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Viewing cable 07HELSINKI94, NIINISTO SEES A TOUGH ROAD FOR THE CONSERVATIVES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HELSINKI94 2007-02-13 14:16 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXRO6117
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHHE #0094/01 0441416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131416Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2962
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4673
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0278
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000094 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL FI
SUBJECT: NIINISTO SEES A TOUGH ROAD FOR THE CONSERVATIVES 
 
REF: HELSINKI 75 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Conservative Party's (CONS) most 
popular candidate, Sauli Niinisto, told the Ambassador 
that CONS is likely to remain in opposition following 
the March parliamentary election.  The Finnish Center 
Party (CEN) will win, he suggested, but the Social 
Democrats (SDP) -- even if they finish second -- are so 
entrenched in government that they can still operate as 
the power behind the throne.  Niinisto downplayed 
widespread speculation that his return to domestic 
politics has caused a power struggle in his own party, 
alluding frequently to Chairman Katainen's clear 
leadership role.  Niinisto's entry into the race has 
been the Conservatives' brightest hope this election 
season, and his sober assessment of their chances may be 
the best indicator that a CEN/SDP governing coalition is 
likely to continue after the March contests.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Slim Chances for the Conservatives 
---------------------------------- 
2. (U) Ambassador Ware hosted Sauli Niinisto for lunch 
Feb. 12.  Niinisto has clearly emerged as the 
Conservative's leading contender and best hope for the 
upcoming March parliamentary election.  A former Finance 
Minister, EU Central Banker and near-winner in last 
year's presidential election, Niinisto's entry into the 
election has buoyed CONS and added momentum to its 
campaign (reftel). 
 
3. (SBU) Despite his wide popularity in Finland and his 
reputation as an outstanding campaigner, Niinisto was 
sober in his assessment of the Conservatives' chances to 
return to government.  In order to join the coalition, 
CONS would have to "beat the SDP and come in second," he 
said.  Even if CONS were to gain several seats at the 
SDP's expense, it would be very difficult politically 
for the Center Party to "reach around the Social 
Democrats" and choose CONS as its governing partner if 
the SDP held on to second place.  Niinisto strongly 
suggested that the Center Party is likely to win, based 
both on the public's general satisfaction with the 
current CEN-SDP coalition as well as on the strength of 
the enormously popular CEN Prime Minister, Matti 
Vanhanen.  Indeed, he acknowledged, economic times have 
been good and the current cabinet has performed well, 
making it hard for CONS, as the largest opposition 
party, to mount a convincing campaign. 
 
The SDP Still Calls the Shots 
----------------------------- 
4. (C) But if CEN is the favorite, SDP is still the 
kingmaker.  Niinisto said that even if the Social 
Democrats do not win outright, they enjoy such an 
entrenched tradition of serving in government -- and of 
pulling government's strings -- that, in effect, they 
still call the shots.  As an example, Niinisto noted 
that following last year's presidential elections, 
President Halonen scolded him for running a campaign 
that was too tough and too personal.  Her accusation 
stunned Niinisto, not only because he nearly scored an 
upset victory, but also because in his opinion the 
campaign was tough but totally issue-based -- never 
personal.  In retrospect, he said, he concluded that the 
President and the other SDP leaders are so accustomed to 
being in power that a real challenge from any other 
party is almost viewed as a lack of respect. 
 
5. (SBU) As part of the same analysis, Niinisto noted 
that several SDP candidates have sharply criticized the 
concept of a "non-socialist" or "bourgeois" coalition, 
which some pundits and candidates have floated as the 
best means for CONS and CEN to join forces and unseat the 
SDP (see reftel).  Niinisto himself dismissed the 
possibility of such a coalition, noting that many issues 
still separate CEN and CONS and that, again, CONS would 
need a strong second-place finish to gain the 
credibility necessary for moving from opposition to 
government.  However, he characterized the SDP's shrill 
reaction as yet another example of its leaders simply 
being offended that CONS and CEN would consider such a 
bold challenge to SDP dominance. 
 
No Power Struggles 
------------------ 
6. (SBU) Niinisto did not specifically address the wide 
speculation that his sudden and warmly received return 
to domestic politics has caused a power struggle -- and 
 
HELSINKI 00000094  002 OF 002 
 
 
even rumors of a possible change in leadership -- within 
his own party.  But he made a clear effort on several 
occasions to suggest to the Ambassador that Chairman 
Jyrki Katainen is clearly in charge.  He referred to 
Katainen's strong leadership, his good campaign skills, 
and his command of both the issues and the party's 
overall strategy.  He praised Katainen's skill in 
winning the youth vote for the party -- something he 
joked that he is not as skilled at (Katainen is 35 and 
Niinisto is 58).  Nevertheless, Niinisto knows he is the 
CONS standard bearer in the voters' eyes and that he 
will be a significant player regardless of whether the 
party gets into government or not.  He even went so far 
as to suggest that if the unlikely occurred and CONS did 
return to government, he would welcome being named 
either Speaker of Parliament or Foreign Minister. 
 
Comment 
------- 
7. (SBU) Niinisto is a strong campaigner, a veteran 
politician who has served both in opposition and in 
government, and he is clearly the Conservatives' best 
hope to pick up seats in the upcoming election.  For 
all these reasons, his sober assessment of CONS's 
chances may be one of the better indicators that the 
current CEN/SDP coalition is likely to remain in power 
after the election.  CEN and SDP have worked well -- 
and worked well together, in the voters' eyes -- and 
CONS is still the dark horse.  Some analysts say that 
CONS, and Katainen, this year actually have their 
sights set on the next election when they hope Katainen 
will be more seasoned and the party better positioned 
for an upset. 
 
8. (SBU) Comment Continued: Perhaps more intriguing is 
Niinisto's analysis of the SDP's ability to pull 
strings, even if CEN wins.  Many claim that the SDP did 
just that in 2003, when it came in second and 
reluctantly conceded the prime ministership, but managed 
to grab both the Foreign and Finance Ministries -- 
arguably Finland's most powerful portfolios.  Indeed, 
over the past 40 years, the SDP has only been out of 
power once -- from 1991 to 1995 -- and on that occasion 
it actually won the election but stepped aside and 
allowed CONS and CEN to form the government.  Septel 
will examine whether or not the current SDP leadership - 
- which is showing some early signs of struggling at 
this highest levels -- is still in position to play the 
kingmaker role. 
WARE