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Viewing cable 07DILI66, RAMOS-HORTA'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY IN CONTEXT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DILI66 2007-02-26 13:57 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO7711
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0066/01 0571357
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 261357Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3298
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0819
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0818
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0779
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0884
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0714
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0637
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0598
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2639
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000066 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM TT
SUBJECT: RAMOS-HORTA'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY IN CONTEXT 
 
 
DILI 00000066  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta, a political 
independent, officially announced his candidacy for president on 
February 25 in the eastern town of Laga.  Ramos-Horta is widely 
known to be the candidate supported by President Xanana Gusmao 
and his newly established political party, but it is not clear 
how much of Gusmao's popularity can be transferred to electoral 
success for his chosen successor.  Despite earlier discussions 
of Ramos-Horta as a possible Fretilin candidate, the ruling 
party ultimately decided against a "compromise" candidate and 
nominated its president, Francisco "Lu'olo" Guterres.  On the 
opposition side, Gusmao made strenuous efforts to gain the 
support of the three key opposition parties for Ramos-Horta, but 
they all ultimately rejected him and turned to nominating their 
own candidates.  The most widely held view is that no candidate 
appears likely to win a straight up majority on the first round, 
and that a run off between Ramos-Horta and Lu'olo is the most 
likely scenario. The question would then be whether Fretilin's 
national party structure or President Gusmao's national appeal 
will be the force to win out for their chosen candidates. 
Regardless of the result, the presidential election will 
dramatically set the stage and possibly even determine the 
outcome of the parliamentary elections to follow.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta, who has no party 
affiliation, officially announced his candidacy for president on 
February 25 in the eastern town of Laga at a ceremony hosted by 
former resistance fighter and President of opposition party 
UNDERTIM, Cornelio Gama ("Elle Sette" or "L7").  Approximately 
2,000 UNDERTIM members gathered for the ceremony.  Joining 
Ramos-Horta and L7 on the podium were representatives of 
Fretilin Mudansa, the opposition faction within the ruling 
party.  Also on the podium was Dionisio Babo Soares, highly 
respected lawyer and academic who co-chairs the bi-lateral Truth 
and Friendship Commission, who has reportedly come on board to 
manage the campaign.  In his remarks Ramos-Horta presented 
himself as a national unity candidate, emphasizing his 
international standing and dedication to "addressing the poverty 
of the people".  Banners and other remarks emphasized his Nobel 
Peace Prize laureate status and long association with the 
resistance. 
 
3. (SBU) The Laga setting for this announcement was of note as 
it is located in the heart of the ruling Fretilin party's 
traditional base, as well as being a stronghold of resistance 
veterans, a key constituency.  However, it may also reflect his 
weakness in that UNDERTIM is the only significant opposition 
party that has come out in his support.  Even UNDERTIM's support 
did not appear to be wholehearted.  Cristiano da Costa, the 
party's Secretary General, declined to attend, reportedly 
because Ramos-Horta had not agreed to his request for 
consultations with the party to precede the public roll out. 
Questions have also been raised regarding Fretilin Mudansa's 
support for the candidacy.  Foreign Minister and Mudansa's 
candidate for Secretary General Jose Luis Guterres has expressed 
support Ramos-Horta, but some Embassy contacts have reported 
divisions in Mudansa over this issue. 
 
4. (SBU) Ramos-Horta is widely known to be President Xanana 
Gusmao's candidate.  Although no representatives of the 
President, or of his soon-to-be-registered new party, were 
evident on Sunday there is no doubt that Gusmao's support is the 
single most important thing that Ramos-Horta has going for him. 
Despite the fact that Gusmao's image has taken a beating during 
the crisis of the last year, he remains the single most popular 
figure in East Timor and there is broad consensus that he would 
win a second term if he were running, albeit without the same 
margin as in 2002.  However, it is not clear how much of 
Gusmao's popularity can be transferred to electoral success for 
his chosen successor.  Despite his international profile, 
Ramos-Horta has never enjoyed national renown on par with 
Gusmao's.  Ramos-Horta also appears to be courting the support 
of the Catholic Church (he had dinner with the Bishop of Baucau 
the night before), although it is not yet clear if he has 
garnered it. 
 
5. (SBU) Ramos-Horta's candidacy is also notable for who is not 
on board.  There had been discussion of Fretilin putting him 
 
DILI 00000066  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
forward as their candidate.  Despite his ties to Gusmao, 
Ramos-Horta has always emphasized that he leads a Fretilin 
government, has frequently consulted with former Prime Minister 
and Fretilin Secretary General Mari Alkatiri, and often referred 
to his roots as one of the founders of Fretilin.  Ultimately, 
his ongoing closeness to Gusmao as well as a strong inclination 
on the part of Fretilin leadership to choose a candidate from 
the inner circle seem to have won out instead.  On February 21, 
Fretilin announced that they would nominate party president 
Francisco "Lu'olo" Guterres.  Lu'olo can argue that he spent the 
entire Indonesian occupation in East Timor, primarily as a 
resistance fighter.  But in reality he is not viewed as a strong 
candidate individually.  Nonetheless, the Fretilin party 
structure and resources, surpassing any other party by far, as 
well as the historical and emotional appeal is still has, may be 
enough to secure electoral success. 
 
6. (SBU) Arguably more important than the Fretilin rejection is 
the fact that the three opposition parties with the largest 
representation in Parliament have all refused to support 
Ramos-Horta's candidacy and nominated their own candidates. 
(These include:  the Democratic Party - PD, the Social 
Democratic Party - PSD, and the Timorese Social Democrat 
Association - ASDT.)  Leaders of all three note that they were 
considering supporting Ramos-Horta, but changed their minds 
following his early February testimony at the trial of former 
Interior Minister, Rogerio Lobato, which they regarded as 
essentially defending both Lobato and Alkatiri, both of whom 
have been accused of illegal weapons distribution.  It should be 
noted that their enthusiasm for Ramos-Horta was already limited 
prior to the testimony, as much of the opposition have come to 
regard Ramos-Horta as a weak Prime Minister who allowed Fretilin 
and former Prime Minister Alkatiri to control him.  In addition, 
PD, the largest opposition party, is particularly upset with 
Gusmao for starting a new party, the soon to be registered 
National Council of Timorese Restoration - CNRT.  In response to 
a mid-Feb meeting where Gusmao asked for PD support of 
Ramos-Horta, one PD leader reportedly described him as "trying 
to sell a rotten fish." 
 
7. (SBU) So instead, each is fielding own candidate.  PD has 
nominated party president Fernando "Lasama" Araujo; PSD has 
nominated Member of Parliament Lucia Lobato; and ASDT has 
nominated its president, Xavier do Amaral.  Despite the parties' 
professed confidence in their candidates, none are likely to 
emerge as front runners.  Of the three, Lasama has the greatest 
chance of significant electoral gains due to the relative 
strength of his party and his roots as a leader of the student 
resistance organization Renetil.  However, outside of his party 
he has a limited profile and is not widely regarded as a 
charismatic figure.  Following the signing last week of a new 
coalition agreement among the three parties, whose main 
provisions apply to post-parliamentary election arrangements, 
they all note that if any coalition member candidate makes it to 
a second round of presidential elections, all three will support 
that person.  None of them are ready to consider what they will 
do if Ramos-Horta goes to the second round against Lu'olo. 
 
8. (SBU) Overall, Ramos-Horta stands as one of the stronger in a 
field of candidates with no clear front runner and a splintered 
opposition.  In addition to the three opposition candidates 
noted above, several other candidates have also emerged, such as 
Kota's Manuel Tilman and UDT's Joao Carrascalao.  They are 
generally not regarded as serious candidates, but may still 
further split the vote.  Lu'olo and Ramos-Horta may be the 
strongest competitors, but neither appears to have the broad 
national appeal to win outright.  The most likely scenario 
therefore is that no candidate will obtain the 50 percent plus 
one majority on the first round, leading to a second round 
standoff between these two.  The question would then be whether 
Fretilin's national party structure or President Gusmao's 
national appeal will be the force to win out for their chosen 
candidates. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment: Although East Timor's presidential candidates 
run as individuals, not as party leaders, all candidates in this 
election have strong party affiliation or backing. The partisan 
 
DILI 00000066  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
nature of this election contrasts greatly with the election five 
years ago in which Gusmao won with over 80 percent of the votes. 
 There is a broad consensus that in addition to choosing an 
individual head of state it will essentially be an exercise to 
determine the relative strength of the various parties.  As 
such, the presidential election will dramatically set the stage 
and possibly even determine the outcome of the parliamentary 
elections to follow.  As one source put it, "whoever wins the 
presidency wins the parliament."  End comment. 
HARSHA