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Viewing cable 07TOKYO495, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/02/07
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 07TOKYO495 | 2007-02-02 08:26 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO5988
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0495/01 0330826
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 020826Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0320
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 2226
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 9762
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 3234
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 9205
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 0763
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5693
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1776
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3175
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 000495
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/02/07
INDEX:
(1) Return of Kadena RAPCON delayed; Timeframe unknown; USFJ
realignment could be affected; Japanese air-traffic controller: Not
enough training time to reach expertise level
(2) Okinawa police compile statistics for 2006 showing 56 crimes
involving US forces or a total of 63 persons, a drop of 9 cases from
2005; Crimes involving youths increase by seven cases
(3) No progress made on abduction victims reported by North as dead
since Megumi case reported a decade ago
(4) Japan, US to revise operations plan by September for Korean
Peninsula emergency; Airports, seaports to be expropriated for US
military use
(5) FTC proposal for easing corporate merger screening standards
will pave way for major corporate reorganization in domestic
industries
(6) "Information on hospitalization" of Takeo Hiranuma aimed at
shaking LDP?
(7) Foreign Ministry officials awed by appointment of Tsuneo Nishida
as ambassador to Canada
(8) Rumor that Vice Defense Minister Moriya may remain in post
floated due to post-Moriya candidate's alleged sexual harassment
case
ARTICLES:
(1) Return of Kadena RAPCON delayed; Timeframe unknown; USFJ
realignment could be affected; Japanese air-traffic controller: Not
enough training time to reach expertise level
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Top play) (Excerpts)
February 2, 2007
It was learned on Feb. 1 that the reversion of Okinawa RAPCON, the
air-traffic control system around the island of Okinawa that
continued after Okinawa was returned to mainland Japan and was
scheduled for reversion by December this year, will likely be
delayed beyond the original timeframe. This was revealed by sources
connected to the Japanese and American governments. The extent of
the delay is unknown. Under the final USFJ realignment agreement
reached last May, a portion of Yokota Air Base's RAPCON was to be
returned by Sept. 2008, but it was written in the agreement that
consideration as the condition for such reversion would include "the
lesson learned from the experience of returning the Kadena RAPCON."
The delay will have an effect on realignment of US forces in Japan.
Training on the Japanese side to reach expert's level in operating
the system began on Dec. 15, 2004, at Kadena Air Base, where Kadena
RAPCON is located. US military air traffic controllers trained
Japanese air-traffic controllers dispatched to the base. According
to an informed source, the schedule became crammed because the US
side carried out their daily duties while training new US military
air-traffic controllers. It took more time than expected to learn
communications with US military jets, which fly at higher speeds
than civilian aircraft, and to learn the military jargon. Although
approximately 40 persons were scheduled for training, only about
TOKYO 00000495 002 OF 008
half are finished with the training course.
The radar and system to transmit weather conditions to aircraft are
different between Japan and the US, so it reportedly will likely
take more time to set up a system for sharing information.
(2) Okinawa police compile statistics for 2006 showing 56 crimes
involving US forces or a total of 63 persons, a drop of 9 cases from
2005; Crimes involving youths increase by seven cases
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 30) (Full)
February 2, 2007
Crimes by US forces in Okinawa, civilian employees, and family
members that occurred in 2006 totaled 57 cases and 63 persons,
according to records of the Okinawa Prefectural Police Department's
First Investigation Division. Compared to the year before, there was
a reduction of nine cases (minus 13.6% ) or two persons (minus 3% ).
This was the smallest number of cases and persons involved in five
years. However, Looking only at juvenile crimes, the records show 23
cases or a total of 28 persons having been involved. This is a 7
case or 12 person jump from the previous year, indicating a
noticeable increase of crimes committed by US military-related
family members.
According to the same police records, the worst three crimes were:
1) a taxi robbery in January by a Marine and another within Camp
Sukeran; 2) robbery and injury in October b y a Marine and another
in the city of Uruma; 3) robbery in December by the son of a
civilian attached to the Navy at Chatan-son. Five persons were
arrested or charged. This was an increase of one case or one person
from the previous year.
In addition, there were 10 cases involving acts of violence, such as
rape and wounding, up three cases from the previous year; 21 cases
of theft involving 27 persons; and nine cases of white-collar crimes
like fraud and embezzlement involving five persons. Other crimes,
including damage to property and forced entry into a home, totaled
14 cases or 14 persons.
(3) No progress made on abduction victims reported by North as dead
since Megumi case reported a decade ago
ASAHI (Page 15) (Full)
February 1, 2007
Ten years have passed since the issue of Megumi Yokota abducted by
North Korea came to light through media reports and Diet
interpellations. Centering on the Association of the Families of
Victims Kidnapped by North Korea, established in March 1997, a
campaign to rescue abduction victims has been actively staged. Such
a relief campaign compelled then Prime Minister Koizumi to decide to
go to North Korea in September 2002. In the Japan-North Korea
summit, the North admitted kidnapping Japanese nationals. Pyongyang
also agreed to let five abductees return to Japan and to let their
family members later leave the country. However, there has been no
sign of progress regarding the other abduction victims whom the
North reported had already died. The Asahi Shimbun interviewed
Special Advisor Kyoko Nakayama, head of the abduction issue
headquarters, about what has occurred over the past 10 years.
Kyoto Nakayama: Arrangements finally completed for government to
demand North to send abductees back to Japan
TOKYO 00000495 003 OF 008
-- How do you look back over the past 10 years?
Abductee family members called on the government to rescue their
daughters or sons who had been kidnapped by North Korea, mentioning
their names. Based on the judgment that as long as their names are
undisclosed, there will be no progress, the family members made a
bold decision to disclose the names of their children who had been
abducted, as I recall.
-- I remember that you assumed the post of cabinet secretariat
advisor in September 2002, just after the Japan-North Korea summit
was held.
At that time, relations between the government and abductees'
families were strained. It was my role to coordinate views with the
victims' families. In December, such families began to say, "We
trust the government."
Since around that time, my duties linked to the abduction issue
increased, but I thought such duties went beyond the job description
as an advisor. So I insisted on the need to establish an office
tasked with addressing the abduction issue in a comprehensive way.
But my suggestion was turned down, and I felt my role had ended.
-- You left the government in September 2004, quitting as advisor.
But you returned to the post last September. Why?
I received a phone call from Prime Minister Abe asking me to join
the cabinet as an advisor. I could sense his enthusiasm to seriously
address the abduction issue. It was Prime Minister Abe when he was
deputy chief cabinet secretary in October 2002 who decided not to
send the five repatriated abduction victims back to North Korea on
the government's responsibility. Since I recommended the
headquarters plan, I thought I had to accept the offer.
Four months after the headquarters was set up, operation expenses
have been included in the supplementary budget, and arrangements
have been finally completed for the government in unity to demand
the North to return abduction victims.
-- When you were ambassador in Uzbekistan, you were engaged in
rescuing four Japanese nationals kidnapped by armed insurgents,
weren't you?
I firmly believed at that time that "it is the government's duty to
rescue Japanese abduction victims. Even so, negotiations with North
Korea are very difficult. The North still holds hostages. We will
have to continue persuasion efforts until North Korea realizes that
"returning the hostages will benefit us more."
-- How do you think sanctions against the North should be linked to
a settlement of the abduction issue?
I think it is desirable for Japan to have friendly ties with North
Korea as its neighbor. But it is impossible to establish such
relations with a country that forcibly took people away from Japan
by putting gags into their mouths and has not allowed them to return
to Japan, depriving them of their freedom.
Taking sanctions is one means to have the North understand our
thinking, that is, "we can't let things go on like this." The United
States' financial sanctions worked to bring the North back to the
TOKYO 00000495 004 OF 008
six-party talks. If North Korea becomes aware of the necessity for
negotiations, the North might agree to hold bilateral talks with
Japan over the abduction issue.
-- Some persons insist that the current North Korean regime must be
toppled in order to resolve the abduction issue.
What the government must pursue is the rescue of the abduction
victims. What to do with the regime is up to the North Koreans.
Should the regime collapse and the situation fall into confusion, we
will have to work out another means to rescue the victims.
-- Mr. Taku Yamasaki visited North Korea and held talks with its
senior officials, didn't he?
He made the visit not on the behalf of the government, so there will
be no effect of the visit on the government's policy.
(4) Japan, US to revise operations plan by September for Korean
Peninsula emergency; Airports, seaports to be expropriated for US
military use
AKAHATA (Page 1) (Full)
January 30, 2007
Japan and the United States are currently in the process of revising
their joint operations plan in anticipation of an emergency on the
Korean Peninsula, sources revealed yesterday. The Japanese and US
governments are expected to work out a revised joint operations plan
by September, according to the sources. This work is intended to
have the now-enacted emergency laws of 2003 and 2004 reflected in
their bilateral defense planning. The laws allow the government to
expropriate civilian facilities, including airports and seaports,
for the US military's use during emergencies. They are planning to
mobilize the Japanese archipelago in its entirety for the United
States' military intervention in the Korean Peninsula.
The current joint operations plan is based on the Regional
Contingency Security Law, which stipulates Japan's cooperation with
the US military for its intervention in the Asia-Pacific region. The
government was not allowed to expropriate civilian facilities for
the US military's use. However, the newly enacted laws allow the
government to do so.
The Japanese and US governments agreed thereafter in October 2005 to
realign US forces in Japan and decided to "reflect Japan's
emergencies legislation" in their bilateral defense planning. The
two governments then began revising their joint operations plan.
On November 21, 2006, the government held a meeting of senior
officials from its ministries and agencies concerned at the prime
minister's office to discuss bilateral defense planning for the
first time in seven years, according to the Cabinet Secretariat's
answer to a question asked by Yasuo Ogata, a House of Councillors
member with the Japanese Communist Party.
Shortly thereafter, on December 13, the "Bilateral Planning
Committee" (BPC) also met in Tokyo for the first time in four years.
The BPC is made up of the deputy commander of US Forces Japan, the
vice chief of staff of the Self-Defense Forces, and other uniformed
officers from the SDF and USFJ, and it actually plans joint
operations for the SDF and USFJ.
TOKYO 00000495 005 OF 008
The BPC meeting was presumably intended to begin the work of
retouching the joint operations plan in response to the Japanese
government's confirmation of its decision to update the plan.
The government has revealed nothing about what to revise in the
joint operations plan. However, one of the scenarios simulated in
the plan is "an emergency on the Korean Peninsula," according to an
informed source.
This scenario is codenamed "5055" in the Japanese and US
governments.
(5) FTC proposal for easing corporate merger screening standards
will pave way for major corporate reorganization in domestic
industries
ASAHI (Page 3) (Almost Full)
February 2, 2007
The Fair Trade Commission (FTC) on January 31 revealed a draft
amendment to the guidelines for corporate mergers. The new
guidelines are bound to have a major impact on corporate strategy.
Major reorganization, which has thus far been viewed as impossible,
could occur. This newspaper explains the mechanism in a
question-and-answer form.
Q: What is merger screening?
A: When a company forms a merger with or acquires another company,
it is necessary for it to notify the FTC of the plan for approval.
If companies form a merger in order to avoid competition and a
company created as a result of the merger raises prices, consumers
and its business partners would suffer losses. The FTC determines
the propriety of planned mergers in compliance with the
Anti-Monopoly Law in order to prevent such a thing from occurring.
Q: How is the FTC going to revise the guidelines?
A: To begin with, it will change the scope of markets, the arena of
competition. The existing guidelines only focus on the domestic
market, but the proposed plan mentions that overseas markets will be
taken into consideration, depending on the case. This is to cope
with the reality that companies are engaging in global competition.
For instance, Sharp commands an overwhelming share on the domestic
market, but on the global market it is one of higher-ranked
companies along with Sony and Samsung Electronics. The plan is to
determine whether a planned M&A could impede competition or not in
global-scale and real terms.
Q: Please be more specific.
A: Under the new guidelines, the standard for determining that a
planned merger has low possibility of impeding competition has been
eased. Currently, if the share of a merged company is 35% or lower
and if the merger is between leading competitors in an industry
whose degree of oligopoly (HHI) is below 1800, this merger plan can
be considered as having low possibility of impeding competition. The
revised plan sets a share standard at 35% or lower and the HHI at
2500 or lower.
New guidelines are of no benefit to consumers? Companies created as
result of mergers may find it difficult to raise prices
TOKYO 00000495 006 OF 008
Q: What will be the impact of the revisions?
A: As indicated in the chart, there will be an increase in M&As that
will require no screening. Business circles gave high scores to this
point with Nippon Steel President Akio Mimura commenting, "It is a
breakthrough." They welcome not only the easing of the screening
standard but also an amendment to guidelines for prior consultation
procedures, which are said to be unclear and complicated.
Q: Will such changes boost a move for M&As?
A: That is right. The ruling parties and the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI) have called for revisions to the
examination standards in alliance with business circles in order to
enhance domestic companies' international competitiveness through
reorganization. Just at such a time, Mittal Steel commanding the top
share in the global steel industry, and Arcelor with the second
largest share merged last year. Some METI officials take the view
that a major merger between Japanese companies will become possible,
as one senior official put it.
The FTC's another aim in easing the guidelines is to ease the
vexation felt by companies that it is difficult to fathom what
judgment the FTC will reach. Given the track records of screening
carried from fiscal 2001 through fiscal 2005, the share of a company
created as a result of M&As topped 50% in 60% of cases. The FTC's
intention was that the guidelines should be eased to reflect this
situation.
Q: Won't consumers be disadvantaged?
A: In drafting the revisions, the FTC has had difficulty
coordinating views with business circles and METI, which prioritize
strengthening corporate competitiveness, since it attached
importance to consumer interests. In a questionnaire carried out by
METI, most companies replied, "It would be difficult to raise prices
even after a merger." Even so, it is still important to verity
whether M&As are not impeding competition even after the examination
standard is eased.
Outline of draft revisions to merger examination guidelines
7 Adopt HHI as a benchmark in determining whether a planned merger
requires examination or not.
7 Expand the scope of applied mergers that can be determined as
having no need to go through screening or having low possibility of
impeding competition.
7 Categorically mention that the market includes overseas markets as
well
7 Improve information disclosure regarding past examination records
7 Speed up and bring transparency to the screening process revising
guidelines for prior consultation procedures as well.
(6) "Information on hospitalization" of Takeo Hiranuma aimed at
shaking LDP?
THEMIS (Page 38) (Full)
February 2007
It was reported that Takeo Hiranuma, former minister of economy,
trade and industry, has been hospitalized after suffering a stroke.
A political journalist, however, said: "That might be a strategy to
TOKYO 00000495 007 OF 008
shake up the executive of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and LDP
Upper House Caucus Secretary General Toranosuke Katayama."
According to sources familiar with Hiranuma's support group,
Hiranuma was admitted into the hospital on Dec. 6 last year after
falling ill while dining with 11 lawmakers -- all former postal
rebels who have now rejoined the LDP. He now speaks with a hoarse
voice and has been undergoing rehabilitation because he cannot walk
without holding on to a handrail. He was diagnosed with a mild
stroke. His doctor has said that since Hiranuma is steadily
recovering from his illness, he will definitely be able to return to
politics.
The journalist analyzed that it was strange that the information
about his stroke was not disclosed for about a month. Although it is
true that he fell ill, the possibility is strong that the news of
Hiranuma's hospitalization was timed to annoy LDP Secretary General
Hidenao Nakagawa, who forced Hiranuma to take a litmus test for his
approval of postal privatization. It is reported that he will not
return to politics before late March, a delicate timing with an eye
on unified local elections and the House of Councillors election.
Therefore, behind his hospitalization there is a maneuvering to play
up his political presence.
Katayama also is concerned, saying, "I heard the rumor of (his
hospitalization) at the beginning of the New Year. Mr. Hiranuma
really must have become fatigued." A local political source predicts
that if Katayama doesn't get support from Hiranuma for his
campaigning for the July Upper House election, he could lose his
Diet seat. If Hiranuma fully recovers, there is no doubt that he
will become one of the candidates in the race to succeed Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe.
(7) Foreign Ministry officials awed by appointment of Tsuneo Nishida
as ambassador to Canada
THEMIS (Page 38) (Full)
February 2007
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has yet to show where his leadership lies.
But at least officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) are
afraid of him because of his appointment of Deputy Minister Tsuneo
Nishida, who joined the ministry in 1970, as ambassador to Canada.
The appointment was adopted in a cabinet meeting on Jan. 16. Nishida
reportedly was overheard talking rudely, having got drunk in an
off-the-record meeting at the Kasumi Club: "Abe has become
arrogant;" "(Chief Cabinet Secretary) Shiozaki will reach a dead
end;" and "(Spokesperson) Seko is a fool."
Deputy Minister Mitoji Yabunaka, whom Prime Minister Abe trusts,
joined the ministry in 1969. He was named as deputy minister for
political affairs. Foreign Policy Bureau Director General Masaharu
Kono, who entered the ministry in 1973, was appointed to replacem
Yabunaka as deputy minister for economic affairs.
A source well-connected in MOFA says:
"Nishida was regarded as a star of the ministry and he was believed
to become administrative vice minister. But in response to a UN
Security Council resolution on North Korea over the North's launch
of missiles last July, he was at odds with then Chief Cabinet
Secretary Shinzo Abe. Another reason is that Lower House member
SIPDIS
Muneo Suzuki and Masaru Sato, a MOFA official on administrative
TOKYO 00000495 008 OF 008
leave, named him as "one of the three officials who would ruin
MOFA."
There is no doubt that Nishida's appointment as ambassador to Canada
is a dismissal in effect.
(8) Rumor that Vice Defense Minister Moriya may remain in post
floated due to post-Moriya candidate's alleged sexual harassment
case
THEMIS (Page 41) (Full)
February 2007
The Defense Ministry was established on Jan. 9. Takemasa Moriya, who
entered the defense agency in 1971, was moved laterally to the
administrative vice defense minister post. Moriya intended to
voluntarily retire this summer, making the upgrading of the Defense
Agency to a ministry as his swan song, but the rumor is that he may
be appointed to serve a fifth year in his current post, which is
extremely unusual.
Although Defense Policy Bureau Director General Kazuo Ofuru, joined
the defense agency in 1973, was the most likely candidate to succeed
Moriya, the expectation is that his promotion will be shelved, faced
with strong opposition by junior and mid-level officers. The idea
suddenly comes up is that Tetsuya Nishikawa, director general of the
Minister's Secretariat, who joined the National Police Agency in
1972, may be promoted to the vice minister's post, instead of Ofuru.
He has had little experience of serving in the Defense Policy
Bureau, but he worked hard along with Moriya to carry out spadework,
which was highly valued. "He is an unusual person in the Defense
Ministry, many of whom tend to intervene by words," said a source
well-connected in the Defense Ministry.
It is ironical that an official hailing from the National Police
Agency will control the Defense Ministry. The big reason is that
Moriya has got rid of competent defense officials. Among the
candidate to replace Moriya, there reportedly is an official who
allegedly committed an act of sexual harassment.
The next vice minister will have to handle the realignment of US
forces in Japan, which will reach a critical point. If Nishikawa
handles the matter successfully, he will gain high marks. If
negotiations between the government and Okinawa become bogged down,
chances are that Moriya will remain in his post.
SCHIEFFER