Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07ANKARA316, Scenesetter for the Visit of CODEL Dicks to Turkey

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07ANKARA316.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ANKARA316 2007-02-14 14:44 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
null
Tim W Hayes  02/15/2007 03:26:42 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Tim W Hayes

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
UNCLAS    SENSITIVE     ANKARA 00316

SIPDIS
CX:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   CONS DAO TSR PMA ECON DCM AMB RAO FCS PA MGT

DISSEMINATION: POL /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: DCM:NMCELDOWNEY
DRAFTED: POL:DBURGER/PMA:MNAR
CLEARED: POL:JGW

VZCZCAYI338
OO RUEHC RUCNRAQ
DE RUEHAK #0316/01 0451444
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141444Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0955
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000316 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER ETRD PGOV TU IZ IR
SUBJECT: Scenesetter for the Visit of CODEL Dicks to Turkey 
 
(U) Sensitive but unclassified - please protect accordingly. 
 
1. Summary: Your visit comes at a critical period in the U.S.-Turkey 
bilateral relationship as the government grapples with continued PKK 
terrorist attacks from northern Iraq, fears that Iraq's instability 
will spread beyond its borders, the aftermath of the Dink murder, a 
potential U.S. congressional resolution on Armenian genocide, and 
how to find a balance between international and domestic priorities 
on Iran.  All this comes against the backdrop of an important 
election year here in Turkey.  Turks in and out of government 
predict that a genocide resolution will severely damage our 
bilateral relations and feed the flames of nationalist sentiment on 
the eve of elections.  End summary. 
 
Armenian Genocide Resolution 
---------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Contacts from across the political spectrum in Turkey warn 
us that the passage of an Armenian Genocide Resolution (AGR) in 
either house of Congress will provoke a harshly negative public 
reaction here, one that will be magnified in this election year. 
(Parliament elects a new President in May, and parliamentary 
elections will be held by November.)  That any AGR will be 
non-binding and have no concrete effect on official U.S. policy 
toward Turkey will not matter.  In the context of already strong 
public disapproval of U.S. policies in Iraq, Turkish officials will 
have to confront an outpouring of public anger at the U.S. should an 
AGR pass. 
 
3. (SBU) The French experience may be illustrative for us. 
Following the French Assembly vote in favor of a law criminalizing 
denial of the Armenian Genocide in October 2006, the Turkish 
military announced the suspension of bilateral military relations 
with France, and protestors pelted the French embassy with rocks and 
eggs and hampered its operations for several weeks. 
 
4. (SBU) Most contacts warn us, however, that the reaction to an 
American genocide resolution will be far worse.  Differences over 
Iraq aside, they tell us that the U.S.-Turkey relationship runs much 
deeper than Turkey-France ties, and that they expected negative 
messages from France which has raised barriers throughout Turkey's 
EU accession process.  They anticipate that the Turkish people will 
react much more negatively and spontaneously to a resolution from 
the United States, forcing them to respond, especially in the 
current atmosphere of heightened nationalism.  It is possible that 
significant Turkish contributions to our key foreign policy agenda 
items could be at risk, such as our air supply routes to Iraq, use 
of Incirlik Air Base for cargo hub and air refueling operations in 
support of coalition efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well 
the Turkey-Iraq border crossing at Habur for trucking fuel to 
coalition forces in Iraq and as a future port to retrograde US 
military equipment out of Iraq.  Over half of US air cargo and 25% 
of fuel for Coalition troops in Iraq transits Turkey. 
 
PKK 
--- 
 
5. (SBU) The Kurdish terrorist organization PKK's safe-haven in 
northern Iraq is a continual irritant in U.S.-Turkey relations. 
Turkey has insisted since Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced in 2003 
that the Iraqi government and/or the U.S. must take steps to address 
this terrorist organization's freedom of movement in Iraq. 
 
6. (SBU) PKK terrorist attacks against Turkey from strongholds in 
northern Iraq killed 600 Turkish civilians and military in 2006 
alone.  A surge in PKK attacks last summer prompted the Turkish 
government to threaten a cross-border operation (CBO) into Iraq.  To 
forestall this and to seek concrete actions to reduce PKK violence, 
the U.S. appointed Gen. (r) Joseph Ralston as Special Envoy for 
Countering PKK Terrorism in August 2006.  The Turkish and Iraqi 
governments in turn named counterparts for Ralston: State Minister 
al-Waili for the GOI, and Gen. (r) Edip Baser for the GOT.  Ralston 
has conducted numerous meetings with Iraqi and Turkish officials, 
most recently in late January. 
 
7. (SBU) Although the Ralston initiative has gained us some time to 
address this problem, Turkey's leaders remain frustrated by the 
perceived lack of concrete results.  With continued clashes between 
the Turkish military and the PKK throughout the winter and an 
expected increase in PKK attacks against military and civilian 
targets once the snows melt in the spring, the government and 
military will find themselves under increasing pressure to take 
unilateral action against PKK strongholds in northern Iraq. 
 
Iraq and Kirkuk 
--------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Turkey is concerned about growing instability in Iraq, 
increasing Iranian influence in the region, and the potential for 
the country to splinter along sectarian and/or ethnic lines.  Turks 
worry that the U.S. is unable to control the violence in Baghdad, or 
to moderate Iraqi Kurdistan's ambitions to expand its territory, 
including to Kirkuk.  The prospect of a referendum this year on the 
future status of Kirkuk exacerbates Turkish fears that a Kurdish 
annexation of the oil-rich province will lead to massive 
inter-communal violence and ultimately the dissolution of the 
country.  Turkey also fears that KRG control of Kirkuk will lead to 
the creation of an independent Kurdish state, which is perceived as 
an existential threat to Turkey. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
9. (SBU) Turkey has cultivated increasing economic ties with Iraq, 
and PM Erdogan has made four official visits to Tehran. 
Approximately 375,000 trucks and 90 percent of eastbound Turkish 
Airline flights cross Iranian territory annually on the way to 
Central Asia.  More than a million Iranian tourists visit Turkey 
visa-free each year.  And Tehran has attempted to put space between 
Washington and Ankara by cooperating with Turkey on the PKK. 
 
10. (SBU) Despite this cooperation, Turkey remains distrustful of 
Iran's regional intentions and nuclear ambitions.  Seeing growing 
Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian 
Territories, Turkish officials and intellectuals have begun to speak 
with concern of an Iranian-controlled Shia "arc of influence" from 
Turkmenistan to the Mediterranean.  Turkey walks a cautious line on 
the Iranian nuclear issue.  The GOT will follow UNSC resolutions, 
but will not get out in front of the international community on this 
matter. 
 
WILSON