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Viewing cable 07REYKJAVIK20, ICELAND: AFGHANISTAN AND KOSOVO VIEWS IN ADVANCE OF NATO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07REYKJAVIK20 2007-01-26 15:55 2011-01-13 05:37 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Reykjavik
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRK #0020/01 0261555
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261555Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3132
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0011
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 0003
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0074
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0239
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE 0048
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L REYKJAVIK 000020 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEFENSE FOR OASD/ISP (J. HURSCH AND J. KELSO) 
EUCOM FOR COL FRANKLIN AND LTC GREEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2017 
TAGS: PREL NATO KPKO AF YI HU IC
SUBJECT: ICELAND: AFGHANISTAN AND KOSOVO VIEWS IN ADVANCE OF NATO 
MINISTERIAL 
 
REF: A. STATE 7434 
 
     B. STATE 4834 
     C. STATE 5652 
     D. B. EVANS EMAIL 1/22/07 
     E. 06 KABUL 5855 
     F. 06 REYKJAVIK 431 
 
Classified By: Amb. Carol van Voorst for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Iceland is supportive of USG goals for the NATO 
informal ministerial on Afghanistan and Kosovo on January 26.  The 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) Permanent Secretary outlined for 
Ambassador the Icelandic government's plans to increase peacekeeping 
deployments to Afghanistan, including discussions with Hungary on PRT 
deployments.  Iceland is also considering contributions to law and 
order and counter-narcotics programs, and at the ministerial will 
confirm the Prime Minister's Riga pledge of NATO airlift funding. 
Ambassador also explored ways to raise public awareness of Iceland's 
contributions in Afghanistan, including the idea of a visit to the 
country by the Prime Minister after parliamentary elections here in 
May.  On Kosovo, Iceland intends to support the Ahtisaari plan but 
will wait until an opportune time to say so publicly.  The MFA 
expects that a Nordic-Baltic Political Directors' meeting in February 
will result in a consensus to support the plan. End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) In the Foreign Minister's absence, Ambassador called on MFA 
Permanent Secretary Gretar Mar Sigurdsson on January 22 to present 
USG thoughts ahead of the NATO informal ministerial later this week. 
Foreign Minister Valgerdur Sverrisdottir, who will represent Iceland, 
is traveling in Europe ahead of the meeting. 
 
3.  (SBU) Regarding Afghanistan, Ambassador thanked Sigurdsson for 
Iceland's contributions in Afghanistan, particularly the 
well-regarded Mobile Liaison Observation Team assigned to the 
Provincial Reconstruction Team in Chaghcharan (ref E).  At the same 
time, she noted that the pressure is on for NATO to deliver this 
spring, and that all Allies must take a hard look at what more they 
can offer.  Sigurdsson said it was good to hear that the Icelandic 
team is appreciated and noted that despite the team's planned 
withdrawal in April 2007, some personnel currently assigned to the 
PRT will remain there in other roles.  When the Ambassador suggested 
that Iceland might find another niche for itself in pairing up with 
NATO members who were to lead their first PRTs, the PermSec agreed, 
noting that Iceland has just begun discussions with Hungary on 
possible cooperation in a Hungarian-led PRT, with two specific 
projects (one of which centers on police training) under discussion. 
 
4.  (SBU) Sigurdsson passed Ambassador a copy of his talking points 
on Afghanistan for recent bilateral security talks in the UK, noting 
that the document gave a good preview of what FM Sverrisdottir would 
have to present in Brussels this week.  The document (scanned and 
emailed to EUR/NB) outlines a planned increase of the total number of 
Icelanders deployed to Afghanistan, though as Sigurdsson noted their 
roles will shift to areas in which Iceland believes it has a "core 
competency."  (Note:  it also confirms Prime Minister Geir Haarde's 
pledge at Riga to fund airlift of personnel and supplies.  End Note.) 
 Sigurdsson offered that this was in line with the FM's emphasis on 
shaping Iceland's peacekeeping participation in ways that would be 
able to be clearly understood and supported across Iceland's 
political spectrum (ref F). 
 
5.  (C) Ambassador expressed appreciation for Iceland's continued 
engagement and plans for increased support to Afghanistan, though she 
cautioned that even "safe-sounding" roles such as midwife training 
can be dangerous peacekeeping assignments.  It could send misleading 
signals to lead the public to believe that peacekeeping deployments 
in unstable regions did not involve risk simply because Icelandic 
participants did not wear uniforms or were unarmed.  She urged the 
government to explain clearly to the parliament and the public why 
these missions were important to do despite acknowledged danger. 
Continuing this theme, Ambassador suggested that the period following 
Iceland's Althingi (parliament) elections this May might be an 
excellent time for the Prime Minister (Haarde or his successor) to 
visit Afghanistan to show support for Iceland's work there and raise 
public awareness of the importance of Iceland's contribution to 
Afghan development and stability.  Sigurdsson enthusiastically 
agreed, noting as well that it might go one better to send the 
Althingi Foreign Affairs Committee, "which doesn't travel enough." 
He noted that FM Sverrisdottir is making a concerted effort to engage 
the Althingi on security and defense issues, including peacekeeping, 
in an effort to bury lingering resentment of the cabinet's tendency 
 
to unilateral control of foreign affairs. 
 
6.  (C) Along these lines, Sigurdsson said Iceland should and will 
look to increase its participation in "traditional" PRT roles in the 
coming years, possibly even to include having Icelanders under arms. 
However, in the short term such deployments are not politically 
tenable.  The only way the MFA can elicit such support, he opined, is 
by moving carefully and bringing the Althingi along at every step. 
Ambassador acknowledged this point, and pushed the MFA to encourage 
as much press coverage and high-level attention on Iceland and NATO's 
work in Afghanistan as possible. 
 
7.  (SBU) On Kosovo, Ambassador noted the urgency of unified 
international support for UN Special Representative Ahtisaari's plan 
for final status.  Sigurdsson agreed, and said the U.S. could expect 
Iceland's support for the plan when the timing was appropriate.  MFA 
Political Director Bergdis Ellertsdottir noted in this vein that she 
expected an upcoming Nordic-Baltic Political Directors' meeting to 
produce a consensus of support for Ahtisaari.  Sigurdsson opined that 
perhaps the Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-Pine) could be 
a vehicle for coordinating support to Kosovo. 
 
8.  (C/NF) Comment:  The GOI (and FM Sverrisdottir in particular) is 
still wrestling with the problem of selling Afghan and other 
peacekeeping operations to a skeptical public unaccustomed to seeing 
its citizens in uniform or potentially at risk.  Nonetheless, Iceland 
will be supportive of NATO's goals in Afghanistan, and its 
willingness to explore PRT cooperation with the Hungarians is a 
welcome sign. 
 
van Voorst