Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07MONTEVIDEO90, HAGUE RULING DISAPPOINTS URUGUAY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MONTEVIDEO90.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MONTEVIDEO90 2007-01-25 11:02 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Montevideo
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMN #0090/01 0251102
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251102Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6750
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0476
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0068
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN MADRID 0863
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2961
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0170
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//J-5//
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS MONTEVIDEO 000090 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/BSC AND EB 
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/WE (MHILL), EUR/NB (MEVANS) 
DEPT PASS USTR FOR EEISSENSTAT AND SCRONIN 
TREASURY FOR OASIA FOR JASPER HOEK 
COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC/WBASTIAN 
NSC FOR JCARDENAS 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SENV SOCI KLIG EINV AR UY
SUBJECT: HAGUE RULING DISAPPOINTS URUGUAY 
 
REF: 06 MONTEVIDEO 00907 AND PREVIOUS 
 
1. (U) On January 23, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) rejected Uruguay's petitions for provisional measures 
which would have obliged Argentina to remove roadblocks 
obstructing international bridges linking the two counties. 
The early morning newscasts here implied that the Court had 
decided it did not have jurisdiction in the matter. However, 
subsequent reading of the decision indicates the Court has 
competence but ruled that the blockades did not present an 
imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights of 
Uruguay at this time. 
 
2. (U) Initially, GOU officials publicly expressed dismay and 
disappointment at the outcome but did not spell out what next 
steps the Government might take. Uruguay's representative in 
The Hague, Hector Gross Espiel, was quoted as saying that he 
"was neither happy nor sad" over the ICJ's decision because 
the Court had failed to legitimize the roadblocks erected by 
Argentine protesters.  Foreign Minister Reinaldo Gargano's 
reaction was vague and muted, though he stated that "we will 
have to wait for the Argentine Government's reaction."  He 
also reiterated that Uruguay would not negotiate with 
Argentina while the bridges were blocked. 
 
3. (U) Meanwhile, the Argentine environmental protesters who 
block the bridges reportedly were elated by the ICJ's 
decision not to exercise its power under Article 41 of the 
ICJ Statute to indicate provisional measures. Some protesters 
reportedly promised to "increase" their pressure against the 
construction of a $1.2 billion Finnish-owned pulp mill 
project on the shared Uruguay river. 
 
4. (U) In somewhat related developments, a Spanish mediator 
in the dispute is scheduled to visit the region next week to 
try and help move things along. Also, the Spanish firm ENCE, 
which had moved the location of its own proposed pulp mill in 
Fray Bentos to a less controversial site in Colonia, for an 
investment of $1.2 billion. The ENCE plant will produce its 
own energy through biomass. 
 
5. (U) Local press speculated several possible next steps to 
resolve the conflict. While all these options existed before 
the Court's ruling, the publication of possible options seems 
to indicate a public eagerness to move forward.  Possible 
options listed are: the facilitator offered by the King of 
Spain could mediate, Argentina could begin the dialogue, or 
Uruguay could make the first move.  The press also raise the 
question as to whether Uruguay would drop its demand to begin 
negotiations only upon lifting of the bridge blockades. The 
press also speculated that Uruguay could return to the ICJ or 
complain at the OAS as well. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: The ICJ decision is seen here as a defeat 
for Uruguay. Observers are clearly disappointed that the 
Court did not limit Argentina's "coercive action," while the 
parties await a final Court decision.  The loss is bound to 
renew criticism of Formin Gargano's handling of the 
long-festering pulp mill dispute.  On the other hand, some 
observers believe that a mild victory for Argentina "saves 
face" for the GOA and may allow Kirchner greater leeway on 
making concessions. The earlier GOA "defeats" at the Hague, 
the Mercosur tribunal and on the IFC loan vote inflamed 
Argentine nationalist passions according to this view. 
 
7. (SBU) Comment (cont): Our contacts at the MFA were coy 
about what Uruguay might do next. Embassy notes that Uruguay 
has never seriously taken up its case with the OAS, other 
than a weak appeal last year by Vice-Formin Maria "Belela" 
Herrera to SYGN Insulza for OAS mediation.  Possibly the GOU 
has not resorted to the OAS because of Mercosur's perceived 
rivalry with the OAS and Gargano's preference for Mercosur. 
Still, in previous discussions with mid-level Uruguayan 
diplomats, some of them expressed a desire for a stronger 
appeal to that forum.  Article 20 of the OAS Charter states, 
"No State may use the coercive measures of an economic or 
political character in order to force the sovereign will of 
another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind." 
However, in its recent pleadings, Argentina argued that since 
the commercial aspects of the case had already been heard and 
decided by the Mercosur Tribunal, under the principle of "res 
judicata" the issue cannot be raised again in another forum. 
We do not know to what degree this principle applies in the 
jurisdiction of the OAS.  End Comment. 
Baxter