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Viewing cable 07SANSALVADOR179, EL SALVADOR: EXTENSION OF TPS FOR EL SALVADOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SANSALVADOR179 2007-02-01 20:02 2011-06-21 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy San Salvador
VZCZCXYZ0024
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSN #0179/01 0322002
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 012002Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5055
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000179 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN J. CORNFORTH AND PRM/PIM T. WRIGHT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017 
TAGS: EAID ES HO NU PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SMIG
SUBJECT: EL SALVADOR: EXTENSION OF TPS FOR EL SALVADOR 
 
REF: STATE 6653 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles Glazer, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C)  Temporary Protected Status should be extended again 
for the nearly 250,000 Salvadoran beneficiaries living and 
working in the United States.  El Salvador's ongoing 
reconstruction from two devastating earthquakes in 2001 is 
incomplete, and a series of moderate local earthquakes during 
late December 2006 in Ahuachapan Department have exacerbated 
the situation by displacing nearly 2,000 more households. 
Current conditions prevent the safe return of Salvadoran 
nationals to a country still ill-prepared to absorb them. 
TPS remains an important bilateral issue, and the forced 
return of such a large group of people would not only have a 
severe negative impact on socioeconomic conditions but also 
severely damage bilateral relations with a country that is 
one of our most important allies in the region. 
 
2.  (SBU)  The earthquakes of January and February 2001 
claimed 1,159 lives, damaged or destroyed 276,000 homes, 
destroyed major hospitals and community infrastructure, and 
left unserviceable 1,400 miles of roadways.  This major 
disruption to the economy and social fabric, despite major 
reconstruction efforts, has yet to be overcome.  Though 
USAID's $170 million disaster reconstruction program made 
significant improvements to damaged infrastructure, 
assistance from many other sources is still being 
implemented.  The GOES has only recently begun to rebuild two 
of the seven hospitals damaged by the earthquakes.  Repairing 
these hospitals will cost an estimated $100 million, and the 
work will not be complete until 2009 at the earliest. 
 
3. (C)  To complicate matters, a series of moderate but 
localized earthquakes (up to 4.6 on the Richter Scale) hit 
the western half of El Salvador during the last week of 2006. 
 There were a handful of deaths, and given the substandard 
housing prevalent in region, nearly 2,000 families were left 
homeless.  The GOES has been unable to adequately respond to 
this latest natural disaster, and the Vice Ministry of 
Housing informed affected residents that the government would 
make loans to cover at most 35 percent of reconstruction 
costs.  The other 65 percent would be paid directly by those 
affected. 
 
4. (SBU)  El Salvador has not recovered from the 2005 
eruption of the Santa Ana Volcano, which was immediately 
followed by flooding and mud slides caused by Hurricane Stan. 
 Those disasters resulted in 69 deaths and $355.6 million in 
damage to housing and infrastructure. The GOES redirected 
local and international funding to address these crises, but 
as their response to the 2006 earthquakes shows, resources 
are scarce.  Moreover, the GOES is redirecting resources to 
face the enormous challenge gang violence poses to the 
country's stability.  The murder rate for El Salvador is the 
highest per capita in the Western Hemisphere (58 per 100,000 
in 2006) and is arguably one of the highest in the world 
outside of an active war zone.  Gang violence continues to 
have a destabilizing effect on the society as a whole, 
damaging the basic social and economic fabric of the country. 
 
 
5. (SBU)  Though the economic situation in El Salvador has 
shown modest improvement in 2006, 35 percent of households 
nationwide still live in poverty. Poverty in rural areas, 
which often bear the brunt of natural disasters, is even 
higher, at 42 percent.  Underemployment nationwide stands at 
32 percent, and apparel manufacturers have cut thousands of 
jobs in the past year as increased competition from China 
takes its toll despite CAFTA-DR benefits. Remittances, which 
in 2006 were $3.3 billion, remain an important source of 
income for the nearly 1.7 million people who receive them. 
With CAFTA-DR, the recently signed Millennium Challenge 
Compact, and other initiatives in support of economic growth, 
the USG is helping El Salvador establish the framework for 
growth in the long term, but the major benefits of these 
agreements, including the connection of the impoverished 
northern zones to the rest of the country, remain years away. 
 At present, there are insufficient economic opportunities to 
ensure a secure reintegration of returnees, and social 
services are inadequate to attend to them. 
 
6. (SBU)  Despite the great strides the GOES has made in just 
15 years since the end of the civil conflict to improve the 
living conditions of its citizens, some estimate that up to 
600 Salvadorans per day leave the country headed for the 
United States.  Many of them never make it to Mexico, let 
alone the United States.  However, USG efforts to stem the 
flow of migrants and return citizens to their native country 
have yet to ebb the tide of Salvadorans emigrating illegally 
to the north. 
 
7. (C)  From a socioeconomic perspective, the GOES is not 
prepared to accept the return of nearly 250,000 nationals 
from the United States, in addition to the some 30,000 others 
who may face deportation this year.  While there remains a 
clear statutory rationale for the extension of TPS again this 
year, the political importance of this issue cannot be 
underestimated.  Such a massive deportation would be a 
political embarrassment for the GOES in the lead up to 2009 
local, legislative, and presidential elections that could 
provide a significant boost to the electoral prospects of the 
communist-dominated and Chavez-supported FMLN.  El Salvador 
under ARENA,s leadership has been one of our most important 
allies in the Western Hemisphere, during a major rise of 
leftist populist regimes unfriendly to USG interests.  El 
Salvador is currently deploying its eighth contingent of the 
Cuscatlan Battalion to Iraq (a deployment the government sees 
in part as an expression of gratitude for USG support in 
their own civil conflict), but terminating TPS would 
dramatically undermine President Saca's ability to support us 
on this and many other global and hemispheric issues of 
importance.  For these reasons, in addition to the 
socioeconomic disruption such a massive deportation would 
cause, post continues to strongly advocate the extension of 
Temporary Protected Status for the Salvadoran nationals who 
are beneficiaries.  Ending TPS now could have a profound 
negative impact on our bilateral relationship. 
Glazer