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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA81, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FACES UNCERTAIN FUTURE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA81 2007-01-12 21:31 2011-06-21 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0081/01 0122131
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 122131Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8617
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000081 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN AND PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PARM KDEM NU
SUBJECT: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FACES UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
 
REF: A. 06 MANAGUA 2161 
     B. 06 MANAGUA 0885 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Embassy contacts fear that President Daniel 
Ortega's failure to name a Minister of Defense before his 
inauguration presages the eventual dismantling/undermining of 
the Ministry, or represents a stall tactic to eventually ease 
Lenin Cerna's wife, Marisol Castillo, into the job over the 
Army's objections.  Senior Ministry officials were told on 
January 8 to turn over all files to an army colonel and a 
minor FSLN-affiliated functionary who was suddenly elevated 
to the position of "temporary administrator" of the Ministry. 
 Anxious officials have begun searching for alternative 
employment, although the Ministry can scarcely afford the 
further loss of civilian expertise.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Ex-Minister of Defense Jose Adan Guerra, who maintains 
close contacts with senior civilian and military officials in 
Nicaragua's defense sector, confirmed to DCM during a recent 
meeting that Ortega decided to name Juan Umana as the interim 
head of the Ministry of Defense after military officials 
rejected the informally proposed nomination of Marisol 
Castillo, the wife of former Sandinista intelligence chief 
Lenin Cerna.  Umana was the technical secretary for the 
Ministry's de-mining commission and the Sandinistas former 
DCM in Moscow during the 1980s.  Guerra does not like or 
trust Umana, who he called a "mole" for the FSLN. 
 
3. (C) Guerra believes the FSLN plans to reduce the authority 
of the Ministry and bring it under the control of the 
Presidency, with Ortega serving as the de facto Minister. 
The party would then submit legislation to abolish the 
Ministry of Defense to make bureaucratic room for a new 
Ministry of Energy.  Guerra mentioned that Nicaraguan law 
establishes a maximum of 12 ministries.  (Note: Law 290 
specifies 12 ministries, although the Ministry of Defense is 
named as one of them.  End Note.)  According to Guerra, the 
Army would gladly trade more direct control by Ortega in 
exchange for the erasure of the civilian control and 
oversight now exercised by the Ministry. 
 
4. (C) In separate conversations with poloff, current 
Ministry officials agreed with Guerra's assessment. 
Inter-Institutional Affairs Director Silvio Diaz claimed that 
the FSLN is "giving us to the Army," and commented that all 
senior Ministry officials were ordered by outgoing Minister 
Avil Ramirez to turn over all of their files to Umana and 
Secretary General of the High Command Colonel Jose Gutierrez. 
 
5. (C) Legal Advisor Gerardo Bravo said that his military 
contacts were acting "very secretive and closed" regarding 
the selection of the new minister, although he heard from 
some contacts that Ortega might name armed forces chief 
General Moises Omar Halleslevens to the position.  Bravo 
noted, however, that such a nomination would require reform 
to the Military Code, as officers are not currently permitted 
to engage in other public duties.  (Note: Milgroup and DAO 
contacts confirmed that Halleslevens was indeed offered the 
position in December, but declined.  End Note.) 
 
6. (C) Guerra, Diaz, and Bravo concurred that the FSLN's 
actions will likely undermine civilian oversight over the 
military, budget transparency, and other goals outlined in 
the Defense White Paper that the USG helped fund (ref A). 
Guerra blamed Ramirez and others in the outgoing 
administration for having "purged and sidelined" 
reform-minded officials, thereby playing into the hands of 
the Sandinistas.  Bravo commented that he is still working on 
a draft of a "National Defense Law" that would strengthen the 
institutional capabilities of the Ministry as per the 
recommendations of the White Paper, which he will present to 
the new administration. 
 
7. (C) Javier Melendez, director of a local think tank 
dedicated to public policy and security studies, agreed that 
Ortega will undermine the Ministry, but blamed Ramirez and 
outgoing President Bolanos for "turning the Ministry into a 
husk" to curry favor with the Army.  Melendez said as much to 
a reporter from a major Nicaraguan daily, who is planning to 
publish his remarks on January 14.  Melendez also plans to 
communicate with regional defense and security experts who 
have consulted with previous administrations and shaped the 
development of the Ministry to urge them to send a public 
letter to Ortega asking the President to maintain and develop 
the Ministry as a viable civilian institution. 
 
8. (C) Comment: Although all of the major parties pledged to 
support the White Paper during a conference last September 
(ref A), the FSLN was reluctant to unequivocally back 
precepts related to the Ministry's authority over defense 
policy and budgets.  Ortega is unlikely to name an 
independent minister or strengthen the Ministry in any way 
that would impede his personal influence over the armed 
forces, and will probably stall or scrap altogether the 
advances made under Guerra.  We also note that in his 
inauguration ceremony remarks, Ortega pointedly observed that 
the Army has its roots in the revolutionary struggle of the 
1970s.  Thanks to Ramirez, most of the defense experts who 
worked on White Paper development were already driven out of 
the Ministry.  Nevertheless, we will continue to encourage 
the new administration to respect the recommendations in the 
White Paper. 
TRIVELLI