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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA466, OPPOSITION ASSEMBLY CAUCUS LEADERS SEEK TRAINING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA466 2007-02-21 22:37 2011-06-21 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXRO3895
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0466/01 0522237
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 212237Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9174
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0958
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000466 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM NU PREL
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION ASSEMBLY CAUCUS LEADERS SEEK TRAINING 
 
Classified By: Charge d,Affaires a.i. Peter M. Brennan.  Reasons 1.4 (B 
,D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  National Assembly caucus leaders 
representing the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), Liberal 
Constitutional Party (PLC), and the Sandinista Renovation 
Movement (MRS) recently met with the Ambassador and sought 
more U.S. training assistance, especially for freshmen 
lawmakers and consultants handling legal matters and thematic 
issues.  Convinced that the legislature offers the best wall 
to contain President Ortega's efforts to consolidate power 
and sideline Nicaragua's established democratic institutions, 
they are considering legislation that would remove the 
Executive's authority to establish national councils. 
Assembly opposition to Ortega's exceeding his authority may 
be producing some positive effects as on February 18, the 
Presidency announced that the national councils and their 
staff will not be funded through the national budget. 
However, the following day, Ortega circumvented the problem 
by reappointing Paul Oquist -- the former director of the 
National Policy Council and a long-time UNDP official -- as 
his ministerial-ranking private secretary for National 
Policy.  End Summary. 
 
Legislature the Front Line against Ortega Excesses 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (C) Victor Hugo Tinoco, Maria Eugenia Sequeira, and 
Maximino Rodriguez, leaders of the National Assembly's MRS, 
ALN, and PLC caucuses, respectively, met on February 16 with 
the Ambassador, DCM, polcouns, and USAID election advisor to 
discuss their perceptions of the Ortega government, 
legislative priorities, and possible USG assistance.  The 
lawmakers asserted that the National Assembly offers the best 
containment wall against President Ortega's efforts to 
consolidate power and sideline Nicaragua's established 
democratic institutions.  Alarmed over President Ortega's 
disregard for the restrictions the Assembly placed on the 
President's newly established national councils -- including 
stipulating that the councils can neither exercise authority 
over the ministries nor receive any share of the national 
budget -- the lawmakers may propose to eliminate the 
President's authority to establish national councils. 
 
Sandinista Visionaries, Intellectuals Abandoned Ortega 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3.  (C) Tinoco, a former FSLN militant familiar with the 
Sandinista leadership, criticized President Ortega's choice 
of ministers, terming them FSLN "nobodies" selected for their 
blind loyalty, not capabilities.  Tinoco, an FSLN insider for 
many years, said he had never even heard of many of the new 
ministers.  All of the party's visionaries and intellectuals 
have abandoned Ortega, claimed Tinoco.  Ortega is stuck in 
the past, a retro-revolutionary incapable of thinking 
democratically -- more bent on consolidating his power than 
resolving Nicaragua's social problems.  However, Ortega is 
also confined by Nicaragua's need for the IMF and donors like 
the United States.  At this juncture, all Ortega has left is 
his revolutionary symbolism; hence his decision to alter the 
national seal and to invite the anti-U.S. Iranian leader to 
launch a tirade against imperialism on Nicaraguan soil, 
opined Tinoco. 
 
4.  (C) Rodriguez, who was cautious in his assessment of 
Ortega, noted that Ortega has yet to define himself, even 
though the President appears not to have learned much from 
Nicaragua's 16 years of democracy.  This time around, Ortega 
is adrift, confronted with the difficult dilemma of placating 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, while remaining within the 
boundaries of the IMF.  Agreeing with Tinoco's assessment 
that Ortega's ministers are essentially place holders with 
virtually no authority or influence, Sequeira recounted that 
during the Finance Minister's recent appearance before the 
Assembly, he had "parroted" the Sandinista party line.  It 
was clear that the Minister was unauthorized to answer any 
questions outside of those in his marching orders, she said. 
 
 
Using the Budget and Court Appointments to Contain Ortega 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5.  (C) Sequeira remarked that the National Assembly's 
control over the national budget offers the best "containment 
wall" against Ortega.  She added that the opposition 
lawmakers will develop a clearer picture of the Nicaraguan 
government's (GON) true intentions once it receives Ortega's 
proposed budget.  Rodriguez and Tinoco nodded, concurring 
with Sequeira that how the opposition members of the Assembly 
deal with the proposed budget will be determinant in setting 
the direction of the country.  Regarding the National 
Assembly's pending appointment of three Supreme Court 
Justices, the Prosecutor General and Deputy, as well as 16 
other judges, Sequeira remarked that her caucus will support 
qualified, independent candidates, not the usual party hacks. 
 Tinoco professed the same, while Rodriguez was more 
circumspect.  (Note: On February 20, the Assembly appointed 
two special commissions to review candidates for the Supreme 
Court and for the Prosecutor General and Deputy.) 
 
Opposition Leery of Venezuelan and Iranian Accords 
- - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (C) The caucus leaders reported that copies of the 
Venezuelan and Iranian agreements that the GON recently 
signed had finally arrived in the National Assembly after 
weeks of opposition pressure to review the accords.  All 
three lawmakers shared that they had not seen the documents, 
and were only familiar with them through media coverage. 
Noting that according to press reports the Iranian agreement 
entails mutual support in international fora regarding issues 
of global concern, the DCM shared our concern that Iran could 
try to draw in Nicaragua into supporting its nuclear 
ambitions in violation of the United Nations, the United 
States, and the EU.  Disconcerted by our observations, 
Rodriguez explained that the Assembly's role is to approve or 
reject each document, but it is not authorized to make any 
changes.  (Note: Also on February 20, the Assembly appointed 
a special commission to review these accords.) 
 
Chavez Will Stop Once He Runs out of Gas 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7.  (C) Rodriguez, who opined that Chavez is neither as 
bright nor as capable as Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, 
attributed Chavez' success to his country's vast oil wealth. 
"Chavez is like a car.  He will lose power once he runs out 
of gas," ventured Rodriguez.  Sequeira, who quipped that 
Chavez could last for some time, asserted that she has not 
seen one sign that Ortega is democratic, but plenty of 
indications that he is following in the footsteps of Chavez. 
 
Ortega "Lost It" Over MANPADS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8.  (C) Responding to the Ambassador's query regarding the 
Assembly's recent renewed interest in MANPADS and President 
Ortega's remarks on the subject, Sequeira clarified that the 
Assembly had invited General Halleslevens to explain the 
military's MANPADS position in order to inform new 
legislators of the matter, not/not to put him on the spot or 
to press a vote.  However, President Ortega had overreacted 
to media coverage of the Hondurans' purchase of small 
counter-narcotics planes, causing the issue to spin out of 
control, explained the ALN lawmaker.  The Ambassador 
clarified that our assistance to the Nicaraguan military is 
quite substantial -- approximately $17 million for 2006-2007 
-- and that, while the Hondurans preferred to purchase planes 
to combat narco-trafficking with our funds, the Nicaraguans 
had purchased boats and communications equipment.  Sequeira 
suggested that CHDS advisor Richard Downie's May defense 
workshop will provide the opportunity for Nicaraguans to 
develop a modern defense strategy that will enable Nicaragua 
to modernize and streamline its defense and make better use 
of U.S. military assistance. 
 
Caucus Leaders Seek Capacity Building, Thematic Experts 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
9.  (C) Sequeira, who recently participated in an 
IRI-USAID-sponsored program for legislators and a trip to 
Mexico to meet with her Mexican counterparts, lauded these 
programs and sought more of them, especially for new 
lawmakers.  Rodriguez suggested that we also provide training 
to the Assembly's legal advisors and thematic experts, as 
many current advisors are out of touch with new developments 
and are ill prepared to provide the kind of expertise 
lawmakers require to draft sound legislation.  Tinoco 
mentioned the need to inculcate in lawmakers and staff a 
sense of public service to offset the traditional 
rent-seeking mentality of many Assembly deputies.  All three 
deputies supported the idea of joint training sessions for 
the three opposition parties, as well as separate sessions 
for each party to develop individual capacity. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
10.  (C) Through USAID, we will arrange follow up meetings 
for the caucus leaders with NDI and IRI.  National Assembly 
opposition to Ortega's exceeding his authority may be 
producing some positive effects.  On February 18, the 
Presidency announced that the national councils and their 
staff, including their coordinators, will not be funded 
through the national budget.  However, the following day, 
Ortega circumvented the problem by reappointing Paul Oquist 
-- the former director of the National Policy Council and a 
long-time UNDP official -- as his ministerial-ranking private 
secretary for National Policy, with the equivalent salary to 
 
BRENNAN