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Viewing cable 07SEOUL270, WILL THE YOUNGER GENERATIONS ELECT THE NEXT KOREAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SEOUL270 2007-01-29 05:22 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0270/01 0290522
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290522Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2576
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1944
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2043
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
UNCLAS SEOUL 000270 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS
SUBJECT: WILL THE YOUNGER GENERATIONS ELECT THE NEXT KOREAN 
PRESIDENT? 
 
 
1.    (U) SUMMARY:  Historically, regionalism has played an 
important role in Korean presidential elections.  But in 
2002, young voters successfully mobilized and helped Roh 
Moo-hyun edge out Lee Hoi-chang by a 2.2 percent margin.  The 
media had a frenzy touting the "youth revolution," and the 
data seems to back that up.  Upon closer analysis of regional 
voting statistics, young voters appeared to be less 
influenced by regional tendencies than the older voters.  In 
addition, the technology-aided mobilization practices that 
younger voters used in 2002 have become the norm for 
elections.  But the next presidential election in December 
2007 will be the true test of whether the "youth revolution" 
was indeed a revolution.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.    (U) Regionalism in South Korea -- particularly in the 
southwest (Honam) and southeast (Yeongnam) -- is notorious; 
voters not only choose their hometown candidates, but they 
often vote against candidates from the rival region.  This 
was one reason why Kim Young-sam (Yeongnam) and Kim Dae-jung 
(Honam) publicly pledged not to run against each other in the 
1987 presidential elections, because they knew their regions 
would split the opposition voters.  (NOTE: Despite their 
promise, they ran against each other anyway, and their 
regions voted exactly as expected -- which gave ruling party 
candidate Roh Tae-woo the presidency.  END NOTE.)  However, 
after the impact the younger generations made on the 2002 
presidential elections, the press speculated that Koreans 
were starting to vote more along generational lines than 
strictly regional ones. 
 
DEFINING THE GENERATIONS 
------------------------ 
 
3.    (U) The Korean War was the event that defined today's 
older generation in Korea.  Ideologically, those who were old 
enough to remember the Korean War tend to be strongly 
anti-Communist and staunchly pro-American.  They also tend to 
view North Koreans as enemies and hold strong opinions about 
how to deal with the North Korean regime.  Politically and 
socially, this generation is conservative.  Economically, 
those over 50 tend to subscribe to the "growth first" 
ideology, which prioritized economic growth over everything 
else, including human rights.  Demographically, those aged 50 
and older make up 24 percent of the population (11,387,000 
people), per November 2005 census figures released by the 
National Statistics Office. 
 
4.    (U) Much has been written about Korea's 386 Generation: 
those who are in their 30s, went to college in the 80s, and 
were born in the 60s.  (NOTE: This moniker first appeared in 
the 1990s, so most people of this are now in their 40s.  END 
NOTE.)  The two defining events for this generation were the 
Gwangju Massacre and the democratic movement in the 1980s. 
Although young at the time, this generation experienced the 
Park Chung-hee authoritarian regime in the 1960s and 1970s, 
then demonstrated against associated military regimes in the 
1980s.  The student demonstrators also urged immediate 
reunification with North Korea and often joined forces in 
solidarity with the labor unions.  Ideologically, the 386 
Generation is characterized by being anti-American and 
sometimes pro-North Korean; it rejects traditional models of 
power and politics, such as old-school networking. 
Politically, this generation is the most progressive and 
active.  Economically, it does not embrace the growth first 
ideology like those over 50; it prioritizes human rights over 
economic growth.  Demographically, those in their 30s and 40s 
are a big group, representing 34 percent of the population. 
 
5.    (U) Many of the 386 Generation have moved into 
positions where they can influence politics or public 
opinion.  A few, such as prominent 386 leader Im Jong-seok, 
are now lawmakers.  President Roh, who defended many student 
demonstrators during the 1980s, has surrounded himself with 
advisors who were demonstrators as students.  Sociology 
professor Park Kyung-tae of Sungkonghoe University told 
poloff that many 386ers also became journalists and TV news 
producers.  Their positions of influence dictate the 
sociopolitical conversations and explain some of the more 
progressive story topics. 
 
6.    (U) The 20-something generation (or Generation-C) is 
the first Korean generation with no mature memory of an 
authoritarian regime.  Generation C grew up after Korea 
 
became democratized and takes free press for granted.  As a 
result, they are sometimes apathetic politically.  This 
generation is also called Generation C because they are so 
wired.  (NOTE: the "C" can stand for cyber, computer, or 
community.  END NOTE.)  Although not an event per se, the 
Internet boom defines this generation above all else.  Young 
Koreans embraced social-networking blog sites (such as 
Cyworld, comparable to MySpace or Facebook and recently 
introduced in the U.S.) much earlier than their counterparts 
in the U.S., thanks in part to the proliferation of broadband 
Internet (NOTE: Nearly 80 percent of Korean households have 
high-speed, broadband Internet, according to Ministry of 
Information and Communication June 2006 data.  END NOTE.) 
 
7.    (U) Ideologically, Generation C tends to be more 
conservative than the 386 Generation, but resists being 
identified with a particular ideology.  Generation C cannot 
be identified as anti-American (although many participated in 
anti-American demonstrations after two young schoolgirls were 
accidentally killed by USFK soldiers in 2002).  They are not 
unquestioningly anti-North Korean like the older generation, 
nor as pro-North Korean as the 386.  Economically, this 
generation takes a developed society for granted.  However, 
because it experienced the Asian financial crisis of the late 
90s, it has a complicated view of money, at times careless 
about consumerism and conservative about saving. Those in 
their 20s are also characterized as being self-centered and 
individualistic, as opposed to the other generations' 
tendency toward more socially responsible outlook. 
Demographically, those in their 20s make up 15.5 percent of 
the population, or 7,334,000 potential voters.  Those who are 
currently 15-19 represent 6.5 percent of the population; 
those in this group who will turn 19 before the December 2007 
election will be able to vote. 
 
USING TECHNOLOGY TO MOBILIZE YOUNG VOTERS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8.    (U) Generation C and the 386 Generation were credited 
with electing Roh Moo-hyun as president.  This is due in part 
to their mastery of Internet and cell phone technology to 
mobilize voters.  When former candidate Chung Mong-jun 
withdrew support of Roh the night before the election, people 
posted messages on Web sites and sent cell phone text 
messages urging people to maintain support for Roh.  This 
mobilized youngsters to vote and also changed the minds of 
people who had been planning on voting for the Democratic 
Labor Party candidate, Kwon Young-ghil.  Roh ended up 
defeating Lee Hoi-chang by a mere 2.2% margin, or 570,980 
votes.  The Internet was also credited with politicizing 
people who would otherwise be apathetic, because "netizens" 
are exposed more frequently to political Web sites. 
 
9.    (U) One media tool in particular that helped facilitate 
the mobilization was OhmyNews, an online news site where 
netizen reporters can write their own articles, which are 
then fact-checked by staff before posting.  This Web site was 
created by 386er Oh Yeon-ho, who has said, "My generation, 
the 386 generation, were (sic) in the streets fighting in the 
80s against the military dictatorship.  Now, 20 years later, 
we are combat-ready with our Internet."  OhmyNews is where 
many netizens submitted articles urging people to get out the 
vote. 
 
10.   (U) After the 2002 election, the media widely reported 
that "generationalism" had the potential to overcome 
regionalism in Korean politics.  A Joong-Ang Ilbo survey 
conducted in late 2002 found that 48.8 percent of those in 
their 20s and 30s had voted for Roh for the sake of a 
"replacement of generations" or "generational transfer." 
Critics have remarked that the media may have fabricated a 
myth of generational conflict where none actually existed. 
 
GENERATION VS. REGION 
--------------------- 
 
11.   (U) Analyzing national election results by age, the 
generations appear to have voted along their ideological and 
political tendencies.  The majority of people in their 20s 
(62 percent) and 30s (60.2 percent) voted for Roh, while the 
majority of people in their 40s (50.8 percent) and 50s  (65.5 
percent) voted for Lee. 
 
12.   (U) Examining the 2002 election results by region, one 
sees that the southwest (Honam) and southeast (Yeongnam) 
voted almost exactly as they did in the 1997 presidential 
elections.  According to Gallup Korea data, in 2002, 93.2 
percent of voters in Honam voted for Roh, which is nearly 
identical to the 94.4 percent of Honam voters who voted for 
Kim Dae-jung in 1997.  In 2002, 75.5 percent of people in 
Yeongnam voted for Lee Hoi-chang, compared with 66.9 percent 
who voted for him in 1997.  (NOTE: This does not include 
votes for Rhee In-je, a former GNP candidate.  After he lost 
in the primaries, he formed a new political party to run 
separately, so most of his votes would have gone to Lee if 
Rhee didn't run.  END NOTE.) 
 
13.  (U) However, it is noteworthy that younger voters in the 
Yeongnam region voted closer to generational lines than 
regional ones in 2002: only 61.1 percent of people in their 
20s and 52.1 percent of voters in their 30s voted for Lee 
(compared to 75.5 percent for Lee overall and 90.1 percent 
for those aged 50 ).  So it appears that younger voters were 
less influenced by their region's tendencies than older 
voters.  Demographically, Honam has 5,021,548 people and 
Yeongnam has 12,701,303 people, representing 10.6 percent and 
26.9 percent respectively of the entire population. 
 
OUTLOOK FOR 2007 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
-------------------------------------- 
 
14.   (U) Professor Kim characterized the current voter mood 
among those in their 20s and 30s as "confused," due to the 
failure of the Roh Administration to achieve real reform. 
Asked to speculate on how voters would react to Park Geun-hye 
as a presidential candidate, Professor Kim opined that she 
could win Generation C's vote if she continues to play good 
"image" politics.  Younger voters react emotionally, not 
necessarily rationally, he explained.  They will ignore her 
father's authoritarian regime and focus on the economic 
miracle he achieved in Korea.  If Park and Lee Myung-bak were 
to run against each other, he predicted that the older 
generation would split the vote between Park, out of 
nostalgia for the "good old days," and Lee, who it perceived 
as having stronger will than Park. 
 
15.   (U) Lessons from the 2002 election have been 
well-digested.  Two in particular are noteworthy.  First, 
some of the technology-aided mobilization tactics from the 
2002 elections have been institutionalized and will likely 
become standard practice for the 2007 elections, particularly 
as more tech-savvy young Koreans come to voting age.  Second, 
politicians will continue to court the younger generation -- 
not only because they are the largest group demographically, 
but also because of the impact they made in 2002.  The 
political parties have already embraced some of the 
technology tactics that the younger generation used in the 
2002 elections in the local and by-elections. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
16.   (U) The younger generations impacted the 2002 
presidential election more than any other election.  Although 
the media may have exaggerated stories about the youth 
revolution and the generational differences in the 2002 
elections, there seems to have been a legitimate trend of 
young voters voting along generational, rather than regional, 
lines. 
 
VERSHBOW