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Viewing cable 07NIAMEY23, NIGER: THREE PILLARS OF TRADITIONAL SLAVERY - AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07NIAMEY23 2007-01-10 15:19 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Niamey
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNM #0023/01 0101519
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101519Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3168
INFO RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0349
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 1495
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 4776
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS NIAMEY 000023 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT: FOR AF/W, BACHMAN; G/TIP FOR ZEITLIN; AF/RSA FOR 
HARPOLE; DRL FOR DANG AND MITTLEHAUSER; DEPT OF LABOR FOR 
ZOLLNER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM SOCI ELAB NG
SUBJECT: NIGER: THREE PILLARS OF TRADITIONAL SLAVERY - AND 
WHY THEY ARE ERODING 
 
REF: 06 NIAMEY 922 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  Traditional caste-based servitude in Niger has always 
rested on three pillars: a lack of economic options for 
slaves, who tend to live in the least developed regions of 
the world's least developed country; a lack of social 
mobility in slaves' typically small, isolated, nomadic 
communities; and, a racial hierarchy between "black" and 
"white" Tuaregs, which contributes to the definition and 
heritability of "slave" and "master" caste identities. By 
their nature, each of these pillars is difficult to address 
via legislation. Thus, traditional slavery has always been 
impossible to legislate or prosecute away. However, during 
recent travel to the northern region of Niger, Poloff 
discovered that some fundamental political, social, and 
economic changes have begun to erode these three pillars - 
suggesting that traditional slavery does not have much of a 
future in Niger. END SUMMARY 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
NEW ECONOMIC OPTIONS AND THE SUBSISTENCE ECONOMY 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2.  Depending on which study one chooses to credit, there are 
anywhere between 8,000 and 43,000   slave caste persons in 
Niger. Definitions and numbers are invariably loose, but they 
are also of secondary concern - the fact remains that many 
Nigeriens are locked into an outmoded system of forced labor, 
and are abused to varying degrees by it. Since 1905, when the 
French colonial government first banned slavery and related 
practices, several attempts to address this problem via 
legislation have been made. The most ambitious thus far was a 
2004 revision of Niger's Penal Code that painstakingly 
defined all elements of forced labor and traditional 
servitude and applied penalties to them. Several cases have 
been tried under this new law, and some convictions obtained. 
However, slavery has always proved resistant to such 
solutions because all too often slaves themselves have no 
better economic choice than to remain within the system. 
"Freedom" at times seems an abstraction that many Nigeriens 
cannot afford. 
 
3.  Much of this is due to the fact that today's slaves tend 
to be found among the most marginal communities in the 
country, and inhabit the most marginal, isolated parts of the 
semi-arid pastoral zone. Caste-based slavery is most common 
among the traditionally nomadic communities of Northern 
Niger. The situation among the nomadic Tuaregs, who comprise 
between 8 and 9% of the country's population, is examined 
here. NOTE: Slavery in sedentary regions along the Niger 
river and Niger / Nigeria border appears to be more a matter 
of residual social discrimination than forced labor. One 
exception is the area described by anti-slavery activist 
Ilguilas Weila as the "triangle of shame." The triangle, 
which runs from Birni N'Konni in the west to Madaoua in the 
east to Illela in the north, is the site of two of the five 
investigations and prosecutions of slave-holders carried out 
in 2006. The other three cases centered on the Tuareg town of 
Abalak. END NOTE The Tuaregs traditionally lived a nomadic 
existence premised on herding. Slave caste persons were 
charged with some of the most repetitive forms of labor - 
putting up and taking down tents, providing personal services 
to the master etc. - but also some of the most creative. 
Metal and leather working, shoe-making, singing and 
entertainment, jewelry making, etc. were generally slave 
caste occupations. 
 
4.  Major droughts in 1983-5, and 1994 initially worsened the 
dependence of slaves on their masters. Over several decades, 
many slave-caste persons had built up the means of economic 
independence - small flocks of animals, and small plots of 
land - and had moved out of the traditional master-slave 
economic relationship. Many had moved physically as well, and 
were no longer as subject to the social and psychological 
constraints associated with the practice. The droughts 
changed everything. Pasturage was wiped out and herds with 
it. Many nomads of all social castes were forced to 
sedentarize. Villages in the agro-pastoral zone became larger 
towns overnight as nomads moved in to access government and 
NGO services and support themselves through trade and paid 
labor. Lacking resources, property, and marketable skills and 
 
often speaking only Tamachek, slave-caste nomads gathered 
around master caste Tuaregs who spoke their language for 
money and support. Initially, Tuareg nobles provided for them 
as a way of fulfilling Zakat - the tradition of obligatory 
Islamic charity; eventually, the relationship solidified, 
with the slave-caste Tuaregs doing chores and working in 
return for material support from the masters. In a non-cash 
economy, this was viewed as a reasonable and natural exchange 
- not to mention a return to traditional ways - rather than 
an imposition of forced labor. 
 
5.  While the forced sedentarization of the 1980s and early 
1990s initially strengthened the master-slave economy, it 
also laid the foundations for the emergence of economically 
independent slaves. The re-emergence and growth of the 
tourist industry in northern Niger after the 1991--1995 
Tuareg rebellion created great opportunities for slave caste 
nomads. Their traditional specialties - leather and metal 
working, jewelry making, and music - have found a whole new 
audience in the form of forex bearing tourists. Between five 
and six thousand tourists (75% French) visit Niger's northern 
Agadez region each year. Tourism is $2.6 million annual 
industry. Sixty tourist agencies (up from fifty last year) 
bring vacationers through many of the region's small towns, 
where, as Poloff can attest, opportunities to buy traditional 
nomadic crafts abound. While it is difficult to quantify the 
level of wealth creation, it is important to realize that 
virtually all of it accrues to savvy ex-slave entrepreneurs. 
Master caste Tuaregs do not engage in any of these highly 
lucrative "slave caste" professions, as they regard it as 
beneath them. In time, market logic may change that; which 
further underscores our argument that social conventions are 
mutable in the face of profit. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REVOLUTION IN THE NOMADIC ZONE 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
6.  Just how mutable they are was illustrated in Poloff's 
December 12 meeting with Serge Hilpron, a Franco-Tuareg 
opposition journalist and pro-democracy activist. Trained in 
France, Hilpron returned to his native Niger in the early 
1990s as democracy emerged. Intending to help it along, he 
founded "Radio Nomade," in Agadez as a source for independent 
news and commentary on the region. One of the best educated 
and most well informed observers of the northern Nigerien 
scene, Hilpron described the political and social changes he 
had witnessed since his return to Agadez fifteen years ago. 
 
7.  Hilpron first emphasized the role of the 1991 - 1995 
Tuareg rebellion as an agent for social change. Going beyond 
the conventional view that the rebellion was solely concerned 
with resource allocation and cultural identity issues between 
the nomadic, minority north and the sedentary, black-African 
south, he described the friction within the northern camp. 
Echoing a view held by many other contacts, Hilpron argued 
that the rebellion was a time for young Tuaregs to challenge 
the traditional leadership, and for lower caste Tuaregs to 
challenge the caste hierarchy. In Hilpron's view, many of the 
most enduring changes wrought by the rebellion were in the 
field of social relations among nomads, rather than in 
political relations with the center. COMMENT: This theory 
seems credible, given the tendency of rebellions to shake up 
many aspects of a society. However, at least one of the 
political outcomes of the rebellion - political 
decentralization - has also affected the lives of slave-caste 
persons. Under this system, authority over local issues 
passed from appointed central government administrators to 
265 new elected commune governments. Many of the councilors 
and mayors elected in 2004 are slave-caste persons. END 
COMMENT 
 
8.  Contrast this with the situation that existed prior to 
the drought years of the 1980s and the rebellion of the 
1990s. Traditionally, the subsistence economy of the nomadic 
zone yielded conservative social mores. Part of a nomadic 
"groupement," that rarely interacted with townsfolk or 
observed alternative social structures, the slave-caste 
Tuareg knew no other way of life. Sedentarization led to new 
economic opportunities and offered a new social vision. The 
towns in which most Tuaregs settled were heavily Hausa / 
Zarma. In addition to learning new languages, slave caste 
Tuaregs were exposed to the famously entrepreneurial culture 
of the Hausas. Hausa cities like Maradi and Zinder are famous 
for their self-made men, who have made enough money through 
 
commerce to build large houses, marry additional wives, and 
travel to Saudi Arabia on hadj, or to Europe to buy used 
cars. Exposed to this alternative socio-economic model, 
slave-caste nomads have started to break down barriers. 
 
9.  Serge Hilpron stressed the linkages between economic and 
social change, arguing that the integration of slave-caste 
craftsmen into the modern tourist economy has enabled them to 
make money and transcend old social limits. Transition from a 
barter economy where masters controlled the means of exchange 
to a cash-economy where slaves are well equipped to earn 
Francs has altered the latter's social position. Many have 
married higher-caste members of the same ethnic group, a 
practice that Hilpron described as "inconceivable, even as 
recently as ten years ago." Intermarriage has also helped to 
break down one of the most obvious traditional distinctions 
between slave and master caste nomads - color. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
RACIAL HIERARCHY, RACIAL MIXING & IDENTITY 
------------------------------------------ 
 
10.  Many exceptions must be granted to the rule that 
slave-caste Tuaregs tended, traditionally, to be black 
Africans while master caste Tuaregs tended to be 
lighter-skinned Berber people. Certainly, that racial 
distinction has never been as hard and fast in Niger as in 
Mauritania. Perhaps the greatest exception is the Sultan of 
the Air - principal traditional leader of the Tuaregs. For 
centuries, ever since feuding Tuareg clans failed to agree on 
a candidate to rule them and invited a noble Hausa family 
from Birni N'Konni to re-establish its dynasty in Agadez, the 
Sultan of the Air has been a black African. Yet, however 
imperfect a measure in theory, racial difference has always 
been a key determinant of caste-status in practice. Most 
Nigeriens would consider a black African Tuareg to be a slave 
caste person and would consider a Berber-Tuareg to be a 
member of the master caste. Popular perception derives from a 
historical truth concerning the development of the race-based 
caste system among the Tuaregs. 
 
11.  Niger's Tuaregs moved into the country from the north. 
Descendants of the Berber people of the Mahgreb, these 
nomadic herders colonized the pastoral zone and drove out 
other ethnic groups. Through their practice of raiding - 
"razia" - which survives in muted form to this day under the 
rubric "vol traditionel," the Tuaregs stole animals and 
people from the sedentary black African ethnic groups of the 
south. Initially integrated into the Tuareg communities as 
slaves, the black Africans formed a racially and socially 
distinct caste that enjoyed very little mobility. While the 
kidnapping of persons via razias died out a century ago, the 
racially based caste hierarchy that it established remained 
durable until the advent of sedentarization. 
 
12.  While no census data are available to quantify the 
argument, most Nigeriens, Tuaregs included, argue that 
intermarriage between "white" and "black" Tuaregs has led to 
a new demographic mix within the community. This has, in 
turn, broken down the old color barrier between the two 
castes, facilitating social mobility. Sedentarization again 
played a role. As Tuareg communities settled in cities with 
largely Hausa populations, intermarriage occurred. "Black" 
Tuaregs especially had more marriage options outside of the 
community. Coupled with the economic and political factors 
noted above, intermarriage contributed to greater social 
mobility. From Poloff's observations during extensive travel 
to the north, the vast majority of today's Tuaregs are 
indistinguishable in physical appearance from their Hausa 
neighbors. "White" Tuaregs are a rare site in the population 
centers of the north. Those who remain persist largely in the 
small nomadic communities north and west of Agadez. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
COMMENT: CAN HISTORY KILL AN HISTORICAL EVIL? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
13.  In a meeting last year with key anti-slavery advocates 
(reftel), Ambassador and Poloff heard the consensus view of 
the people who know the subject best: the long term solution 
to slavery and associated social discrimination in Niger is 
economic and social change. To the extent that donors and 
NGOs can help that natural process along - by equipping 
ex-slaves with economic tools like literacy, job training, 
and microcredit, or educating them on their legal rights - 
 
well and good. Less attention was paid to coercive legal 
remedies, even though one participant - Timidria's Ilguilas 
Weila - has made great use of them. Poloff's discussions and 
observations during his trip to the nomadic zone suggest why. 
Slavery - the product of economic, social, and demographic 
circumstances - cannot survive changes in those 
circumstances. Long term economic and social change is 
eroding the pillars that support this system. Contacts agree 
that those pillars are much weaker now than they were even 
ten years ago. Through programs designed to enhance 
ex-slaves' economic skills (and thereby their social 
mobility) the USG can give slavery's tottering pillars a 
push. 
ALLEN