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Viewing cable 07QUITO272, GOVERNMENT AND CONGRESS REACH ACCORD, CALMING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07QUITO272 2007-02-01 21:01 2011-05-02 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Quito
VZCZCXYZ0021
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHQT #0272/01 0322101
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 012101Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6229
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6398
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 2335
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ FEB 0384
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 1366
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 1806
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS QUITO 000272 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINS ASEC EC
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT AND CONGRESS REACH ACCORD, CALMING 
STREET FOR NOW 
 
REF: A. QUITO 247 
 
     B. QUITO 200 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  In a joint press conference on January 
31, the President of Congress and Government Minster Gustavo 
Larrea announced an agreement whereby Congress would debate 
the government's proposed referendum on a constituent 
assembly on February 6.  Conciliatory statements by Larrea 
and the congressional reversal of an unpopular appointment 
diminished tensions between the Correa government and 
pro-referendum demonstrators on one side, and the Congress on 
the other. The agreement paves the way for eventual 
Congressional approval of the referendum, which even members 
of the anti-assembly opposition concede cannot be stopped, 
only delayed.  Electoral authorities are expected to act next 
week to restore the political rights of ex-president Lucio 
Gutierrez, a key referendum supporter.  In the wake of street 
violence earlier in the week, the Correa government has 
distanced itself (somewhat) from the excesses of the 
demonstrators, shown some pragmatism in relations with 
Congress and avoided crossing democratic redlines.  End 
Summary. 
 
Correa Turns Up Heat, Larrea Turns it Down 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (SBU) President Correa had incited his supporters to 
defend the referendum on whether to hold a national 
constituent assembly in a nationally-televised address on 
January 28.  Demonstrators from various pro-assembly groups 
turned out on January 30, breaking through police barriers to 
interrupt the congressional session (Ref A), causing several 
minor injuries.  President Correa on January 31 lamented the 
violent excesses but blamed the Congress and the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal (TSE) for the confrontation, saying that 
by delaying approval of his government's referendum the 
Congress had provoked public reaction.  If necessary, he 
said, he would create a new body to administer the referendum. 
 
3.  (SBU) At a hastily-organized press conference later that 
day in the office of Congress president Jorge Cevallos, 
attended by representatives of most parties represented in 
Congress, Larrea moderated Correa's tone, declaring the 
government preferred to seek congressional approval for the 
referendum if possible.  Larrea defended the right to 
legitimate protest, but admitted that police protection for 
Congress (which falls under his ministry's control) had been 
inadequate during the demonstration on January 30, saying the 
breach would be investigated.  He denied any intention by the 
government to dissolve Congress, and pledged to "guarantee" 
its ability to function in the future.  Congress president 
Cevallos agreed to put the issue of the referendum at the top 
of Congress' agenda for February 6. 
 
4.  (SBU) Congress resolved another problem during 
yesterday's session by accepting embattled and discredited 
attorney general Francisco Cucalon's resignation and pledging 
to select his replacement from the list presented by the 
National Judicial Council.  Correcting that substantive, 
legal and political misstep will remove what has been an 
effective point of criticism against this Congress by 
pro-Correa forces. 
 
Day After--Streets Calm 
----------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) After an active day breaking into Congress (Ref A) 
and the TSE a week earlier (Ref B), pro-assembly 
demonstrators called for an evening rally on January 30 in 
the same north Quito park where middle class anti-government 
protesters had rallied against then-president Lucio 
Gutierrez.  The rally fizzled, attracting only 30-40. 
Assembly opponents have accused the Correa government of 
organizing and paying for the more numerous pro-assembly 
demonstrations, and deliberately permitting the demonstrators 
to enter the Congress building.  On January 30, the number of 
demonstrators declined to only 300, who marched to the 
presidential palace on January 31 to show support for the 
assembly referendum.  No demonstrations were expected on 
February 1. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6. (SBU) The accord between Cevallos and Larrea has already 
calmed the situation in the streets stirred up by the 
government to pressure Congress to approve the referendum. 
Backing down from its threat to proceed without congressional 
approval, the government, thanks to Gutierrez, currently has 
the votes in Congress to bring the referendum within 
constitutional bounds.  Assembly opponents in the PSC and 
PRIAN confide that with Correa high in the polls at the 
outset of his presidency, and the Congress largely 
discredited in public opinion, they hope not to block the 
referendum and subsequent assembly, but only to delay it. 
Some are also thinking ahead to try to gain an adequate 
number of seats on the assembly to block constitutional 
changes they fear will be for the worse. 
 
7.  (SBU) Separate from but linked to congressional approval 
of the referendum is the issue of restoration of Lucio 
Gutierrez' right to run for office (currently blocked for two 
years by a TSE ruling which kept him out of the 2006 
presidential race).  A majority in the TSE is expected to 
reinstate those rights, permitting Gutierrez to run for the 
assembly himself (he hopes to seek the presidency of the 
assembly if he wins).  The show of "popular support" in the 
streets on January 30 is viewed by some here as Correa's 
attempt to maintain his political purity by changing public 
perceptions of his government's modus vivendi with Gutierrez, 
creating the impression that Congress will approve the 
referendum not because of a political deal with the devil, 
but instead in response to popular will "expressed in the 
streets." 
 
8.  (SBU) Recent events have demonstrated Correa's 
willingness to take a hard public line against Congress, 
while permitting his minister to avert conflict (at the last 
minute or after some violence, as in this instance) by making 
conciliatory gestures.  That strategy is proving effective at 
this early stage of his presidency, but could cost him 
popular support over the longer term.  For its part, the 
opposition appears eager to provoke Correa's impulsive ire, 
seeking to speed his inevitable descent in the polls.  We are 
staying away from this baiting game, and maintaining our 
focus on democratic redlines (keeping the assembly referendum 
within constitutional bounds, not dissolving Congress) which 
Correa has not yet crossed. 
JEWELL