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Viewing cable 07ADDISABABA500, ETHIOPIA: INTER-PARTY TALKS ON ELECTORAL LAWS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ADDISABABA500 2007-02-21 12:02 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO3016
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #0500/01 0521202
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211202Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4672
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000500 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: INTER-PARTY TALKS ON ELECTORAL LAWS 
CONCLUDE WITH PARTIAL AGREEMENT 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 02032 
     B. ADDIS ABABA 02123 
     C. ADDIS ABABA 03120 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  In a potentially significant concession, 
the ruling EPRDF has agreed to accept nominations from 
opposition parties for the National Electoral Board, and to 
prepare a consensus list of candidates from whom the Prime 
Minister will select the new board.  There was no agreement, 
however, on the number of nominees the PM will have to choose 
from, and opposition leaders remain concerned that the GOE 
will still find a way to manipulate the selection process. 
Nonetheless, there is reason to hope that the new board, as 
well as other measures to restructure and modernize the NEB 
Secretariat, will significantly strengthen Ethiopia's 
 
SIPDIS 
electoral process.  Party representatives also agreed that 
the local elections should be postponed from April until at 
least December in order to provide them enough time to 
recruit and organize candidates, as well as giving the NEB 
time to adopt reforms and complete preparations.  These next 
elections will be critical in determining whether Ethiopia 
can successfully address the failures of the disputed 2005 
election and rebuild public confidence in the democratic 
process.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
TWO ISSUES DOWN, TWO TO GO IN INTER-PARTY TALKS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
2. (SBU) On February 7, the ruling EPRDF and representatives 
of all major opposition parties concluded their talks on 
reform to the electoral law and the National Elections Board 
(NEB).  Opposition parties were led in the talks by Lidetu 
Ayalew, United Ethiopian Democratic Party ) Medhin 
(UEDP-Medhin); Dr. Merera Gudina and Beyene Petros, United 
Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF); Temesgen Zewdie and Ayele 
Chamisso, from competing factions of the Coalition for Unity 
and Democracy Party (CUDP); and Bulcha Demeksa, Oromo Federal 
Democratic Movement (OFDM).  These talks were part of a 
broader inter-party dialogue designed to address the 
parliamentary procedural reforms, which was completed in July 
2006 (reftel A), electoral reform, political party financing 
and the press law and overall media framework. 
 
3. (SBU) After six weeks of talks, party leaders held a joint 
press conference to announce progress made and reforms agreed 
to by all parties. The press statement outlined success on 
three items: 1) adoption of the NEB strategic plan proposed 
by international consultants; 2) postponement of the local 
elections; and 3) amendments to the electoral law. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
STRATEGIC PLAN AND ELECTION POSTPONEMENT HAVE CONSENSUS 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
4. (SBU) The strategic plan reviewed and adopted during the 
talks had been developed by British expert Hannah Roberts, 
who was contracted by donor countries to identify key areas 
for restructuring and reform within the NEB (reftel B).  This 
plan focused on technical issues, such as expansion of the 
Secretariat function, bolstering NEB capacity outside of 
 
SIPDIS 
Addis Ababa, and enhancement of IT capabilities. As explained 
to Ambassador, P/E Counselor and Poloff in a series of 
meetings with opposition leaders, nearly all parts of the 
strategic plan were eventually agreed upon, with some 
reservations, particularly by Beyene Petros.  His primary 
concern was that the final agreement did not establish NEB 
offices down to the zonal (county) level.  Instead, the GoE 
agreed only on the creation of one new permanent office in 
each region.  Beyene claims that this arrangement will mean 
continued reliance on temporary staff hired at the local 
level during election periods.  To address this, he suggested 
that permanent NEB representation be established at the 
woreda (of which there are roughly 630) level.  Additionally, 
Beyene and other leaders voiced concern about independent 
oversight of the NEB,s "hiring committee," fearing that 
hiring would be open to politization.  (COMMENT: An 
independent Election Board, when established, should maintain 
oversight to ensure that hiring is done based on 
qualifications, thereby reducing these concerns. END COMMENT) 
 
5. (SBU) The second significant agreement reached was the 
postponement of local elections.  It was agreed that they be 
rescheduled from April 2007 (reftel C) to the December 2007 
) February 2008 time period.  All opposition parties agreed 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000500  002 OF 003 
 
 
that this was preferable in order to give them time to 
organize candidates, also saying that they believe their 
constituencies would understand this decision. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
SELECTION OF NEW BOARD PROVES MORE DIFFICULT 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Party representatives spent much time haggling over 
how to appoint new members to the NEB.  According to the 
constitution, the PM is charged with selecting 7 nominees, 
subject to approval by Parliament, to serve a five-year term. 
 Opposition parties had little say in the past in selecting 
Board Members and clamored unsuccessfully for a new NEB board 
prior to the disputed 2005 elections.  Irregularities and 
tabulation delays in those elections fueled political 
violence and underscored the need to strengthen the NEB's 
capacity and credibility. 
 
7. (SBU) Though some details remain to be clarified, party 
negotiators did reach important agreements on the board 
nomination process.  First, the number of board members 
increased from 7 to 9.  A number of minimum qualifications 
were established that each nominee must possess (political 
independence, higher education, etc.) and, importantly, all 
those eventually passed to the PM for consideration must have 
approval from every party.  Nominees for board members from 
all parties will be submitted by the end of February, at 
which time parties will reconvene to discuss all the nominees 
submitted.  The PM will eventually select 9 candidates from 
among these nominees submitted by the inter-party group.  As 
all necessary vetting will have been done prior to submission 
to Parliament, this process should ensure a mutually 
acceptable board.  In addition to this important progress, a 
number of more minor technical amendments were also made to 
the electoral law that seek to address disputed issues in the 
previous election (e.g. enhanced immunities granted to 
candidates in order to provide political space for 
campaigning). 
 
8. (SBU) The important issue still outstanding is the process 
by which the nominees for the NEB will be vetted in the 
multi-party meetings prior to submission to the PM.  Beyene 
Petros had suggested a method whereby each representative 
would assign a score to a particular candidate and the 
candidates with the highest scores would be submitted to the 
PM.  However, this was rejected by the EPRDF, which proposed 
a qualitative, rather than a quantitative method of 
evaluating candidates, whereby the merits of each person is 
discussed and each representative is free to use his veto 
power.  Another issue not resolved was that of the total 
number of candidates to be submitted to the PM.  Temesgen 
Zewdie suggested that the best 12 should be put forward for 
consideration.  Bulcha Demeksa, following the advice of 
Pol/Econ Counselor, proposed 18 (equaling twice the number 
eventually chosen).  In the end, the EPRDF insisted that the 
list of nominees vetted by the representatives and sent to 
the PM for consideration not be limited in number. 
Opposition parties were concerned that they will find it 
difficult to properly vet large numbers of candidates since 
their resources are limited. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
NO GUARANTEE OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION 
----------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Opposition parties also sought guarantees from the 
GoE that international observers would be allowed to observe 
the upcoming local elections.  Though any party participating 
in a precinct has the right to their own local observer, 
opposition representatives felt that international 
participation will be essential in ensuring a free and fair 
election.  The ruling party refused to guarantee access at 
this point to international observers, but indicated that if 
international organizations apply to send observers, the GoE 
will consider this on a case by case basis.  Further, the GoE 
indicated that observation by local NGOs will be permitted, 
so long as those organizations will have not also been 
involved in voter education prior to the election. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
COMMENT: GOE APPEARS TO MAKE MAJOR CONCESSION ON NEB 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
10. (SBU) The EPRDF has made a major concession in giving 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000500  003 OF 003 
 
 
every opposition party effective veto power over NEB 
nominees.  This represents a significant shift from the 
ruling party's refusal to discuss the Board with opposition 
leaders prior to the November 2005 political violence.  Party 
leaders remain suspicious that the EPRDF will be able to 
manipulate the selection process; it should be clearer within 
the next two months to what extent the GOE is operating in 
good faith.  It is unfortunate that talks fell short of a 
full consensus, as did similar negotiations in 2006 on reform 
of parliamentary rules of procedure, but most opposition 
leaders continue to view engagement with the GOE on political 
reform as worthwhile.  Nevertheless, the GoE has now 
fulfilled its promise in engaging with opposition parties on 
two of the major issues identified for discussion following 
the May 2005 Parliamentary elections.  Despite maintaining a 
more than two-thirds majority in Parliament, the ruling EPRDF 
has made a significant effort to work with other parties in 
furthering democratic reform.  In a discussion with 
opposition leaders on February 20, there was no consensus on 
names to put forward for the board.  Opposition leaders 
argued over submission of a long or a short list, and even 
suggested quotas to ensure that the different opposition 
groups are represented on the board. 
 
11. (SBU) Agreement on the donor-funded NEB restructuring and 
capacity-building plan may be just as important as 
discussions on the NEB board.  The strategic plan developed 
by Hannah Roberts, once implemented, will dramatically 
enhance the NEB's capacity to prepare for and hold elections, 
as well as to deal with probable post-election complaints. 
Once officially endorsed by Parliament, the donor community 
can go forward with plans to help fund implementation of the 
NEB strategic plan.  Postponement of the upcoming the local 
elections that had been scheduled for April will give both 
opposition parties and the NEB itself much needed time to 
prepare for these elections.  These next elections will be 
critical in determining whether Ethiopia can successfully 
address the failures of the disputed 2005 election, and 
rebuild public confidence in the democratic process. 
YAMAMOTO