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Viewing cable 07TOKYO30, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 01/05/07
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 07TOKYO30 | 2007-01-05 08:09 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO0238
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0030/01 0050809
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 050809Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9581
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 8940
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5411
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1501
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2959
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 000030
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WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
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CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 01/05/07
INDEX:
(1) Editorial: Why is the DPJ avoiding contests?
(2) Interview with DPJ Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama about the
election year: Unity of the party would unravel if the party is
defeated
(3) Japan, US to review Korean Peninsula contingency concept plan;
Shift from armchair theory to effectiveness
(4) The light and darkness of Japan-US alliance unification (Part 1)
-- Front line of Japan's defense: Eyes of Commander of US Forces
Japan, Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright are cast on North Korea
(5) With application of Anti-monopoly Law in mind, FTC investigates
dozens of companies, including leading general construction
contractors, over low-priced bidding
(6) Opinion column -- Disputed Northern Territories: Compromise
proposal to Russia will simply have an opposite effect
ARTICLES:
(1) Editorial: Why is the DPJ avoiding contests?
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full)
January 5, 2006
This year is the year of elections with unified local elections
taking place in the spring, followed by the Upper House election in
the summer. And yet the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto)
somehow lacks visibility right from the very start of such a year.
Gubernatorial elections for Yamanashi, Ehime and Miyazaki
Prefectures were officially announced yesterday, but the DPJ failed
to field its own candidate in any of the three prefectures.
The party abode by its major principle of not fielding joint
candidates with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as advocated by
party head Ozawa. Its official explanation may be that it was unable
to find appropriate candidates.
However, given situations in various prefectures, it is questionable
to what extent the DPJ can proudly say that it has stuck to its
policy of prohibiting the fielding of joint candidates.
In Ehime Prefecture, the LDP, the New Komeito and the Social
Democratic Party support the incumbent governor. The DPJ-affiliated
group in the prefectural assembly also supports the same candidate.
Failure to field an opposing candidate is in essence tantamount to
joining an all-ruling party camp, excluding the Japanese Communist
Party. In Yamanashi Prefecture, while the LDP has split into two
camps, the DPJ's prefectural chapter has endorsed the incumbent
independently of the party headquarters.
In Miyazaki Prefecture, too, the DPJ's local chapter is supporting a
new candidate also recommended by some members of the LDP.
Wakayama Prefecture held a gubernatorial election late last year to
make a clean start from a bid-rigging scandal similar to the one
occurred in Miyazaki Prefecture. However, failing to field its own
candidate, the DPJ lost the election by default.
TOKYO 00000030 002 OF 010
The Abe Cabinet is having a hard time with its support ratings
plummeting over the reinstatement of postal rebels, followed by the
resignations of the chair of the government's Tax Research
Commission and the state minister for administrative reform. What is
happening now can be taken as if the DPJ, the no. 1 opposition
party, is helping out the Abe cabinet by fielding joint candidates
or losing an election by default.
Some DPJ members have voiced their real opinions, including that it
would be disgraceful if they forced themselves to field candidates
and their candidates were defeated and that they want to remain as a
ruling party in prefectural governments, by fielding candidates
jointly with the LDP, if possible.
In the Fukushima gubernatorial election last November a candidate
who ran on the DPJ's ticket for the first time defeated a candidate
officially endorsed by the LDP and the New Komeito. Though the DPJ
was defeated in the Okinawa gubernatorial election, it fought the
election with a candidate jointly endorsed by opposition parties.
Such results do not appear to be valid in districts where the DPJ's
footing is weak.
However, since the DPJ proclaims that it will aim at taking the
reins of government, emerging from a permanent opposition, it should
offer another option different from that offered by the LDP in each
election. If it cannot do that, it should not be able to solidify
its footing. Its stance of avoiding confrontation in gubernatorial
elections is not challenging at all.
The DPJ has placed a ban on fielding joint candidates with the LDP.
So far so good. However, it appears that Ozawa is recently devoting
much of his attention to finding candidates for the Upper House
election and snatching block votes from the LDP.
We want Ozawa to reconfirm the reasons why fielding joint candidates
is not good for elections for heads of local governments. The party
convention to be held in the middle of this month should provide the
best opportunity for that.
The Tokyo gubernatorial election to be held in April is noteworthy
of attention as a touchstone.
For the first time, the LDP intends to support Shintaro Ishihara,
who will aim for a third term. How is the DPJ going to deal with
issues confronting the Ishihara administration, including his
luxurious overseas trips and his spending of public money for his
fourth son? If the DPJ cannot wage a contest on such an occasion, it
will lose its reason for existing.
(2) Interview with DPJ Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama about the
election year: Unity of the party would unravel if the party is
defeated
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full)
January 5, 2007
-- What do you think the Upper House election implies for your
party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto)?
Hatoyama: "It is a survival game. I've braced myself for the
election, having this acute awareness that losing this game would
mean the party might cease to exist. By putting the toughest person
TOKYO 00000030 003 OF 010
conceivable in the top post, our party has now been able to bring
unity of the party for the first time. Our minimum goal is to force
the ruling parties to lose their majority, even by a margin of one
seat.
"In order to bring about a dissolution of the Lower House for a snap
general election, I think, there is no choice but to win the Upper
House election. If we fail, our party will lose its unity. This
election in this sense will be a major political showdown."
-- In order to force the ruling bloc to lose its majority, the
opposition parties need to grab a total of at least 18 seats, in
addition to the seats they have before the election.
"If we have a similar battle as we had in the previous Upper House
election in 2004, it will be sufficient for our party-authorized
candidates to win nine seats in the 29 single-seat constituencies,
but our party President Ichiro Ozawa has set the goal of winning 15
seats."
-- The single-seat constituencies are located mainly in rural areas
where the Minshuto is less popular.
"Prime Minister Shinzo Abe intends to inherit former Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi's line of forsaking the rural areas. Our party,
however, attaches importance to agriculture, forestry, and
fisheries, and we have suggested introducing an individual
income-security system for them. Ruling Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) Secretary General Nakagawa criticizes that system as
pork-barrel politics. Supposedly, he fears our party's approach."
-- In proportional representation blocs, the Minshuto plans to put
up candidates chosen from organizations that previously supported
the LDP.
"This will have an impact on the LDP. It would make voters feel
relieved that our party's policy is not necessarily wide apart from
the LDP's. I think it important to offer an option to those who are
unsatisfied with the current state of the LDP, which appears to be
on the verge of being swallowed by the junior ruling coalition
partner New Komeito."
-- Do you have any concern that the policy differences between your
party and the ruling parties will become blurred?
"That's is an important point. President Ozawa has suggested working
together with other opposition parties, even the Japanese Communist
Party (JCP), but the view shared by a number of junior lawmakers in
our party is that the Social Democratic Party (SDP) will be a
borderline party the Minshuto can get along with. Given that, it's
impossible to get along with the JCP. This point must be kept in
mind; otherwise a serious mistake will be made. I take it
seriously.
"Our president emphasizes a bright side of joining hands (with the
SDP and the JCP), but we must properly assess a negative effect of
doing so in order to avoid trouble. I support offering as much
cooperation as possible to the SDP and the People's New Party, but
it's no good if our party is seen as easily making concessions in
policy debates."
-- It appears how you will face the ruling bloc in the ordinary Diet
session will significantly affect the election.
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"We will seek to examine the problem involving former State Minister
in Charge of Administrative Reform Genichiro Sata, who resigned from
his post just recently, even though the Diet is in recess. This
problem will be high on agenda even in the ordinary Diet session. We
will pursue the prime minister's responsibility for his appointment,
as well as his accountability. If that is not sufficient, we will
seek to summon someone as a sworn witness.
"Our focus in policy debate will be on how to remove social
disparities. We will come up with counterproposals for, for
instance, labor legislation and reform of the pension programs."
-- Do you think there is any possibility that double elections (for
both the houses of the Diet) will occur?
"Such a possibility is slim, though our party by July will determine
all candidates to run in the next Lower House election. The prime
minister cannot go that far."
(3) Japan, US to review Korean Peninsula contingency concept plan;
Shift from armchair theory to effectiveness
YOMIURI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly)
January 5, 2007
Tokyo and Washington have begun drawing up a specific plan for
evacuating Japanese and American civilians from South Korea in time
of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. Along with a revision of
Concept Plan 5055, the two countries' effort to map out effective
plans to deal with a contingency on the peninsula has now been set
in motion. Concept Plan 5055 has been regarded as a plan filled with
loopholes due to the lack of involvement of relevant government
agencies. There is a possibility, however, that Japan-US talks and
coordination with concerned government agencies and local
governments will run into difficulties.
Progress
On Dec. 4, 2006, senior defense officials from Japan and the United
States met in Tokyo. In the session, the Defense Agency reported:
"Concerned ministries and agencies held a meeting in late November
at the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) for revising
Concept Plan 5055." This elicited praise from US Deputy Defense
Under Secretary Richard Lawless who said: "That's great progress. We
would like to see further progress in our meeting next year."
Plan 5055, which was drawn up by the Defense Agency Joint Staff
Council (currently the Joint Staff Office) and US Forces Japan, is
linked to US-ROK Joint Operational Plan 5027 envisioning the North's
advance to the South and Plan 5029 envisaging a collapse and
destabilization of North Korea by a coup d'etat or other factors.
As Japan's assistance to the US, Plan 5055 lists, among other items,
allowing US aircraft and vessels transporting supplies to the Korean
Peninsula to use private airports and seaports in Japan and
providing medical treatment to wounded US servicemen.
But the plan is impractical because key players, such as the Land
and Transport Ministry and the Health and Welfare Ministry, were not
involved in the process of producing it. The plan, which is devoid
of specificity about which airports and seaports to use and the
types and quantities of supplies to be transported, is nothing more
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than a pipe dream.
Kickoff
A Japan-US director general-level meeting held in September 2006
reached an agreement to finish revising the plan in about a year. In
the wake of North Korea's missile launches in July, the two
countries decided to speedily finish up work that used to take two
years, according to a government source. The plan to revise 5055
gathered further momentum with North Korea's nuclear test in
October.
Allowing the US military to use airports and seaports in Japan on a
priority basis is a key factor in revising the plan. "In the event
of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, Japan would have to serve
as a supply base for the US military from a geopolitical
perspective," a Foreign Ministry official explained.
In principle, fighters and bombers would use US military bases in
Japan and Self-Defense Force bases, and US-chartered civilian planes
and vessels for transporting supplies would use commercial airports
and seaports.
Late last year, the government received a US list of some 30
specific airports and seaports in Japan for use by the US military,
while citing the need to confirm their unloading, refueling, and
storing capability, plus firefighting and guard systems and parking
spaces.
Based on the introduction of a missile defense (MD) system in Japan
and the US, a revised plan would specify ways to deal with a
"compound contingency" involving a missile attack on Japan and a
terrorist attack by North Korean agents in the country.
Tough challenge
The work's toughest challenge would be making arrangements with the
US, concerned government offices, and local governments.
Putting high priority on facilities, the US is hoping to use major
Japanese airports, such as Narita, Haneda, Kansai, New Chitose, and
Fukuoka airports. Major airports are also in high demand by civilian
planes. The government intends to secure parts of large airports for
civilian use by utilizing mid-size airports with low operating
rates.
The public facilities usage law enacted in 2004 allows the
government to forcibly use airports and seaports in time of a
contingency in the country. But in time of a contingency in areas
surrounding Japan, the government is allowed only to request their
use. Airport and seaport administrators might reject requests for
use by the US military.
Additionally, small and mid-sized facilities in local areas have
only a few customs, immigration, and quarantine officials. The
Finance Ministry, the Justice Ministry, and the Agriculture,
Forestry, and Fisheries Ministry will study a support system and
other factors for smooth procedures.
Maintaining confidentiality will also be a challenge.
Designating the plan's contents as defense secret under the
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Law Article 96-2, the Defense Agency has
TOKYO 00000030 006 OF 010
imposed strict security obligations on officials in charge and SDF
personnel. Violators face up to five years in prison, which is
heavier than up to one year in prison for leaking secrets under the
National Civil Service Law.
A senior Foreign Ministry official ascribed the delay in fleshing
out the plan to growing difficulty to keep secrets with an increase
in the number of persons concerned. The government plans to punish
government officials who leak secrets as severely as SDF personnel.
A need will also arise to discuss in advance with local governments,
private medical institutions, and transport companies such factors
as the number of hospital beds available for wounded or sick troops,
how much water and food can be procured and how they should be
transported as part of Japan's logistical support for the US
military.
Plan for evacuating Japanese nationals from South Korea
Drawing up a plan for evacuating Japanese nationals from South Korea
has been an issue over the last 10 years since the Guidelines for
Japan-US Defense Cooperation were formulated in September 1997. In
evacuating Japanese nationals, use of US military aircraft and
vessels will be essential. The US will also need Japan's cooperation
as a temporary refuge for Americans evacuated form South Korea.
Japan and the US are in a relationship of mutual complementation.
Japan-US talks have been suspended since 2003. There has been a
large gap between US requests for using Japan's airports and
seaports and medical assistance and the contents of Japan's
cooperation, according to a Foreign Ministry source.
Bilateral talks reopened last December largely because Tokyo has
established a government-wide system to tackle the challenge of
revising Plan 5055.
Coordination with South Korea will be indispensable in evacuating
Japanese citizens, an issue which has been left unaddressed. Many
observers think that holding talks with South Korea on a possible
contingency on the Korean Peninsula would be difficult as long as
President Roh Moo Hyun, who maintains a reconciliatory North Korea
policy, remains in office.
(4) The light and darkness of Japan-US alliance unification (Part 1)
-- Front line of Japan's defense: Eyes of Commander of US Forces
Japan, Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright are cast on North Korea
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 6) (Abridged)
Eve., January 4, 2007
It happened just before dawn on July 5, 2006. Seven flashes of light
raced across the Sea of Japan, just at the time when all across the
United States, people were celebrating Independence Day. The lights
were ballistic missiles launched by North Korea's Kim Jong Il
regime.
The ballistic missiles were pointed south in waters off the coast of
Russia. Two "eyes" were quietly shining in the sea to the north: the
flagship Blue Ridge of the US Seventh Fleet and the Navy carrier
Kitty Hawk. The Blue Ridge had entered the port of Vladivostok,
located in Russia's Far East, nominally for "confidence building."
The Kitty Hawk had made a call after a six-year hiatus at the port
of Otaru in Hokkaido.
TOKYO 00000030 007 OF 010
Was it just coincidence that two Navy vessels regularly home-ported
at Yokosuka in Kanagawa Prefecture happened to be deployed to the
northern sea on the same day? Or was it deliberate?
On this point, a source connected to Japan-US military relations
confided: "Both the Blue Ridge and the Kitty Hawk were fully loaded
with ammunition for strike use, so they should have been well
prepared in case of an emergency."
Two months earlier, at US Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii,
Commander of the US Forces Japan Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright met secretly
with PACOM Commander Admiral William J. Fallon. Wright had already
picked up signs of missile launches at two sites in North Korea, a
launch testing sight on the Japan Sea and another one at the
southeast part.
"I would like USFJ and PACOM to closely coordinate," Wright
proposed. Fallon immediately agreed. According to a source connected
with Japan-US military relations, usually when the Blue Ridge, Kitty
Hawk or other ship leaves the home port of Yokosuka, the vessel is
not alone but is accompanied by a number of escort vessels, such as
cruisers and submarines, deployed to the rear. There are many such
cases. In other words, the two ships had sent a message to North
Korea, "In the event that anything unusual should happen toward
Japan, it would not be taken lightly," as one Defense Agency source
put it.
Three months after the missile launches, North Korea committed
another outrage by an underground nuclear-weapons test. At that
time, too, Wright from early morning took up his position at his
office at the USFJ command at Yokota Air Base in Tokyo, swiftly
issuing orders.
With the North Korean crisis as the occasion, Wright last fall
launched a Japan-US joint commanders' meeting, in which for the
first time since the bilateral alliance started, top brass from the
Japan and US uniformed services met to exchange views.
From the US side, starting with Wright, the top brass from the US
Navy, Army, and Air Force in Japan attended. From the Japanese side,
Admiral Takashi Saito, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office of Japan's
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) attended along with the top brass of the
ground, maritime and air defense forces. Wright said, "I would like
to hold this US-Japan joint commanders' meeting at a twice-a-year
pace."
Wright, who has pushed ahead with the idea of "institutionalizing"
the Japan-US alliance, has gone beyond his dual role of being the
commander of the 5th Air Force and of the US forces in Japan. He is
standing at the front line of the defense of Japan from a position
of being the overall representative of the Pentagon in Japan.
(Editorial staff writer Tsuyoshi Sunohara)
(5) With application of Anti-monopoly Law in mind, FTC investigates
dozens of companies, including leading general construction
contractors, over low-priced bidding
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full)
January 5, 2007
Concerning a succession of extremely low-priced tenders for
TOKYO 00000030 008 OF 010
government-sponsored public projects, it was learned that the Fair
Trade Commission (FTC) has started investigations into dozens of
companies, including leading general construction contractors, with
the possibility of applying the Anti-Monopoly Law. The FTC spread
the scope of the investigations to cover projects sponsored by
prefectures and government ordinance and collected information on
projects that were made the targets of its investigation into bids
tendered at prices lower than standard levels that were worked out
based on estimated prices. It intends to take such actions as
retraction orders, an administrative punishment, against companies
that carried out unscrupulous dumping practices, such as barring
access by many other competitors with contract prices below project
costs.
According to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport
(MLIT), among the projects it sponsored (excluding projects related
to ports, harbors and airports), the number of those that became the
targets of the investigation almost doubled in 2005 over the
previous year's level. Projects contracted at prices lower than
standard prices are also found among projects sponsored by local
governments.
For this reason, the FTC late last year ordered dozens of companies,
such as leading and mid-ranking general construction contractors,
and major local construction companies that have influence on the
market, to report on contracted prices and cost prices of projects
for which they received orders from the state, prefectures and
government ordinance cities.
Generally speaking, contracted prices mean project costs added with
general administrative costs, such as operating expenses. The FTC
noted that it would determine whether the contracted prices infringe
upon the Anti-monopoly Law or not, taking into account the number of
competitors that were unable to win bids due to low-priced bidding.
In doing so, one standard for reaching a judgment is whether
contracted prices were below project costs or not.
(6) Opinion column -- Disputed Northern Territories: Compromise
proposal to Russia will simply have an opposite effect
YOMIURI (Page 12) (Full)
January 5, 2007
Shigeki Hakamada, professor at Aoyama Gakuin University
A half-century has passed since Japan and Russia normalized
diplomatic relations with the signing a joint declaration. As the
New Year starts, I would like to consider the problems that
Japan-Russia relations face today, and also ponder what approach
Japan should take.
According to a Yomiuri Shimbun poll released on last Oct. 18, 85% or
so of the Japanese people surveyed thought that the Northern
Territories issue stood in the way of relations between Japan and
Russia further developing, and 70% of the people had a bad
impression of Russia. The results of the poll have made it clear
that Japan and Russia need to resolve the controversial Northern
Territories issue and sign a peace treaty in order to normalize and
improve bilateral ties. Restoring national sovereignty that has been
violated is a matter of national principle and dignity and should
come first before improving relations.
In this regard, I can say Russia in recent years has increasingly
TOKYO 00000030 009 OF 010
hardened its attitude toward the territorial issue. In fact, the
view of refusing to return even two of the disputed four islands,
let alone the four islands, is gaining momentum in Russia. The first
move of Russia in this context came in the way of disregarding the
Tokyo Declaration (issued in 1993) stating that the issue of the
attribution of the four islands shall be discussed in bilateral
talks. Russia also shifted its previous position so as to admit only
the Japan-Soviet Union Declaration, in which the two countries
agreed that the two islands -- Habomai and Shikotan -- would be
handed over to Japan after the signing of a peace treaty. Moreover,
Russia has emphasized that the term "hand over" is not the same as
the term "return." President Putin, as well, made this ambiguous
remark in a dialogue with domestic and foreign experts in last
September: "The Japan-Soviet Union Joint Declaration does not
mention under what conditions the islands will be handed over."
Combining all these things to such remarks by Russian officials as
the four islands fall under Russia's sovereignty as a result of the
war and that is recognized by international law, I think what Russia
has in mind is clear. Russia has assumed a hard-line posture like
this in tune with its policy of favoring the Great Powers, perhaps
bolstered by the oil-money boom and against the backdrop of growing
nationalism. Perhaps Japan's one-time approach of placing emphasis
on the Japan-Soviet Union Joint Declaration would have helped such a
Russia.
I have concern about the current situation surrounding the two
countries. I am talking about our country's foreign minister,
politicians, and experts coming up with "new proposals" one after
another in the hope that the territorial issue might be resolved
while Putin is in office. For instance, during a meeting on Dec. 13
of the Lower House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister
Aso came out with the notion of dividing the Northern Territories in
two in terms of acreage, adding that idea is his personal view. In
the past, as well, the foreign minister mentioned the idea of the
return of three islands or the concept of joint development of the
disputed islands. Every time the foreign minister referred to those
ideas, the Foreign Ministry denied it. In last October, the
Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ or Minshuto) Secretary General
Hatoyama and his party members hosted a commemorative meeting
marking the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-Soviet
Union Joint Declaration in Moscow. On that occasion, some Japanese
politicians and experts offered a similar "new proposal."
I can understand their intention to somehow break the stalemate in
the territorial issue, but they have made three fundamental
mistakes. First, Russia, seeing these moves of Japan, may conclude
that its recent tough posture toward Japan was correct and may
further toughen its posture toward Japan in order to press Tokyo to
make even more concessions. Second, "new proposals" shown by the
Japanese side, for instance, the partition proposal or the proposal
for the return of three islands, are all over-optimistic in that
they ignore Russia's intention, namely that Moscow has no intention
at present to negotiate the territorial issue with Japan. Third,
even though a political decision may be necessary eventually, it is
stupid to show a bottom line in public before the start of
negotiations. Price reduction will start from that point.
What Japan should do now is to avoid hastily showing compromise
proposals in succession. The start of negotiations on the issue of
the sovereignty of the four islands was basically agreed on in the
Tokyo Declaration. Japan should resolutely call for the start of the
negotiations on that issue. How the issue will be finalized will be
found in the process of the negotiations. The negotiations should be
TOKYO 00000030 010 OF 010
held between officials concerned of the two countries who have built
a trust relationship. A political decision, if any, will come after
that. Doing all this seems difficult, but Japan should steel itself
to address the issue under a far-sighted policy.
DONOVAN