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Viewing cable 07BAGHDAD360, UK DEFENSE SECRETARY SAYS HMG WILL DRAWDOWN, AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BAGHDAD360 2007-02-03 13:48 2011-06-05 03:00 SECRET Embassy Baghdad
Appears in these articles:
http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/wikileaks/Wikleaks-US-anger-at-Gordon.6779840.jp
http://news.scotsman.com/iraq/Wikileaks-Gordon-Brown-39wanted-to.6779847.jp
http://news.scotsman.com/iraq/Wikileaks-Iraqi-premier-feared-British.6779849.jp
http://news.scotsman.com/iraq/Wikileaks-Tories-asked-to-oppose.6779848.jp
http://news.scotsman.com/opinion/Leader-Historical-insight.6779771.jp
VZCZCXRO7181
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0360/01 0341348
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031348Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9393
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000360 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017 
TAGS: PINS PNAT PINR PREL MOPS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: UK DEFENSE SECRETARY SAYS HMG WILL DRAWDOWN, AND 
IRAN IS A MENACE 

REF: A. BAGHDAD 0328 
B. BAGHDAD 0257 
C. BAGHDAD 0229 

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1. (S) SUMMARY: On January 29, UK Secretary of State for 
Defense, Des Browne told the Ambassador that HMG remains 
committed to the mission in Iraq, but would need to drawdown 
its force strength in the coming months. He promised that 
London would coordinate this downsizing with us. The 
Ambassador emphasized the importance of British forces 
maintaining a strong presence in central Basra. Browne 
expressed concern with Iranian interference in Iraq, agreeing 
that the time was right to ratchet up the pressure on Tehran. 
At the same time, he supported a dialogue with Iran, if 
Tehran undertook some confidence building steps first. END 
SUMMARY. 

UK to Drawdown Forces 
--------------------- 

2. (S) On January 29, UK Secretary of State for Defense Des 
Browne told the Ambassador that HMG is planning to withdraw a 
significant number of its troops in the coming months. 
Browne explained the entire UK force is no larger than the US 
Marine Corps and that it is stressed by service in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. It can no longer sustain the current tempo. 
Furthermore, he said, the UK is increasing its force size in 
Afghanistan because they believe there is a real opportunity 
to defeat the Taliban and stabilize the south in the next 
several months. He said that the increase in Afghanistan 
would need to be counterbalanced by a reduction of troops in 
Iraq. Browne added that the growing dissatisfaction with the 
war among the British population was also putting pressure on 
the government to drawdown. 

3. (S) Browne said the MND-SE commander would coordinate 
closely with the Coalition to ensure the transition goes 
smoothly and Basra remains stable. He assured the Ambassador 
that the UK would maintain its presence in Basra, but noted 
that London had yet to finalize its plan. The Ambassador 
said Washington was eager to receive the details of the plan, 
noting that the change will affect the U.S. presence in the 
area. The Ambassador said he needed to consider the British 
plans as we determine how best to protect U.S. civilians 
working in the Basra Palace. 

4. (S) Browne said the US should not focus on the British 
reduction in terms of troop numbers. While the downsizing 
would result in the closure of forward operating bases and 
other facilities around Basra, Browne argued that remaining 
British forces would still conduct critical missions in the 
center of Basra, such as training and supporting the ISF and 
having quick reaction forces stationed for emergencies. The 
Ambassador stressed the importance of the UK maintaining a 
solid presence in the center of Basra, noting that the 
Coalition does not want the enemy to think we have given up. 
He said that Prime Minister Maliki also wants to have the UK 
remain in Basra, the second most important city in Iraq. 
Browne committed to take this message back to London. 

Near Term Steps to Change Iranian Behavior 
------------------------------------------ 

5. (S) Browne told the Ambassador that HMG is gravely 
concerned with malign Iranian-sponsored activities in Iraq, 
adding that steps must be taken to disrupt and diminish them. 
He said Iran was targeting UK soldiers, providing training 
to militias, and smuggling weapons into Iraq. The Ambassador 
agreed, outlining his ideas for a near term way forward to 
change Iranian behavior. 

6. (S) When the Ambassador said that MNF-I spokesman Major 
General Caldwell intended to hold a press conference offering 
evidence of Iranian activity in Iraq, Browne suggested 
bolstering the presentation's effect by simultaneously 
mounting an I/O campaign. He said this could be done by 
leaking some of President Talabani's conversations in Tehran 
and Syria with Iranian officials (Reftel C). For example, 
IRGC's Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimeni reportedly told 
Talabani that Tehran supports the killing of British forces. 
Browne also said we could leak reports that Tehran is working 
with Sadr to provide JAM leaders with safe havens in Iran. 

7. (S) The Ambassador said that he is working with Iraqi 
Foreign Minister Zebari to ensure Iranian diplomats 
accredited to Iraq are actually diplomats (Reftel B). Zebari 
recently provided the Embassy with a list of Iranian 

BAGHDAD 00000360 002 OF 002 


diplomats serving in Iran and has committed to removing 
anyone identified as a member of Pastran, Quds Force, or 
MOIS. Those proven to be involved in illegal activities will 
also be removed. The Ambassador said that he had warned 
Zebari that Iraqi accreditation of Quds Force personnel would 
significantly increase the risks of conflict between Vienna 
Convention and U.S. force protection responsibilities. 

8. (S) The Ambassador said he was exploring with Washington 
how to respond to Soleimani's message brought by Talabani. 
Browne said London could serve as a messenger to Iran, if 
needed. He recommended that we precondition any talks, 
asking Iran to take a few concrete steps to demonstrate it is 
serious about changing its activities in Iraq. Browne 
suggested demanding that the Iranian Government: publicly 
state it will stop targeting/attacking Coalition forces; 
assist the Coalition in identifying nefarious actors; and 
provide assistance to the GOI for development along the Shatt 
al Arab waterway. Browne said the waterway commitment would 
be extremely useful, noting that reconstruction of the ports 
is virtually impossible at this time because it would require 
Iraqi "transgression" into Iranian waters. 

The Right Time to Pressure Iran 
------------------------------- 

9. (S) Browne agreed with the Ambassador's assessment that 
the timing is right to increase the pressure on Iranian EFP 
networks. Browne said Iran is increasingly on the defense, 
noting the recent uptake in domestic and international 
condemnation of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's strident, 
belligerent messages; the increased criticism by regional 
players of Iran's actions that fuel sectarian violence; and 
the US's recent successful military operations against 
Iranians linked to EFP networks. 

10. (S) Browne asked whether the Ambassador was concerned 
this added pressure might push Iran to escalate its 
activities in Iraq. While acknowledging that we cannot 
precisely calibrate the Iranian reaction to our operations, 
the Ambassador argued that doing nothing seemed more risky. 
Browne agreed, but cautioned that Iran is an unpredictable 
and inconsistent actor. The Ambassador concurred, but said 
that Iran seemed to want to avoid a direct military 
engagement with the US. 
KHALILZAD