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Viewing cable 07THEHAGUE205, NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN/JSF: LABOR PARTY VIEWS ON DEFENSE AS COALITION TALK...

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07THEHAGUE205 2007-02-02 15:33 2011-01-18 21:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy The Hague
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0205 0331533
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021533Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8087
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0235
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000205 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UBI, SCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017
 
TAGS: NATO PINS PREL MARR MOPS AF NL
 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN/JSF: LABOR PARTY VIEWS ON DEFENSE AS COALITION TALK...



95112,2/2/2007 15:33,07THEHAGUE205,"Embassy The
Hague",CONFIDENTIAL,,"VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #0205 0331533
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021533Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8087
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0235
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

","C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000205
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/UBI, SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017

TAGS: NATO PINS PREL MARR MOPS AF NL

SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN/JSF: LABOR PARTY VIEWS ON DEFENSE AS COALITION TALKS CONTINUE

Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. Summary: (C) Labor Party (PvdA) Defense Spokesman Frans
Timmermans offered his party's views on the Joint Strike
Fighter and Afghanistan within the context of on-going
government coalition formation talks. He said that the Labor
Party will practically concede defeat in its opposition to
JSF, relying on an upcoming third-party independent review of
the JSF business case as an opportunity to ""save face."" On
Afghanistan, he said failure is ""not an option,"" and
indicated his party's leadership will support additional
budget supplementals aimed at bolstering the Dutch deployment
in Uruzgan, even if his party opposes increased defense
spending. Timmermans discussed these issues with Amb. Arnall
on February 1. End summary.

JSF: Past the Point of No Return
--------------------------------

2. (C) Timmermans said the Labor Party will ""more or less""
swallow the GONL's plans to purchase the Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF). Timmermans, who opposed investing in JSF while State
Secretary for Defense during the Wim Kok Cabinet of the early
SIPDIS nineties, admitted that he still regrets the Dutch decision
to participate in JSF. He said, however, that his position
on JSF is more nuanced than some give him credit for, and had
been highjacked by others within his party who were unable to
articulate a more measured position. For example, he
acknowledged that JSF was the best option, and even said for
the first time that he ""could not imagine"" the Dutch buying
any other plane.

3. (C) Timmerman's criticism of the program hinges on
participation in the investment phases -- in order to justify
participation, the Dutch will be compelled to buy a number of
planes that exceeds their requirements while limiting
leverage to pursue other options, should alternatives become
available -- ""that is just not smart,"" Timmermans said. That
said, PvdA will push for an independent, third-party review
of the JSF business case to be completed by the end of 2007.
Should the review go according to plan, Timmermans said PvdA
will be able to ""save face,"" and acknowledge that JSF ""makes
sense."" At any rate, Timmermans said the Dutch are ""past the
point of no return"" on withdrawing from JSF program
participation.

Afghanistan: Failure is Not an Option
-------------------------------------

4. (C) Timmermans indicated that as part of the government
coalition formation agreement currently under discussion, the
new government will likely support two budget supplementals
-- 300 million Euros each -- for Defense and Development
Assistance aimed at bolstering the Dutch deployment to
Uruzgan. He acknowledged that his party will ""have problems""
with the increase in spending for defense, and the commitment
to JSF will certainly put pressure on an already tight
budget, but failure in Afghanistan is ""not an option"" -- the
Dutch and NATO must succeed in Afghanistan, even if it means
staying longer than the two year commitment. Timmermans
admitted he initially opposed the Dutch deployment to
Afghanistan, suggesting that the mission was too difficult
for Dutch forces. Once the decision was made in favor of
deployment, however, Timmermans noted there was ""no turning
back"" in terms of Dutch involvement in Afghanistan.

Comment
-------

5. (C) Timmermans is a direct and honest contact who is
well-plugged in to the coalition formation talks. He claims
to be currently considering the MFA's EU Integration State
Secretary position in the new government, but may instead opt
SIPDIS
to head his party in parliament. He has long opposed the JSF
investment case; if he appears ready to concede defeat, then
Dutch procurement of JSF is in good shape.
ARNALL