea? 
 
A: "I think that is merely a change of style. From the initial 
stage, some people were skeptical of the six-party talks, but I 
attended the three rounds while I was in the post, and following me, 
current Assistant Secretary of State Hill has joined it three times. 
I think (the Bush administration) understands (the six-party 
process). The ultimate goal is to dismantle North Korea's nuclear 
development programs verifiably and completely. No change has been 
made in that goal. However, we don't expect that to be realized in 
the initial phase." 
 
Q: Financial sanctions seemed to have a stronger impact than they 
were expected. 
 
A: "No one anticipated (such sanctions) were that effective. The 
case of Banco Delta Asia is only a drop in the ocean. Macao was one 
typical case where North Korea's elite put money into circulation. 
Similar financial bases are scattered around the world. Supposedly, 
the North Koreans may be afraid that their other financial bases 
will be subject to sanctions following the Banco Delta case." 
 
(2) Cabinet adopts USFJ realignment special measures legislation 
 
ASAHI (Page 1) (Excerpts) 
Evening, February 9, 2007 
 
The government adopted at a cabinet meeting this morning US Forces 
Japan (USFJ) realignment special measures legislation featuring a 
new system to provide subsidies to municipalities accepting burdens, 
such as US bases and training, depending on the level of progress on 
realignment plans. The government also decided to allow the defense 
minister to designate subsidy-receiving municipalities and establish 
in the Defense Ministry a USFJ realignment promotion council to 
determine promotional plans. The envisioned council will be the 
first cabinet council to be chaired by the Defense Ministry. A 
system will be set up to advance USFJ realignment under the 
leadership of the Defense Ministry. The cabinet meeting also adopted 
a bill to amend the Defense Ministry Establishment Law to abolish 
the Defense Facilities Administration Agency. 
 
An outline of USFJ realignment special measures legislation 
 
7 Designate municipalities that will bear greater base burdens as a 
result of USFJ realignment. Provide subsidies depending on the level 
of progress on realignment plans. 
7 For municipalities bearing substantially large burdens, increase 
subsidy ratios for public works projects, such as roads, seaports, 
water-supply facilities, and schools. 
7 Establish a defense-minister-chaired USFJ realignment promotion 
council in the Defense Ministry. 
7 The Japan Bank for International Cooperation can invest in or 
extend loans to the relocation of US Marines from Okinawa to Guam. 
 
TOKYO 00000599  003 OF 009 
 
 
Establish a special account for management. 
7 The legislation will be valid for 10 years until March 31, 2017. 
 
(3) US military to carry out paradrop training at Camp Schwab 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 1) (Abridged) 
February 9, 2007 
 
The US military will carry out paradrop training on Feb. 13 in a 
zone of training waters in Oura Bay off the coast of Camp Schwab in 
the northern Okinawa city of Nago, according to "sympathetic 
information" that came yesterday from the Defense Facilities 
Administration Agency's Naha bureau to Nago City and local fishery 
cooperatives. Such paradrop training will be carried out in the 
Schwab waters for the first time in eight years since the last one 
was conducted there in 1999. In 1996, the Japan-US Special Action 
Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO) agreed to 
relocate parachute drills to an auxiliary airfield on Iejima, an 
island off the northwestern part of Okinawa's main island. In 
January this year and afterward, however, the US military carried 
out parachute drills in areas other than Iejima Island, such as 
Kadena Air Base and a zone of training waters near Tsukenjima, an 
island off the southeastern part of Okinawa's main island. Okinawa 
Prefecture's Military Base Affairs Division, in its request to the 
US military yesterday, proposed suspending parachute training. In 
addition, the DFAA's Naha bureau has also requested Regional 
Coordinator Joseph Weber, who is the top commander of US forces in 
Okinawa, to suspend such training. However, the US military is 
poised to carry it out. 
 
According to government officials, the US military will carry out 
the parachute drill in Zone 3, which is more than 500 meters away 
from the shore, as an amphibious drill. Schwab-based US Marine Corps 
soldiers are expected to participate in the parachute drill. 
 
The "May 15 Memorandum," which stipulates conditions for the US 
military's use of bases in Okinawa, allows the US military to use 
Zone 2, Zone 3, and Henoko Beach for amphibious training exercises. 
It also stipulates that the Japanese government will not allow 
continuous anchoring, mooring, diving, salvaging, stopping, or any 
other continuous activities in Zone 3, and that the US government 
will not restrict fishing operations there as long as they do not 
disturb US military operations during the US military's training. 
 
Reiji Fumoto, an Okinawa prefectural government official in charge 
of base disaster prevention, said yesterday in a strong tone of 
voice: "Our understanding is that they are only allowed to conduct 
parachute training at Iejima airfield in accordance with the SACO 
accord. We cannot accept such training at any other areas." 
 
(4) Defense Ministry overtures several plans to eliminate Futenma 
airfield's danger 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 1) (Full) 
February 8, 2007 
 
Administrative Vice Defense Minister Takemasa Moriya met with 
Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima in Tokyo on Feb. 5 and presented the 
governor with several plans to eliminate the danger of the US Marine 
Corps' Futenma Air Station by improving the airfield's operation, 
sources revealed yesterday. Nakaima appreciated the Defense 
Ministry's proposition to a certain extent. Meanwhile, Japan and the 
United States have now agreed on a plan to build a V-shaped pair of 
 
TOKYO 00000599  004 OF 009 
 
 
airstrips as an alternative facility for Futenma airfield. However, 
the governor strongly requested the government make sure to revise 
the V-shaped airstrips plan without fail after an environmental 
impact assessment. 
 
In the meeting, Moriya stressed the necessity of an environmental 
impact assessment, according to the sources. Moriya then suggested 
the possibility of revising the V-shaped airstrips plan if problems 
are noted in the governor's statement on the outcome of an 
environmental impact assessment, the sources said. Nakaima said he 
would study Moriya's proposition with his Okinawa prefectural 
government staff. The governor avoided clarifying whether he will 
accept Moriya's proposition, the sources said. There are still 
cautious views within the prefectural government. However, the 
Futenma relocation talks are also likely to see progress after 
coordination with the Japanese government. 
 
Nakaima reiterated his call for Futenma airfield to be turned into 
"a state of closure within three years." Moriya said, "It's possible 
to shorten the period of construction (reportedly eight years) by up 
to one year and a half, and if so, there will be no danger during 
the latter half of construction." With this, Moriya sought 
understanding on Futenma relocation with a shorter period of 
construction. 
 
The government plans to relocate Futenma airfield to a coastal area 
of Camp Schwab in the northern Okinawa city of Nago, and stony 
corals will begin laying eggs in waters off the coast of Camp Schwab 
in May or June. For this reason, Moriya stressed the need to start 
an environmental assessment of the relocation site by May at the 
latest. 
 
In the meeting, Nakaima called for Moriya to "make sure" to revise 
the V-shaped airstrips plan after an environmental assessment of the 
relocation site for Futenma airfield. In this connection, Moriya 
noted that the government has revised its plan to relocate helipads 
along with the US military's partial return of its northern training 
area on Okinawa's main island, explaining that the government has 
reduced the number of helipads from 7 to 6 in response to the 
governor's statement that came after an environmental impact 
assessment of newly planned helipad sites. In the case of relocating 
Futenma airfield as well, Moriya implied that the government would 
be ready to comply with the governor's call for revisions to the 
V-shaped airstrips plan if the governor notes environmental or noise 
problems in his statement that will come after an environmental 
assessment of the relocation site. 
 
In addition, Nakaima asked Moriya to consider relocating aircraft 
training from Futenma airfield to other areas, judging from the 
necessity of reducing the number of Futenma-based helicopters in 
order to eliminate the airfield's danger. Moriya frowned on this 
request. "That's difficult," he said. Nakaima returned to Okinawa on 
Feb. 6. "We talked about a lot of things, but I have nothing to say 
in particular for now," Nakaima told reporters at Naha Airport. 
 
(5) Presence of too many councils making Kantei-led promotion of 
policies difficult 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
February 9, 2007 
 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has stressed the need for the Kantei to 
take the lead in the policymaking process. But it seems difficult to 
 
TOKYO 00000599  005 OF 009 
 
 
put this system on the right track. The difficulty is attributed to 
a lack of unity among responsible officials as a result of the 
number of councils set up in rapid succession. In order to realize 
drastic reforms, the prime minister's leadership is imperative. 
Depending on to what extent the prime minister is able to 
demonstrate leadership will affect the support rate of his cabinet 
that is now continuously falling. 
 
In responding to questions from reporters at the Kantei yesterday at 
noon, the prime minister clearly rejected Special Advisor (for 
education rebuilding) Eriko Yamatani's suggestion that the reform of 
the Central Education Council would be discussed at the Education 
Rebuilding Council. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiokawa also 
flatly said in a press briefing, "I have not heard of it at all." 
 
Stressing that the focus of discussion in the current Diet session 
is on rebuilding the education system, the prime minister instructed 
Education Minister Bunmei Ibuki and others to submit to the Diet by 
mid-March bills related to reform the education system, including 
the introduction of a teaching-license renewal system. The Education 
Ministry is drafting the bills with great urgency. 
 
The Central Education Council is deliberating on the contents of the 
bills. Yamatani's remarks implied that "the council has not played 
any role." Many take the remarks as intended to apply pressure on 
the council members who are cautious about a significant education 
policy switch. However, if the discord between the Kantei and the 
education panel is spotlighted under the present situation, it may 
become difficult to submit the bills. 
 
Besides the leadership struggle between the Education Rebuilding 
Council and the Central Education Council, dissatisfaction is 
smoldering in the Liberal Democratic Party over the lack of 
sufficient time. The perception gap between responsible officials 
stands in the way of the promoting education reform. 
 
The Potential Enhancement Strategy Team was established under the 
lead of the chief cabinet secretary. This study group has also been 
under heavy fire. Keeping in mind the opposition camp's emphasis on 
redressing social disparity, the team plans to come up with a 
package of specific measures in about two weeks, although it was 
only launched on Feb. 1. In the second meeting of the teams on Feb. 
8, though, participants did no more than just reporting overseas 
cases, with no debate conducted on specific measures. One 
participant vented, "Compiling a package in a week is impossible." 
 
Many government officials believe that the Council on Economic and 
Fiscal Policy, chaired by the prime minister, is in charge of 
charting a long-term economic strategy. This strategy team places 
emphasis on environmental arrangements related to offering jobs and 
raising children, similar to the second-chance aid program advocated 
by the prime minister. 
 
On Feb. 9, the Strategy Council on Japan Supporting Children and 
Families, chaired by Shiozaki, was also inaugurated as part of 
efforts to counter the falling birthrate. A senior Finance Ministry 
official commented, "It will be impossible to come up with 
additional fresh measures." A senior ruling party member grumble, 
"Why is the government eager to set forth new policy measures 
although Diet deliberations on the budget is underway?" 
 
Each expert team is responsible for setting the direction of the Abe 
administration's showcase policies, but the impression that the 
 
TOKYO 00000599  006 OF 009 
 
 
government has set up extra council has taken root. 
 
Major study councils of Kantei 
 
1. Name(Time of establishment) 
2. Immediate purpose 
3. Confronting challenge 
 
1. Education Rebuilding Council(October 2006) 
2. Submit three bills related to educational reform, based on its 
first report, to the Diet. 
3. In the ruling camp, there are strong calls for caution over 
specific reform plans. 
 
1. Council on Strengthening Kantei Security Functions(November 
2006) 
2. Present by the end of February a report specifying what the new 
body should be. 
3. How will it share roles with the Foreign Ministry and the Defense 
Ministry? 
 
1. Asia Gateway Strategy Council(November 2006) 
2. Finalize a draft plan on reforming the distribution system in 
March and a comprehensive concept in May. 
3. How will it promote such measures as introducing a 24-hour 
airport operation system, breaking the current vertically divided 
system of administration? 
 
1. Potential Enhancement Strategy Team(February 2007) 
2. Compile a package of policy measures by the end of next week. 
3. There is little time left until the deadline for the compilation. 
Its measures are similar to those in the second-chance program. 
 
1. Strategy Council on Japan Supporting Children and 
Families(February 2007) 
2. Finalize a basic concept in June. 
3. Since countermeasures have presented many times, it is difficult 
to come up with fresh measures. 
 
(6) LDP urgently needs "silver bullet" for elections; alarmed by 
unaffiliated voters shying away from the party 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
February 9, 2007 
 
The candidates backed by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
lost the Miyazaki gubernatorial and Kitakyushu mayoral elections. 
Also the LDP-backed-candidate faced an uphill battle in the Aichi 
gubernatorial race. With the summer's House of Councillors election 
and the April unified local elections in mind, calls for a review of 
the party's election policy have grown stronger in the LDP. 
 
In a general meeting yesterday of the Tsushima faction, LDP Chief 
Deputy Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi pointed out the need for 
measures to win unaffiliated voters and young people. He commented 
on the Aichi gubernatorial race: 
 
"Of the LDP supporters, 30% voted for the candidate backed by 
Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan). Many unaffiliated votes went 
to the Minshuto-backed-candidate. The number of young voters in 
their twenties to forties who supported our candidate was less than 
that of the young voters who backed the Minshuto-backed-candidate." 
 
 
TOKYO 00000599  007 OF 009 
 
 
He then urged the party leadership to review the election strategy. 
 
At a meeting of the Tanigaki faction, as well, Chairman Tanigaki 
said: "We need to thoroughly analyze the outcomes of the Aichi and 
Kitakyushu races to prepare for the Upper House election." 
 
In a meeting yesterday of the group called "Fresh Breeze," made up 
of former Secretary General Tsutomu Takebe and the so-called 
"Koizumi's children" -- freshman LDP lawmakers elected to the Lower 
House last year, many members said that young and unaffiliated 
voters supported the LDP in the Lower House election in 2005 but not 
this time. The group then decided to submit a set of proposals to 
the party's reform implementation headquarters. 
 
The party leadership, however, said: "If there are effective 
measures, we would have implemented them." It is very hard for the 
LDP to find a silver bullet. 
 
As to what issue should be the main campaign focus in the Upper 
House election, views are split in the LDP. Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe intends to bring up constitutional reform as the main campaign 
issue. LDP Election Strategy Headquarters Chief Yoshio Yatsu, on a 
Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS) satellite program raised an 
objection to Koizumi's policy line, noting, 
 
"Constitutional reform will not become the main campaign issue. 
Instead, the prime minister should make issues with which the public 
feels familiar - including the pension and education issues, as well 
as the dropping birthrate - as main campaign issues." 
 
Secretary General Hidenao Nakagawa stated in a speech in Kyoto: 
 
SIPDIS 
 
"Lowering the wages of local public servants is the LDP's pledge to 
the public. Candidates officially endorsed and recommended by the 
LDP should make this their campaign pledge for the unified local 
elections and the upper House election." 
 
Policy Research Council Chairman Shoichi Nakagawa told reporters: 
"Both are important. We will start a discuss on narrowing down 
issues." He indicated that the LDP would speed up drafting its 
campaign pledges. 
 
(7) Editorial: Put measures to deal with global warming at top of 
cabinet's agenda 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
February 9, 2007 
 
The Abe Cabinet is not positive enough in its efforts to deal with 
the global warming issue. A mood for addressing global warming is 
growing not only in Europe but also in the US. With such a trend in 
motion, how to deal with the global warming issue will determine the 
future course of Japan's economy, taxes, fiscal and political 
affairs and corporate management. We want to see the cabinet 
seriously tackle the global warming issue by placing it at the top 
of the national agenda. 
 
When Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Europe in January, the focus 
of his talks with British and German leaders was on global warming. 
After returning home, the prime minister ordered the Environment 
Ministry to compile a 21st century strategy for a state founded on 
the principles of environmental protection, including measures to 
address global warming. The Environment Ministry wants to ready the 
 
TOKYO 00000599  008 OF 009 
 
 
strategy by June and incorporate it into the basic policy guidelines 
on economic and fiscal management and structural reforms for fiscal 
2008. However, preparations have just gotten underway as one 
official noted, "We have yet to decide on discussion themes." The 
global warming issue is not even one of the seven reforms proposed 
by the Council of Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP). Some CEFP 
members said, "It's unfortunately impossible to include measures to 
prevent global warming in this year's basic policy guidelines." 
 
This is unacceptable. To begin with, Japan has yet to obtain 
prospects for cutting greenhouse gas emissions, such as carbon 
dioxide, an effort to be started next year in compliance with the 
Kyoto Protocol. Japan has committed to cut 6% of emissions of such 
gases, compared with the 1990 level. However, since its emission 
amount has increased 7% from the 1990 level, it must cut 
approximately 14% in total. 
 
European countries have set up an emissions-right trading system, 
under which a central authority setting a cap on the amount of a 
pollutant that can be emitted by each company and companies that 
pollute beyond their allowances must buy credits from those who 
pollute less than their allowances. Japan has yet to establish such 
a system due to opposition from industrial circles. Under the 
Protocol, when a company contributes to developing countries in 
conserving energy consumption, the amount can be counted as 
reductions achieved by the company's country. Promoting this system 
requires funds allowing the government to purchase emissions rights 
from companies. However, how to fund this system has yet to be 
settled. 
 
Foreign countries have already started a post-Kyoto Protocol 
framework after 2012, when the first commitment period under the 
Kyoto Protocol ends. The European Union has released its target for 
cutting carbon dioxide emissions by 20%, compared with the 1990 
level. The US, which had previously been negative to the idea of 
addressing global warming, has proposed a long-term target, such as 
a reduction by plus or minus 0% by around 2020, from the 1990 
level. 
 
If the process of establishing a post-Kyoto Protocol framework 
progresses at the initiative of European countries and the US, it 
might include details disadvantageous to Japan. This issue will be 
on the agenda of the Summit next year to be hosted by Japan. It will 
be a good opportunity for Japan to exercise leadership, but it will 
miss such a chance, if it fails to consolidate domestic views. 
Depending on the nature of the new framework, Japan might be able to 
sell its distinguished energy-conserving environmental technologies, 
which can help bring about economic growth. In that sense, too, 
global- warming preventive measures can be a viable economic policy. 
The issue should be one of key themes to be discussed at the CEFP 
presided over by the prime minister. 
 
(8) Editorial: Do not miss rising mood for resuming WTO trade 
liberalization talks 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
February 9, 2007 
 
A mood for resuming the multilateral trade talks (Doha Round) at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), which have been put on hold since 
last July, has emerged. US President Bush has asked Congress to 
extend his special trade negotiation powers, known as fast-track 
authority. He also released a plan to cut domestic agricultural 
 
TOKYO 00000599  009 OF 009 
 
 
subsidies. In response, WTO Director General Pascal Lamy declared an 
end to the freeze on the talks. 
 
Promoting WTO talks for free trade, which will benefit 150 
economies, is a trade policy that Japan should prioritize along with 
free trade agreements (FTA), a framework for agreements between 
individual countries. In view of the growing possibility of a 
resumption of the talks, Japan must not neglect necessary 
preparations on the domestic front. 
 
If it continues to remain reluctant to open its agriculture market, 
Japan will be labeled protectionist. It is time for it to accelerate 
efforts for structural reforms, including reform of agricultural 
regulations to enhance productivity. 
 
US Congress holds the key to resumption of the talks. In the US, 
Congress grants special trade negotiation powers to the president on 
a temporary basis. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
pursues trade talks as the president's proxy. The US government is 
unable to engage in trade talks with foreign countries without this 
authority. 
 
The current authority lapses on July 1. There are some unclear 
elements, such as whether Congress, where the Democratic Party 
commands a majority, will approve extending the authority or not. 
However, the president has opted to tackle coordination of views 
with Congress, which is expected to be difficult, intertwined with 
the agricultural subsidies issue. It is significant that the US 
administration has indicated eagerness to restart the trade talks. 
 
The positions of Congress and the Democratic Party are divided. Some 
protectionists directly oppose the idea of extending the powers 
given to the president, while leading congressmen who have a strong 
voice on economic diplomacy are indicating a flexible stance, albeit 
under the condition that domestic jobs must be protected. The 
Democratic Party certainly does not want to be stigmatized as a 
"round crusher" by the international community. We want to see swift 
deliberations on the issue of extending the president's authority. 
 
We wonder whether Japan's agricultural regulators and persons 
involved in agricultural affairs have not been relaxing their 
attention. If they intend to slowly advance intensive farming while 
continuing to protect farmers with high tariffs, taking advantage of 
the talks being at an impasse, it is completely wrong. 
 
The possibility of resuming the talks has actually emerged. The role 
Japan should play as a trade-oriented country is to elevate this 
mood spearheading the world. 
 
SCHIEFFER