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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM158, CURB YOUR ENTHUSIASM: UPDATE ON UN SUPPORT FOR AMIS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM158 2007-02-05 03:54 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO7434
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0158/01 0360354
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 050354Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5979
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000158 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/RSA 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PREL AU SU UN
SUBJECT:  CURB YOUR ENTHUSIASM:  UPDATE ON UN SUPPORT FOR AMIS 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  37 out of 105 military staff, 29 out of 33 
civilian police, and four out of 48 civilian staff have deployed to 
El Fasher and Khartoum as part of the UN light assistance package to 
the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).  UN officers hope to have 
the entire contingent in place by the end of February, but point to 
challenges in civilian recruitment and a shortage in commitments 
from troop contributing countries.  The construction of facilities 
for the light package has been uneven, though this has not impeded 
the inflow of personnel.  Major hurdles in implementing the light 
package and laying the groundwork for implementation of the heavy 
support package include recruitment, land acquisition, facility 
construction, and staff integration -- all in the midst of a dicey 
security situation.  The senior UN officer charged with light 
package implementation has instructed his staff to work as 
"termites" to supplant the dysfunctional AMIS structure with 
something more effective.  He estimates this process will take 6 - 
12 months, but is contingent on the UN mission being 
internationalized and not merely being an African force in blue 
berets.  End summary. 
 
---------------- 
PERSONNEL STATUS 
---------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Poloffs met January 30-31 with UN and AMIS officials 
responsible for light package integration, Pacific Architects & 
Engineers (PAE) managers, incoming UN civilian police, and light 
package military officers who have arrived in recent weeks.  As of 
January 30, 37 military officers (out of 105), 25 civilian police 
(out of 33), and four civilian staff (out of 48) have arrived as 
part of the UN light support package, according to Miguel Martin, 
chief of the coordination cell for the mission support division of 
the UN.  An additional 12 military and four civilian police are 
awaiting deployment from Khartoum.  Martin hopes the remainder of 
the personnel will be in place by the end of February.  He noted, 
however, that civilian recruitment is lagging due to security 
concerns, living conditions, and new UN personnel rules.  Martin 
added that the lack of clarity on the joint administrative structure 
of the UN and AMIS has deterred some applicants.  He also said that 
countries have been slow in fulfilling their commitments on the 
military side. 
 
---------------- 
EQUIPMENT STATUS 
---------------- 
 
3. (SBU) According to Brig. Gen. John Musonda, chief of the Joint 
Forward Headquarters, much of the light package equipment has been 
turned over, including all the generators, half the night vision 
goggles, and the equipment for the rapid reaction company.  Some 
items, such as the audio-visual equipment, are slated to arrive when 
there are personnel on the ground to help use it.  Martin said that 
UN is pushing for training for the incoming equipment to ensure 
accountability and proper use and maintenance.  AMIS has so far been 
receptive to these requests. 
 
--------------- 
FACILITY STATUS 
--------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Although camp construction for the light package has been 
uneven, physical space issues have not impeded the inflow of 
personnel.  PAE is preparing three sites adjacent to the AMIS camp 
for office space for light package personnel.  According to Martin, 
the sites will be finished within a month. 
 
5. (SBU) As the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) 
declared another PAE-built site for incoming staff unusable for 
security reasons, personnel are living in rented guesthouses around 
the AMIS camp or UN guest houses downtown.  Living quarters to 
accommodate 110 personnel are planned, but North Darfur Wali Yousef 
Kibbir rejected the proposed location, adjacent to the PAE 
headquarters, and offered four less desirable sites.  UNMIS also 
plans new construction in each of the three other areas - Nyala, El 
Geneina, and Zalingei - where some personnel are scheduled to be 
deployed by the end of February, but logistical discussions are 
ongoing. 
 
---------------------- 
PREP FOR HEAVY PACKAGE 
---------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Despite the fact that the budget for the heavy support 
package has not been approved by UN headquarters in New York, Martin 
said that there is some planning in process for heavy support 
implementation.  Construction for the heavy support package could 
begin in one to two months - with the initial priority on supporting 
engineering units - but key elements of the package will not arrive 
for at least three to four months. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000158  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
INTEGRATION OF PERSONNEL 
------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) The question of how light support personnel are integrated 
into the AMIS operation will prove more complicated than the 
construction of facilities and the deployment of personnel and 
equipment.  UN Military Staff Chief Thinus Van Staden, the senior 
light support officer overseeing the integration into AMIS, said 
that the current staffing document calls for UN staff to be spread 
throughout AMIS headquarters to enhance professionalism and bring 
more skilled officers into the command structure.  However, many UN 
officers have been placed in positions below their grade or where 
they are under-utilized.  One European officer said a group of 
Nigerian officers in AMIS feel threatened by the UN and so have 
worked to keep them out of the core operational functions.  Others 
officers have said they feel redundant.  According to a Canadian 
officer, for example, "six people are doing the work of two" in the 
air operations center. 
 
8. (SBU) Van Staden suggested, however, that each officer is having 
a different experience.  "Some are being used 100 percent, some 50 
percent, and some 5 percent," he said.  His thinking on his own 
position has evolved from a preference to serve as chief of staff to 
remaining an advisor outside the formal staff structure, which will 
better allow him and his successor to monitor and respond to how UN 
personnel are begin used.  Van Staden has told his officers to be 
patient with the situation and to "subvert the system."  He has 
urged them to enhance efficiency by instituting proven managerial 
mechanisms, such as standard operating procedures, in a 
non-threatening way, "like termites," so the dysfunctional structure 
will crumble and something better will emerge.  He concedes, 
however, that this is a long-term process, requiring between 6 -12 
months, and that some departments will not be reformed until the 
current AMIS section heads are transferred. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment:  A number of UN officers were assigned to the 
Joint Operations Center (JOC), but in addition to good officers, the 
JOC needs to be integrated into the AMIS force structure so that 
information is collected and processed.  One Norwegian Captain in 
the JOC said he is a "virtual officer, in a virtual Joint Operations 
Center."  End comment. 
 
-------------------------- 
Pitfalls in Implementation 
-------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Van Staden outlined three pitfalls in implementing the 
light and heavy support packages.  First, the lack of European and 
North American officers hinders effective operations.  Van Staden 
believes that if the mission continues to recruit heavily from 
Africa, the incoming officers will flow into the current structure 
without making substantive changes.  Second, the structural divide 
between the AMIS deputy head of mission and the force commander in 
El Fasher is crippling operations, as the acting head of mission is 
in Khartoum.  Van Staden recommended an integrated 
political-military chain of command.  Absent this, some of the new 
UN officers will only reinforce a stagnating operation.  Third, the 
two-tiered pay structure of AMIS and the UN will damage morale. 
AMIS officers and soldiers receive a stipend of 90 dollars per day 
regardless of where they are living.  Though payment of this stipend 
is often delayed, the UN only provides a stipend when the officers 
are living outside of UN-operated facilities, normally for the first 
few weeks or months of their tour. 
 
POWERS