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Viewing cable 07NAIROBI870, SOMALIA DART SITUATION REPORT 16 - THE IMPACT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07NAIROBI870 2007-02-23 09:30 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO5717
RR RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #0870/01 0540930
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230930Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7693
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME 0103
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 000870 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
USAID/DCHA FOR MHESS, WGARVELINK, LROGERS 
DCHA/OFDA FOR KLUU, GGOTTLIEB, AFERRARA, ACONVERY, 
KCHANNELL 
DCHA/FFP FOR WHAMMINK, JDWORKEN 
AFR/AFR/EA FOR JBORNS 
STATE FOR AF/E, AF/F AND PRM 
STATE/AF/E FOR NGARY 
STATE/F FOR ASISSON 
STATE/PRM FOR AWENDT, MMCKELVEY 
NSC FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
USMISSION UN ROME FOR RNEWBERG 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PHUM PREL SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA DART SITUATION REPORT 16 - THE IMPACT 
OF INSECURITY ON HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS 
 
REFS:A) NAIROBI 00660  B) NAIROBI 00294 
 
NAIROBI 00000870  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1.  Continuing insecurity and political uncertainty in 
Somalia are displacing some populations from Mogadishu 
and impeding humanitarian operations in Lower Juba 
Region and Mogadishu.  USAID's partners continue to 
operate under extremely difficult circumstances, but 
the populations that remain inaccessible are likely to 
be in dire need of assistance.  This cable examines the 
current security situation in Mogadishu and southern 
and central Somalia as it relates to humanitarian 
operations and discusses particular areas of concern. 
End Summary. 
 
THE CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
 
2.  Ongoing military action against remnants of the 
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in southern Somalia, 
especially in Lower Juba Region, has had a negative 
impact on the ability of the humanitarian community to 
provide needed assistance in the most affected areas. 
Humanitarian assistance providers are increasingly 
concerned that short of immediate deployment of an 
effective peacekeeping force that would assist the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in establishing 
rule of law and security, Somalia could again be 
plunged into a broad civil conflict. 
 
3.  The security situation continues to be fluid in 
Somalia with violent incidents reported daily by 
international relief agencies.  Civil disturbances and 
demonstrations are also frequently reported. 
Additionally, threats by the TFG to forcibly evict 
existing internally displaced persons (IDPs) from 
government-owned buildings have raised concerns among 
the humanitarian community. 
 
4.  In January, the UN Common Air Service (UNCAS) and 
other humanitarian flights into Somalia were restricted 
due to insecurity.  However, many key airfields 
throughout central and southern Somalia have now been 
re-opened for humanitarian air traffic by the UN. 
Baidoa, Galkayo, and Wajid are key airports for 
humanitarian operations and are currently in full 
operation.  Other airfields, including Luuq, Jamame, 
and Jowhar are also open, but require special 
permission, and Belet Weyne airport is available for 
large cargo only.  Mogadishu and Kismayo airports 
remain closed. 
 
MOGADISHU 
 
5.  Continuing violence and an unpredictable security 
situation continue to limit movements of humanitarian 
personnel in Mogadishu.  The UN suspended UNCAS flights 
to Mogadishu following the mortar attack at Mogadishu 
airport on January 24.  The UN World Food Program (WFP) 
reports that the port of Mogadishu continues to 
operate. 
 
6. On February 13, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), which runs the Kesaney Hospital in 
Mogadishu, reported a significant increase in the 
number of incoming war-wounded patients.  In addition 
to the wounded, Mogadishu hospitals continue to treat 
patients with malaria, diarrhea, and other diseases. 
 
NAIROBI 00000870  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
According to the ICRC and the UN World Health 
Organization (WHO), the hospitals continue to function 
and relief agencies in Mogadishu have long-established 
systems to maintain operations under high levels of 
insecurity. 
 
7. ICRC told USG Disaster Assistance Response Team 
(DART) members that they are particularly concerned 
about the recent Islamist threat to shoot down any 
planes flying into Mogadishu airport, and that the 
escalating violence in Mogadishu is the worst that they 
have seen in 10 years. 
 
SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL SOMALIA 
 
8.  Much of southern and central Somalia is 
experiencing a gradual improvement of security 
conditions.  On February 12, USAID partner 
International Medical Corps (IMC) reported that the 
situation in Bay and Bakool regions, where it operates, 
had improved in January and humanitarian agencies were 
now able to access project sites that had been off- 
limits since December. 
 
9.  Little information is available on the humanitarian 
situation in Lower Juba Region.  The non-governmental 
organization (NGO) Horn Relief said that surveillance 
flights and the presence of Ethiopian forces have 
created anxiety and uncertainty causing pastoral 
communities to change migration patterns.  For example, 
the town of Jiiro, Afmadow District, a preferred 
grazing area, has remained empty since the bombing 
there in January. 
 
10.  The UN has not allowed international or national 
staff to return to Kismayo, and the helicopter base and 
port there remain closed.  WFP received permission to 
have a few staff return briefly to close the office and 
inter-agency storage facility.  Although the port of 
Kismayo remains closed and clan struggle for control 
over the port continues, some small vessels from Dubai 
have docked at the Kismayo port.  WFP reports that it 
continues to work with some transport contractors and 
they are in the process of loading food that had been 
prepositioned in Kismayo for distribution in the 
region. 
 
11.  The ICRC is able to access Lower Juba Region and 
has conducted several expatriate-led medical missions 
to Afmadow District in the last two weeks.  The ICRC 
can not access Kismayo by air, due to the military use 
of the airport.  Additionally, areas southwest of 
Kismayo are off-limits due to ongoing military 
activity.  On February 13, ICRC reported receiving 
large numbers of casualties in Kismayo hospital and is 
trying to transfer the most serious cases to Afmadow or 
Baidoa. 
 
CLAN CONFLICT 
 
12.  Throughout January, UN agencies reported inter- 
clan fighting in Lower Juba Region that resulted in 
civilian deaths and small-scale displacement.  Clan 
conflict affects the ability of humanitarian agencies 
to access vulnerable populations when ongoing fighting 
restricts local and international staff movement, 
delivery of resources, and program implementation. 
 Examples include the current clan conflicts in Lower 
 
NAIROBI 00000870  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Juba Region, chronic clan fighting in Gedo Region, and 
periodic clan fighting in Belet Weyne town, where 
different clans control the east and west sectors of 
town, which is divided by the Shabelle River. 
 
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS 
 
13.  Most of Somalia remains at UN security phase IV, 
which limits UN agency operations to strictly 
humanitarian and emergency activities.  Mogadishu and 
southern Lower Juba Region are classified as UN 
security phase V, which requires that UN activities 
receive approval from UN headquarters in New York, 
limiting UN assistance and presence. 
 
14.  The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) also notes concerns regarding the 
resurgence of warlords, especially in southern Somalia, 
and increased checkpoints on main roads, where militias 
often demand road taxes and fines.  The UN Children's 
Fund (UNICEF) and WFP report that banditry, roadblocks, 
and ambushes are increasing, making in-country 
transport of supplies and staff extremely difficult. 
UNICEF also reported that in Mogadishu pre-CIC 
transport protocols have returned, in which vehicles 
are handed off from one driver to another as they move 
through areas controlled by different clans. 
 
15.  WFP reports that by late January, the number of 
checkpoints on the Mogadishu-Baidoa road had 
diminished, but checkpoints in other areas were on the 
increase.  WFP said a humanitarian convoy was held by 
militia at Haway on the Merka-Buaale road in Middle 
Juba Region, but was later allowed to proceed after 
paying a passage fee.  On January 31, WFP reported that 
attacks on the Mogadishu-Balad road near the 
encampments of Ethiopian forces had increased and that 
convoys should take extra precautions.  According to 
WFP, the TFG has reportedly removed most of the 
checkpoints on the Mogadishu-Merka-Brava road. 
 
COMMENT 
 
16.  Humanitarian agencies are most concerned about 
vulnerable populations in Lower Juba Region that are 
food insecure, flood and conflict-affected, and have 
nearly no access to international humanitarian 
services.  Relief activities in Mogadishu continue, but 
the ongoing conflict has limited the UN's re-engagement 
and expansion of activities. 
 
17.  Insecurity and ongoing fighting in Mogadishu and 
Lower Juba Region have resulted in a humanitarian 
response in Somalia driven by access rather than need. 
USAID partners have been able to respond quickly and 
sufficiently to disease outbreaks and deliver food aid 
in many regions in Somalia, but the most vulnerable 
areas in Lower Juba Region and along the Kenya-Somalia 
border have not received adequate relief services. 
 
18.  In Lower Juba Region, only a few agencies (mostly 
local NGOs) have been able to travel and reliable 
information is unavailable.  However, relief agencies 
believe that humanitarian indicators in this area are 
deteriorating due to food insecurity, lingering effects 
from the November-December flooding, and Rift Valley 
fever, which is concentrated in Afmadow District. 
 
 
NAIROBI 00000870  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
19.  To date, the DART has been unable to conduct 
humanitarian assessments, monitor partner programs, or 
begin building working relationships with Somali 
Transitional Federal Institutions from within Somalia 
due to security restrictions.  The DART will continue 
to monitor the security situation in Somalia from 
Nairobi, Kenya, through partners and UN agencies with a 
presence on the ground, but an in-country presence is 
preferable.  UN and NGO expatriate staff travel 
regularly to areas in Somalia that have been assessed 
by UN security officials and take the necessary 
precautions as mandated by UN standards. 
 
20.  USAID's Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance 
is reviewing the possibility of funding humanitarian 
security initiatives to ensure timely communication of 
accurate security information relevant to humanitarian 
operations, facilitate multi-agency security 
assessments, and improve NGO and UN agency contingency 
planning. 
 
RANNEBERGER